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Foreword
Education is widely recognized as a fundamental right and as one of the most 
powerful instruments for economic growth and poverty alleviation. Education is 
critical to the World Bank Group’s mission to end extreme poverty and boost 
shared prosperity in the world by 2030. It also features prominently in the 
Sustainable Development Goals adopted by the United Nations in 2015 to trans-
form the world. The fourth of these global goals calls for access to quality educa-
tion and lifelong learning opportunities for all. In fact, quality education is 
essential for any country aiming for sustained and diversified economic growth. 
The question that policy makers are constantly asking is how to achieve 
 quality in education in the face of daunting challenges. The World Bank’s 
Education Strategy 2020 calls for investing early, investing smartly, and investing 
for all—with a particular emphasis on strengthening education systems and rais-
ing learning outcomes. Worldwide, education systems differ in history, context, 
policy focus, and implementation, as well as results. Through its financing, devel-
opment knowledge, and global partnerships, the World Bank Group aspires to 
bring the best global and comparative evidence to individual country contexts. 
This study, How Shanghai Does It, provides many exciting, valuable, and relevant 
lessons from Shanghai, one of the world’s best-performing education systems 
according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
(OECD’s) Program for International Student Assessment (PISA). 
By analyzing and benchmarking education policies and practices pertaining to 
teachers, school financing, student assessment, and school autonomy and 
accountability, the study provides an unparalleled and comprehensive account of 
the insights and lessons from Shanghai. The account reveals that Shanghai has 
managed to strategically plan, develop, and establish a set of highly coherent and 
synergistic education policies that have together boosted education results. 
Furthermore, the study reveals a second secret—that Shanghai implements its 
education policies consistently and constantly strives to innovate and reform to 
meet new challenges. The breadth of the information and analysis in this study 
is both practical and relevant, not only for education systems aspiring to achieve 
Shanghai’s success, but for Shanghai itself in view of the rapidly changing land-
scape of social demography and educational purpose and technology in the 
region and globally. 
xii Foreword
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One of the most impressive aspects of Shanghai’s education system is its pro-
cess for development and management of teachers. Teaching is a well-respected 
profession, not so much because of the level of pay teachers receive, but 
rather because of the society’s respect for the profession, sustained through 
 long-term, rigorous preservice education and pervasive school-based professional 
 development. Both of these attributes are linked to a well-structured professional 
career ladder and performance evaluation system. Teachers are expected to be 
active researchers who constantly reflect on their pedagogy and implement inno-
vations in relation to student outcomes. Principals are strong instructional leaders 
who can provide guidance on teaching and learning and who understand how 
best to evaluate teachers. Teachers and principals alike maintain a high level of 
professional accountability. 
What Shanghai has to offer the world is not just its past or even its present, 
but the future it intends to create for the country as a leading economy in the 
East Asia and Pacific region, and in the world beyond. In a way, Shanghai itself 
has already moved beyond PISA and is deliberating even harder questions and 
challenges, such as the social-emotional well-being of its children, global citizen-
ship, and environmental consciousness, creativity, and innovation. 
Shanghai’s long-term vision and persistent efforts to reflect on and reform 
long-held educational traditions, values, and practices are a source of inspiration 
to the international education and development community. 
Claudia Maria Costin
Senior Director of Education
World Bank
Bert Hofman
China Country Director
World Bank
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This report, How Shanghai Does It: Insights and Lessons from the Highest-Ranking 
Education System in the World, presents an in-depth examination of how students 
in Shanghai achieved the highest scores in the areas of reading, science, and 
mathematics on a respected global assessment of 15-year-olds’ educational abili-
ties. It documents and benchmarks key policies in Shanghai’s basic education, 
provides evidence on the extent to which these policies have been implemented 
in schools, and explores how these policies and their implementation have 
affected learning outcomes.
The report uses the World Bank’s Systems Approach for Better Education 
Results (SABER) as an organizing framework to organize and benchmark poli-
cies. School-based surveys and other existing research are employed to shed light 
on educational impact and implementation. Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA) 2012 data are used to analyze the variations in 
Shanghai students’ achievement and to examine the extent to which school 
variables may be  associated with variation after accounting for family and stu-
dent background.
Based on the SABER framework and rubric, Shanghai scored “established” and 
“advanced” in almost all areas across four key educational domains: teachers, 
school finance, school autonomy and accountability, and student assessment. 
SABER rated school accountability and role of the school council in governance 
as “emerging” (appendix A).
One finding is that Shanghai has a high degree of coherence between policy 
and implementation. The study does not find significant divergence between 
policy statements and reality. This noteworthy connection between policy and 
implementation can possibly be attributed to a number of factors, including the 
cultural and historical Chinese characteristics of top-down and centralized gov-
ernment administration; close monitoring of the programs and policies and align-
ment of performance with incentives; high levels of professional accountability 
among teachers, principals, and administrators within the education system; and, 
to some extent, modest and realistic policy statements and goals.
Shanghai also stands out for its constant drive to renew and improve its 
 education system and practices. The city has been on a journey of educational 
reform ever since China opened up to the world in the 1800s, when western 
missionaries established new western-style schools. Reform efforts have further 
Executive Summary
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intensified during the past three decades, subsequent to the Cultural Revolution 
in the 1970s. Three key strategic documents issued by the Chinese State Council 
during this period have guided national education reform in three distinct phases. 
The documents include “Decisions about Education System Reform” (1988), 
“Decisions on Deepening Education Reform and Promoting Quality-Oriented 
Education in an All-Round Way” (1999), and “China’s Medium- and Long-Term 
Education Reform and Development Plan Outline” (2010). The city has been a 
pioneer and leader of the national education reform movement and is now mak-
ing plans for new reforms through 2050. The following sections summarize key 
policy highlights and describe some main policy considerations as Shanghai con-
tinues along its educational reform path.
Attracting and Developing an Excellent Teaching Force
Clear learning objectives and standards, compact and well-aligned teaching learn-
ing materials, and efficient evaluation systems for all subjects across all grade 
levels provide the framework for teachers in Shanghai. The Teachers Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (1993) defines teachers’ general obligations and 
working hours. Not only should teachers fulfill teaching contracts and carry out 
the school teaching plan, but they should also dedicate themselves to the moral, 
physical, and intellectual development of students and organize relevant student 
learning activities. The Teachers Law also requires teachers to improve their own 
moral ethics and pedagogical expertise. Teacher responsibilities go beyond the 
classroom to encompass professional development and extracurricular activities.
Teaching in Shanghai is an attractive and respected middle-class profession. 
The working conditions, such as educational facilities and student-to-teacher 
ratios, are attractive, and clear career advancement mechanisms are in place. 
Shanghai requires at least a three-year tertiary education for primary school 
teachers and a four-year university education for secondary school teachers. In 
practice, however, the academic requirement is more stringent, and most teach-
ers in Shanghai have at least a bachelor’s degree. Teachers fulfill a one-year pro-
bationary period before being formally hired by the school districts.
The city offers teachers incentives to teach in hard-to-staff rural and semi-
urban schools. It transfers and rotates teachers to help underperforming schools 
and disadvantaged student populations. Teachers and principals working in 
 hardship areas can advance more quickly in their careers. Although Shanghai 
does not face a critical teacher shortage in any particular subject, a disparity 
remains in the allocation of teachers and other resources between rural and 
 central urban districts.
Recruitment criteria for school principals are high and stringently adhered 
to, with a clear focus on instructional leadership. But detailed qualification 
requirements vary across districts. Principals in Shanghai participate in various 
leadership programs, based on the “Professional Standards for Basic Education 
Principals,” over the course of their tenure. Principals have opportunities for career 
advancement. The city links part of principals’ pay to the overall performance of 
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their schools. It also explicitly expects principals to be instructional leaders. Most 
principals in Shanghai observe between 30 and 50 classes per semester and 
 provide feedback to teachers.
Results from a series of student assessments serve a diagnostic purpose for 
monitoring and evaluating teachers. Teacher performance is monitored using 
multiple mechanisms, not just students’ academic achievement. These processes 
include frequent district-level inspections of teachers’ work and classroom obser-
vations by senior teachers and principals.
Shanghai designs professional development activities to be collaborative 
and to focus on instructional improvement. School principals are responsible 
for creating targeted teacher training plans based on each teacher’s evaluation 
results. Professional development is often a substantial part of schools’ opera-
tional expenditure. The city pairs weak and inexperienced teachers with high-
performing and experienced ones. Important platforms for teacher professional 
development and performance evaluation—teaching-research groups and lesson 
observations—are also practiced universally in schools. Teachers are expected to 
be researchers who would evaluate and modify their own pedagogy in relation 
to student outcomes. The city requires new teachers to complete at least 360 
hours of professional development in their first five years of service, and an addi-
tional 540 hours to be considered for a senior rank.
The city rewards good teachers. Performance affects promotional opportuni-
ties, and a small part of teacher pay reflects workload and performance. Policy 
guidelines require teachers to be accredited once every five years to continue 
teaching. The city can dismiss teachers for misconduct, child abuse, or poor per-
formance, but these events are rare. In cases of poor performance, transfers and 
early retirement are the more commonly observed reprimanding practices.
Overall, Shanghai is characterized by a coherent and comprehensive sys-
tem of teacher professional development that incorporates multiple layers of 
in-service training, school-based teacher research groups, evaluation of teacher 
performance, and a structured career ladder that provides both motivation and a 
mechanism for teachers to progress in their careers, which is key to Shanghai’s 
demonstrated excellence in education.
Financing Education for Quality and Equity
Detailed policies and regulations are in place to ensure minimum educational 
inputs of infrastructure, staffing norms, learning materials, and teacher qualifica-
tions. The education budget is channeled to schools via teacher salaries,  capital 
investment, and an operational budget based on the number of students. 
However, because of the decentralized nature of education financing, in which 
each district finances its own basic education, disparities remain across districts 
and between city and rural schools. Shanghai’s public expenditure on education 
as a share of GDP was about 3.5 percent in 2013, a smaller proportion than 
spent by other high-performing economies such as Finland, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea, and the United States.
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The system increasingly designs education financing to ensure that it lifts 
all students’ learning outcomes by assisting low-performing schools and  districts 
through financial and other means. Shanghai has discarded the inequitable 
basic education “key school” system1 and is instead focusing on making every 
neighborhood school excellent. Innovative financing instruments such as 
“entrusted  management,” which pairs low-performing schools with high- 
performing peer institutions, is rapidly gaining support. The municipal govern-
ment transfers half of education surplus taxes to economically weak districts 
and mandates that top secondary schools reserve some spaces for middle school 
graduates from poor districts. 
Shanghai closely monitors the school management environment and teaching-
learning outcomes. The municipality collects school and district data annually. 
However, Shanghai could improve the way it uses information and communi-
cations technologies to collect data. Efforts are being made in this regard. In 
2010, based on the lessons from PISA, the Shanghai Municipal Education 
Commission established its own quality-monitoring system called “Green 
Indicators of Academic Quality of Primary and Secondary School Students,” also 
known as Green Indicators. The main objective was to assess school quality holis-
tically, including academic rigor, teaching motivation, and student-teacher rela-
tionships. Shanghai has a city-level system for determining the school’s annual 
calendar, and mechanisms are in place to monitor the availability of school learn-
ing materials and physical resources.
Education budgeting is based on adequate and transparent information and 
made available to the public. Data are collected at the school and district level to 
adequately inform future budget planning. Internal and external audit systems 
are in place to verify the use of educational resources. Schools that fail internal 
or external audits receive legal sanctions.
Shanghai has specific policies to assist disadvantaged students with education 
expenses. The city provides free school meals for migrant children and students 
living below the poverty line, and provides education subsidies to students with 
disabilities or economic hardships. Shanghai has made more progress in attaining 
equitable access to schooling than any other region in China according to the 
2015 National Compulsory Education Quality Monitoring Assessment.2 Migrant 
children, however, continue to face barriers in accessing local public compulsory 
education schools. These children cannot always produce the necessary docu-
ments to prove their family’s working status and they cannot access Shanghai’s 
public senior secondary schools after completing the nine-year basic education. 
The city should further implement special education and strengthen efforts to 
help migrant and other disadvantaged children.
Balancing School Autonomy and Accountability
Schools in Shanghai are afforded a high level of autonomy in planning and man-
aging the school budget. Budget planning is a collaborative and multistep process. 
After receiving budget approval from the district Department of Finance and the 
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municipal government, schools can execute the budget under defined categories. 
Schools have limited influence over teachers’ base pay scale, which is set at the 
municipal level, but have the autonomy to allocate merit-based pay. The school 
wage bill is divided into two parts: The base salary of teachers makes up 70 per-
cent of the total wage budget. The remaining 30 percent is distributed on the 
basis of work load and performance. Schools tend to have more say in determin-
ing the salaries of nonteaching staff. Public schools have less autonomy than 
private schools, particularly in their ability to raise funds. Detailed guidelines 
are in place for regulating financial management and transparency standards in 
public and private schools. Compliance failure leads to legal sanctions.
Schools have substantial autonomy in personnel management. Based on their 
district, schools have varying levels of autonomy to appoint and dismiss teachers. 
Schools in principle have the authority to hire and fire teachers, but in practice 
they can only hire additional teachers if their quota is raised. Otherwise they can 
only hire teachers on short-term contracts. Teachers are rarely fired. The hiring 
and deployment process for nonteaching staff is more flexible. Mechanisms are 
in place for schools to participate in teacher recruitment and select the preferred 
candidates.
Private school principals in Shanghai tend to exercise greater autonomy 
over staff and pay-related decisions than do public school principals. Shanghai 
does not have a uniform municipal-level policy on the appointment and deploy-
ment of principals; districts have the authority to establish their own processes. 
Districts usually maintain and cultivate a pool of principal candidates over a 
sustained period before formal recruitment.
In addition to complying with financial management guidelines, schools 
are also accountable for school management and learning outcomes. The city 
inspects schools annually and comprehensively evaluates them with the Green 
Indicators. It uses a well-established and frequently administered system of 
school assessments to inform teaching practices and make necessary adjustments 
and also conducts citywide examinations annually at the end of ninth and twelfth 
grades. China’s first nationwide basic-education quality assessment was con-
ducted in 2015. Shanghai is also the first Chinese province or city to have par-
ticipated in the international PISA since 2009. The rich set of student data helps 
policy makers track student learning outcome trends. One positive observation is 
that Shanghai has made an effort not to rank or publish individual student exam 
results or to use exam results as an explicit mechanism for teacher rewards or 
sanctions.
Shanghai schools have some autonomy in curriculum and pedagogy. At the 
central level, the Ministry of Education sets overall national curriculum standards 
for all subjects. Shanghai, along with a few selected provinces, is allowed to have 
its own curriculum and has released its subject-specific “Curriculum Plan for 
Regular Elementary and Secondary Schools in Shanghai.” Shanghai schools fur-
ther have the autonomy to design 30 percent of the curriculum as school-based 
curriculum, according to each school’s strengths and the areas of their curricular 
focus. Furthermore, teachers have a certain level of pedagogical autonomy.
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The system promotes and maintains professional accountability through rela-
tions within the teaching staff and through the execution of in-service teacher 
training and monitoring procedures. As school principals and senior teachers 
engage with others through teaching-research groups and through other support 
and mentoring methods, professional accountability becomes more apparent.
Public schools are not mandated to have school councils but follow the 
“school principal responsibility system,” in which principals make key decisions, 
usually in consultation with party secretaries and increasingly in consultation 
with teacher staff associations. Private schools in Shanghai are legally required 
to establish “school boards.” Although the boards participate in decision making 
on general planning and budgeting, they are generally not involved in profes-
sional teaching and learning matters. Parent-teacher associations, formed begin-
ning in 2012, are limited to supporting basic school management tasks and 
helping students learn at home. There is no city guideline, manual, or policy regu-
lating the participation of the community in school activities and learning inputs.
No explicit policies or public forums are in place for expressing accountability 
to stakeholders. Communities and parents trust educational professionals to 
manage their professional affairs and to educate.
Creating an Effective Student Assessment System
The common formats for student assessment used in China and Shanghai are 
those of continuous and formative classroom assessments, summative examina-
tions particularly at the end of ninth grade (zhong kao) and twelfth grade (gao 
kao), and national and international large-scale assessments. Classroom assess-
ments are frequent and are executed in a variety of formats, such as quizzes, oral 
tests, presentations, home assignments, and so forth, allowing students greater 
possibilities for demonstrating their learning based on their abilities than afforded 
by summative examinations that mostly tend to be written tests. 
There are clear guidelines on assessment standards, and efforts have been 
made to align these standards with appropriate, age-relevant expected learning 
outcomes. It has been ascertained that efforts are made to monitor the quality 
of assessments at the school level, and the data are effectively used to inform 
teaching-learning and future assessment practices in the classroom. As part of 
government efforts to improve education quality the State Council formally 
rolled out the Plan for National Compulsory Education Quality Monitoring in 
April 2015. In 2011, the Shanghai Municipal Educational Commission also 
launched a series of surveys entitled “Green Indicators of Academic Quality of 
Primary and Secondary School Students.” The surveys aim to improve educa-
tional management and the educational ecology. The indicators include student 
academic achievement, student learning motivation, student academic workload, 
teacher-student relations, teachers’ instruction styles, and the annual progress on 
such indicators. The surveys are aimed at all primary and junior secondary stu-
dents in the compulsory education stage. To further improve classroom assess-
ment, the municipal and district-level Teaching Research Offices undertake 
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regular research projects on the status of student assessments to inform policy 
decisions.
Senior secondary entrance and graduation exams are well-recognized social 
events in Shanghai and are closely followed by students, parents, educators, and 
the media. Effective execution of these exams is enabled by a well-structured 
system with clear policy guidelines, regular funding, and sufficient and well-
trained human resources. These exams are aligned with learning goals for stu-
dents and teachers. These exams are considered high in quality and transparent 
and fair in process. However, the exams are often blamed for creating high 
 pressure on students and motivating schools and teachers to teach to the test. 
Exam test scores almost exclusively determine whether a student can attend a 
university and which tier.3 To alleviate the fear parents and students have of these 
examinations, the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission is currently 
 making an effort to revise the gao kao and zhong kao exams to make them more 
flexible. The new formats will be rolled out in 2017–18. 
Shanghai is one of the pioneer Chinese provinces to participate in interna-
tional large-scale assessments. It performed outstandingly on the 2009 and 2012 
PISA and garnered significant national and international attention for its educa-
tional success. The enabling context for its participation in PISA, which includes 
the presences of clear policy guidelines, necessary funding, and effective human 
resources, were assessed at the “advanced” level. However, it scored rather poorly 
on its policy goal of ensuring effective use of the data generated through such 
international assessments.
Linking Policies and Implementation to Learning Outcomes
The extent to which Shanghai’s education policies and practices foster learning 
outcomes is revealed in the 2012 PISA results. Variations are substantial across 
educational programs, with upper secondary students performing better than 
lower secondary, and model or experimental senior secondary students perform-
ing better than those from vocational schools. Overall, model or experimental 
upper secondary school students scored the highest across math, science, and 
reading. Shanghai also emerged as one of the most equitable education systems 
among the PISA participants, with the highest proportion of disadvantaged stu-
dents performing among the top 25 percent of students after controlling for 
socioeconomic status.
The between-program variation in PISA scores is greater than the within-
program variation, indicating that the system efficiently places students into 
 different programs at the end of lower secondary school based on test scores. 
However, the analysis performed for this report was able to show that within 
each of the program types, policies and practices at the school level play a 
 significant role in explaining students’ PISA performance. School factors that are 
positively associated with PISA performance largely fall into the following cate-
gories: educational resources, extracurricular activities, principal instructional 
leadership, curriculum autonomy (slightly negative on math performance in 
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lower secondary school), accountability (vocational schools with more parental 
pressure do better in math), and teacher participation in school governance 
(positive on math at the upper secondary level).
Moreover, individual and family background characteristics have demon-
strated consistent correlation with student performance across academic pro-
grams. Girls perform significantly worse on math and science and better on 
reading than boys, consistent with findings from other PISA participants.4 Home 
educational resources, cultural possessions, and parental education are positively 
associated with student literacy. In contrast, family wealth is negatively related to 
performance. Students who have attended at least a year of preschool perform 
significantly better on all three domains.
Policy Considerations for Shanghai
The comprehensive assessment and benchmarking of education policies provides 
an opportunity to reflect on a few considerations for Shanghai.
Consider delaying tracking to tenth grade or later. The zhong kao exam after 
ninth grade tracks students into three distinct senior secondary programs with 
very little horizontal mobility between programs. Cumulative differences in 
endowment in teachers and other resources further accentuate the disparity in 
education quality among programs. Shanghai could potentially pilot eliminating 
the zhong kao and delaying tracking to tenth or twelfth grades like other advanced 
nations and provide more curriculum diversification. 
Increase assistance to migrant and other disadvantaged children. Shanghai has 
proactively enacted policies and approaches to expand education services to 
migrant and other disadvantaged children. However, the current eligibility crite-
ria of three years of residency and employment may need to be relaxed to allow 
more migrant children to enroll in local public or government-sponsored private 
schools. “Disadvantaged” children are required to update their status every year 
to qualify for assistance, which could ostracize them further. The city does not 
allow migrant children to enroll in its public senior secondary schools, limiting 
their potential. 
Expand the role of parents, the community, and society in education. Parent-teacher 
associations are a fairly new practice and tend to have limited responsibilities. At 
the same time, many anecdotes and isolated studies seem to indicate some dissat-
isfaction with the public education system. Shanghai could consider expanding the 
role of parents, the community, and society in general in the  education system. 
Further explore the role of public-private partnerships to address the last-mile 
issues in education service delivery. Promising initiatives such as entrusted manage-
ment of low-performing schools and purchase of education services from private 
providers could be scaled up and formally institutionalized.
Find a healthier balance between academic excellence and students’ social and 
emotional well-being. Though not explicitly discussed in this report, students in 
Shanghai report more unhappiness and parental pressure compared with their 
international peers. The city could further encourage institutions to engage in 
Executive Summary xxv
How Shanghai Does It • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0790-9 
evidence-based education research and public education debates. It could also 
continue to build a virtuous cycle of reform and development toward an educa-
tion system that is even more competitive globally.
Notes
 1. “Key schools” were schools selected for their records of educational accomplishment 
and were given priority in assignment of teachers, equipment, and funds. In practice, 
key schools favored urban areas and were allowed to admit and train high-achieving 
students for entrance into top universities. The practice was gradually abolished 
 beginning in the late 1980s in stages across different regions of the country.
 2. China implemented its first national compulsory education quality assessment 
in 2015. The sample included about 200,000 fourth- and eighth-grade students in 
6,474 primary and middle schools in 323 counties or districts from the 31 Chinese 
provinces as well as autonomous regions. Students were tested in the two subjects of 
mathematics and physical education/health. More than 100,000 teachers responded 
to teacher surveys.
 3. Chinese universities are grouped into four tiers: first-tier universities consist of 
the best Chinese universities; second-tier universities are regular tertiary degree 
 universities; third-tier universities are mainly provincial or city-level universities; 
and the fourth tier are mainly tertiary technical and vocational education and train-
ing colleges. The Ministry of Education announces cutoff scores for each tier after 
the exam.
 4. On the 2009 PISA, boys outperformed girls in mathematics in 35 of the 65 partici-
pating countries and economies. In 5 countries, girls outperformed boys, and in 
25 countries there was no significant difference between the genders. (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]. 2011. PISA 2009 at a 
Glance. Paris: OECD Publishing, Paris. http://dx.doi.org /10.1787/9789264095298-en.)
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Introduction 
Background
The release of the 2012 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Programme for International Student Assessment 
(PISA) results has sparked another round of discussion and comparison of 
 student achievement across the globe. PISA is an international assessment that 
measures the capabilities of 15-year-olds in reading, science, and mathematical 
literacy. In addition, PISA surveys participating students, parents, and school 
principals on a wide range of detailed and internationally comparable measures 
of background information, covering students’ family characteristics and institu-
tional features of the school systems. PISA has been conducted once every three 
years since 2000. Specifically, PISA 2012 tested mathematics literacy in depth 
and updated the assessment of student performance in reading and science in 
65 economies. The 2012 PISA also included modules on problem-solving skills 
and financial literacy.
Among the 65 participating economies in 2012, Shanghai, China, ranked 
first in mathematics literacy, with a mean score of 613 points, which is 
119 points higher than the OECD average (equivalent to approximately three 
years of schooling). Hong Kong SAR, China; Japan; the Republic of Korea; 
Liechtenstein; Macao SAR, China; the Netherlands; Singapore; Switzerland; 
and Taiwan, China, were among the top 10 performers in mathematics. 
Shanghai also achieved the highest scores in reading and science. Shanghai 
first participated in the PISA tests in 2009 when it also ranked highest in the 
three subjects.
An intense discussion has been trailing the Shanghai PISA story since 
2009, ranging from initial questioning of the true representativeness of 
the sample, to attempting to discredit Shanghai’s results by saying that 
Shanghai is not China, or attributing Shanghai and East Asian achievements 
to merely “Confucius,” culture, or parental emphasis on education. In paral-
lel, professional efforts have also tried to “demystify” Shanghai’s secrets. 
Most prominently, Tom Friedman shared his observations on Shanghai’s 
2 Introduction 
How Shanghai Does It • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0790-9
elementary schools in his article “The Shanghai Secret” in the opinions pages 
of the New York Times on October 22, 2013: 
When you sit in on a class here and meet with the principal and teachers, what you 
find is a relentless focus on all the basics that we know make for high-performing 
schools but that are difficult to pull off consistently across an entire school system. 
These are: a deep commitment to teacher training, peer-to-peer learning and 
 constant professional development, a deep involvement of parents in their chil-
dren’s learning, an insistence by the school’s leadership on the highest standards and 
a culture that prizes education and respects teachers.
In a similar but more global fashion, the OECD put together a series of country 
education highlights focusing on high-performing countries in a short video 
 program “Strong Performers and Successful Reformers” in 2012. In the video, 
Shanghai’s success was largely attributed to government leadership and a policy 
focus on improving low-performing schools.
Missing from the picture, however, is a more comprehensive, systematic, 
 in-depth, and objective rendition of the policies and practices of basic education 
in Shanghai, benchmarked against others in key dimensions. This report, there-
fore, is an attempt to systematically organize and document the policy and 
implementation efforts in the realm of basic education in Shanghai. The report 
uses an existing systems diagnostic and benchmarking tool developed by the 
World Bank, the Systems Approach for Better Education Results, or SABER, 
along with supplemental data from school-level principal surveys, existing stud-
ies carried out mostly in Chinese, and additional data and information on educa-
tion expenditures and labor force surveys.
The report also provides extensive analysis of student performance on the 
2012 PISA and makes an effort to identify school-level variables that are 
 correlated with variation in student performance across Shanghai. The report 
attempts to adopt a systems approach, but particular emphasis is placed on 
teachers, education financing, balancing autonomy and accountability, and 
 student assessment.
The report has three broad audiences in mind. The most relevant audience 
would be education policy makers from other countries and the rest of China 
interested in learning more about Shanghai’s education system and policies. 
A second audience would be the relevant education authorities in Shanghai and 
China, given that the report attempts to benchmark Shanghai against other 
systems and in the process identify highlights, challenges, and recommendations 
for future reform in light of other countries’ experiences. Finally, because of its 
scope and depth, the report can serve as an important review for education 
researchers and policy analysts and help direct future education research efforts 
in Shanghai.
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C h A P T E R  1
Overview of Shanghai and 
Its Education System 
Introduction
Located on the eastern shore of China, Shanghai is the country’s most populous 
city, inhabited by 23 million people as of 2013. Administratively, Shanghai has 
been granted provincial status (along with Beijing, Guangzhou, and Chongqing). 
As a province Shanghai is divided into 16 county-level divisions or districts. Even 
though every district has its own urban core, a few districts collectively form the 
main city while the others form the suburban part, composed of satellite towns 
and rural areas farther away from the urban core.
Since the Chinese government shifted to more open economic policies in 
1978, Shanghai has become one of the largest economic centers in China, with 
annual GDP per capita close to US$12,000, nearing the World Bank’s high-
income threshold. The manufacturing and services sectors contribute 48 percent 
and 51 percent, respectively, to the city’s overall economy; agriculture contrib-
utes barely 1 percent.
In 2010, the Port of Shanghai overtook the Port of Singapore to become 
the world's busiest container port. In 2014, the Port of Shanghai set a historic 
record by handling more than 35 million containers. Shanghai has already set its 
mid- and long-term development goals: to build the city into one of the finest 
 economic, finance, trade, and shipping centers in the world and to realize its 
vision of becoming a modern socialist international metropolis by 2020. Shanghai 
also leads the nation in educational achievement—19 percent of the adult 
 population possess higher education degrees and another 26 percent have 
attained high school education, as compared with 8.9 percent and 14 percent 
nationwide.1
China has a centralized leadership structure but a decentralized government 
administration system, delicately balancing the authority of the central govern-
ment with the autonomy and flexibility of local administration. The central 
Ministry of Education is responsible for education nationwide, in charge of 
 formulating national development goals and plans for education, and for 
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developing guidelines and policies in all educational domains and monitoring 
their implementation. However, provinces and municipalities, including 
Shanghai, maintain a relatively high level of autonomy for developing localized 
policies, implementation and financing strategies, and province-specific goals 
and targets. A centerpiece of decentralization is education financing. In the 
1980s, the Chinese government reformed education financing from a central-
ized system with a narrow revenue base to a decentralized system with a diversi-
fied and larger revenue system. With the guidance of upper-level educational 
committees and bureaus, county-level governments became responsible for the 
financing of compulsory education. The decentralized education financing pol-
icy is at the heart of the education outcome disparities between provinces and 
between rural and urban areas (Ngok 2007). 
Education affairs in Shanghai are managed by the Shanghai Municipal 
Education Commission, under the Chinese Ministry of Education. As shown in 
figure 1.1, the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission shoulders the major 
responsibility for educational affairs in Shanghai, in particular the financing and 
provision of affiliated institutions of higher education. Although a few key higher 
education institutes are directly financed and managed by the central Ministry of 
Education, most of Shanghai’s universities and colleges are financed and man-
aged by the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission. At the same time, 
Figure 1.1 Shanghai Education Management
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 district (in urban areas) and county (in rural areas) governments are responsi-
ble for the financing and provision of preprimary education, the  nine-year basic 
education, and senior secondary education. 
Figure 1.2 illustrates the educational structure in Shanghai. Basic education 
(also known as compulsory education in China) includes primary education (first 
through fifth grades) and secondary education (sixth through ninth grades).2 
Shanghai’s education system has evolved to be the best in the nation in access, 
equity, and quality. Enrollment in the nine-year basic education has remained 
about 99.9 percent in the past few years, slightly higher than the national average 
of 99.7 percent. The promotion rate among junior middle graduates was 
96  percent in 2013 compared with 91.2 percent nationwide.3 Among the 
1.2 million basic education students, almost 47 percent, or 0.57 million, were 
migrant children in 2013. Shanghai achieved a remarkable outcome by enrolling 
77 percent of those migrant children in neighborhood public schools and the 
remaining 23 percent in private schools but with the municipal government 
covering all tuition and fees. 
After completing the nine years of compulsory education, Chinese students, 
including those in Shanghai, are tracked into various streams of senior secondary 
education programs strictly based on the scores from the junior secondary gradu-
ation examination (zhong kao). The streams are general academic or vocational.4 
Within the academic track, there are two further types of programs or schools: 
Figure 1.2 Shanghai Education Structure
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the most elite model or experimental senior secondary schools and regular senior 
secondary schools. Competition is fierce for spots in the model senior secondary 
schools, which also tend to have the highest proportion of graduates entering the 
elite and first-tier universities in China or world-class universities abroad. 
The government is the dominant financer and provider of education in 
Shanghai and China, especially in the compulsory education period. Data from 
the 2012 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) confirm that 
only about 10 percent of regular junior secondary and vocational schools are 
private.5 Figure 1.3 presents trends in private enrollment in all levels of education 
using official data. Private schools that provide compulsory education (within the 
citizen education track) are nonprofit organizations regulated by the Bureau of 
Education.6 They tend to follow the same curriculum as public schools, and most 
receive government funding in various forms including per student subsidies and 
teacher training, and they can be eligible for specific project funding. 
Table 1.1 presents key information about the size of the Shanghai system and 
the endowment of teachers. It is important to note that although Shanghai over-
all has fairly low pupil-to-teacher ratios in preprimary, primary, junior secondary, 
and even senior secondary education, the average class size is almost triple 
the pupil-to-teacher ratio. This results from the way teaching and classes are 
 organized. Within each grade there are a number of classroom sections. Each 
section hosts a group of students that take the same classes and courses 
with the same teachers and progress to the next grade together. The general 
basic education subjects include Chinese, math, English, crafts, art, music, 
 physical education, information technology, and natural sciences. In addition, 
primary school  students take ethics and social studies, and secondary school 
 students take  science, physics, chemistry, biology, history, geography, fine art, and 
political  science and ethics. 
Figure 1.3 Percentage of Private Enrollment in Shanghai by Level and Year
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Source: Data from Shanghai Statistical Yearbook: Education 2014 (http://www.stats-sh.gov.cn/data/toTjnj.xhtml?y=2014e). 
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As in most other Asian countries, segregation of curriculum and pedagogy by 
subject is the norm and one of the key characteristics of the Chinese education 
system and philosophy. School children, beginning in first grade, are taught by 
teachers who are trained and recruited by subject. Each key subject teacher is 
responsible for teaching that subject. Depending on the school, teachers might 
be teaching different classes in the same grade or  different classes across grades, 
but only in one subject. However, teachers of noncore subjects such as music, 
arts, and information technology could teach more subjects.
In 2009 Shanghai participated for the first time in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) PISA and ranked first in 
all three subjects (math, reading, and science) (OECD 2009). In 2012, Shanghai 
continued to be the top performer (OECD 2014). Its mean mathematics score 
of 613 points, representing a 4.2 percent annualized increase from 2009, is 
119 points above the OECD average, the equivalent of nearly three years of 
schooling. Its mean score of 570 points in reading represents annualized improve-
ment of 4.6 percent since 2009, the equivalent of more than a year-and-a-half of 
schooling above the OECD average of 496 points. Its mean score in science, 580, 
is more than three-quarters of a proficiency level above the OECD average of 
501. Furthermore, Shanghai is also home to the largest proportion of top per-
formers (proficient at level 5 or 6) in mathematics (55.4 percent), reading 
(25.1 percent), and science (27.2 percent). With 55.4 percent of students attain-
ing level 5 or 6 in mathematics, Shanghai is the only PISA participant with more 
students at these top levels than in any other level (table 1.2). 
Moreover, Shanghai has one of the most equal education systems among 
PISA participants. For example, it has the highest proportion of resilient stu-
dents (19.2 percent), that is, disadvantaged students who perform among the 
top 25 percent of students across all participating countries and economies 
after controlling for socioeconomic status. The strength of the relationship 
between mathematics performance and socioeconomic status is also below the 
OECD average.
Table 1.1 Key Characteristics of Shanghai’s Education System, 2014–15
Indicator Preprimary Primary
Junior 
secondary
Senior 
secondary
Secondary 
vocational
Number of schools 1,462 757 522 246 104
Number of classes 16,468 20,491 20,491 12,455 4,565
Number of full-time teachers 51,022 41,366 36,049 14,272 8,358
Student enrollment 501,030 792,476 436,696 156,817 153,298
Student-to-teacher ratio 10 19 12 11 18
Average class size 30 39 35 34 —
Gross enrollment ratio, 
Shanghai (percent) 99.0 99.9 99.9 96.0 —
Gross enrollment ratio, China 
(percent) 67.5 99.7 104 86.0 —
Note: — = not available. 
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Education Development in Shanghai
Shanghai has a history of constant renewal and has been a national champion 
of various reforms, including in education. Ever since China opened up to the 
world in the mid-nineteenth century, when western missionaries started to 
establish western-style schools, Shanghai has been at the forefront of a relent-
less crusade to update its education system and policies in line with its social 
and economic development. Table 1A.1 describes the main stages of the evolu-
tion of the development of education in Shanghai. The beginning of socialism 
in China in 1949 laid the foundation for public education for all and empha-
sized the cultivation of skills to help build the new socialist country. After 
the unfortunate disintegration of education during the decade-long Cultural 
Revolution, the Chinese government vowed to resuscitate education and has 
called for rounds of education reform during the past three decades to bring 
education in line with the requirements of modern Chinese society. Three stra-
tegic documents so far have guided the overall direction of reform: (1) the 
1988 State Council “Decisions about Education System Reform,” (2) the 1999 
State Council “Decisions on Deepening Education Reform and Promoting 
Quality-Oriented Education in an All-Round Way,” and (3) the 2010 State 
Council “China’s Medium- and Long-Term Education Reform and Development 
Plan Outline.” Shanghai has closely followed the central government’s reform 
guidance and has been driving education reform accordingly, becoming a 
national champion of education innovation. 
Shanghai is now beginning to undertake a “Comprehensive Education 
Reform” as one of the pilot cities in China. This phase of education reform 
will entail policies that would further emphasize bridging the quality and 
access gap and promoting child-centered teaching and learning, the innova-
tion and creativity needed for developing 21st-century skills, and lifelong 
learning.
Table 1.2 Snapshot of Performance on PISA 2012 in Math, Reading, and Science in Shanghai 
and OECD Average
Indicators Shanghai OECD average
Mathematics Mean score 613 494
Share of low achievers (below level 2) (percent) 3.8 23.0
Share of top performers (level 5 or 6) (percent) 55.4 12.6
Annualized change in score points (2009–12) 4.2 −0.3
Reading Mean score 570 496
Annualized change in score points (2009–12) 4.6 0.3
Science Mean score 580 501
Annualized change in score points (2009–12) 1.8 0.5
Source: Data from OECD 2014.
Note: The annualized change is the average annual change in PISA score points from a country’s/economy’s earliest 
participation in PISA to PISA 2012. It is calculated taking into account all of a country’s/economy’s participation in PISA. 
OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; PISA = Programme for International Student 
Assessment. 
Overview of Shanghai and Its Education System  9
How Shanghai Does It • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0790-9 
Table 1A.1 Development Phases for Shanghai’s Basic Educational Reforms (19th Century to Present)
Phases Key national events Shanghai impact and activities Outcomes
The beginning of 
western 
influence on 
Shanghai 
education 
(1843–1949)
• Treaty of Nanking (1842): 
International trading 
relations
• Self-Strengthening 
Movement (1861–95): 
Adoption of western 
knowledge and skills
• War of Resistance against 
Japan (1928–45)
• International influence on local 
education practices
• New-style schools set up by 
western missionaries
• Teacher training institutions 
emerge in Shanghai
• By 1940s, an independent 
system created by missionaries
• Shanghai implements the 
national education system 
(1945–49)
• Emergence of a 
multidimensional structure of 
education
• Institutionalization of teacher 
training
• Cross-learning and translations 
of western literature in 
Chinese scripts
Expansion of 
mass schooling 
(1949–66)
• The People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) founded in 
1949
• More than 20 new higher 
education institutions 
(including two normal 
universities for teacher training) 
set up
• Several new schools set up 
under the first five-year plan
• Vocational education 
introduced for agricultural 
communities and 
manufacturing industry
• Initiation of a public education 
system for all citizens
• Popularization of education 
among the working class
• Cultivation of experts and 
engineers with higher 
education for the new republic
A period of 
educational 
disintegration 
(1966–76)
• “The Cultural Revolution”
• Education viewed as a 
means of political 
indoctrination
• Centralized planning
• Several conventional schools 
and colleges closed down
• Students, teachers, and 
intellectuals sent to villages to 
be “re-educated” in Maoist 
theories and lifestyle
• Historical scriptures and cultural 
relics destroyed
• Curriculum and administration 
controlled centrally
• Reversal of educational 
progress
• Educational deprivation for an 
entire generation
• Stifling of diversity and 
educational innovation
• Loss in secondary and higher 
education
Structural 
rehabilitation, 
reorientation, 
and expansion 
of education 
(1977–99)
• Establishment of the 
National Education 
Committee (1985)
• Decentralization and 
marketization
• Key policies: Compulsory 
Education Law (1986); 
Decisions about 
Education System Reform 
(1988); The Program for 
Educational Reform and 
Development in China 
(1993); Teachers Law of 
the PRC (1993); Education 
Law (1995); Vocational 
Law (1996); Higher 
Education Law (1998) 
• The Qingpu experiment 
(1977–92): Focused on 
improving teaching method in 
mathematics; was successful in 
raising students’ performance; 
later extended to other subjects, 
and influenced teaching-
learning practices nationally 
• Shanghai becomes the first city 
to achieve universal primary 
and secondary education (1985)
• Shanghai assumes greater local 
control over education
• Local curriculum reform era I 
(1986–97): Focused on textbook 
content, subject categories, 
pedagogy, disciplinary 
approach, and assessment 
orientation
• Nationwide drive to learn and 
teach
• Legalization of various 
educational provisions
• Devolution of power to local 
authorities
• Education linked with 
economic modernization
• Universalization of nine-year 
school completion
• Popularization of general and 
vocational higher education
• Move away from standardized 
national textbooks to 
experimentation and diversity
• Emergence of Shanghai as an 
educational model
table continues next page
Annex 1A
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Table 1A.1 Development Phases for Shanghai’s Basic Educational Reforms (19th Century to Present) (continued)
Phases Key national events Shanghai impact and activities Outcomes
Quality and 
equity 
orientation 
(1999–2009)
• Decisions on Deepening 
Education Reform and 
Promoting Quality-
Oriented Education in an 
All-Round Way (1999)
• The Decision about 
Reform and Development 
on Basic Education (2001)
• The Decision about 
Further Strengthening 
Education Work in Rural 
Areas (2001)
• Revised Compulsory 
Education Law of the 
PRC (2006)
• Local curriculum reform era II 
(1999–2007): Elaborated on 
student-centered and lifelong 
learning, initiative taking and 
practical ability, and basic 
principles of curriculum reform 
with sufficient autonomy for 
individual schools
• An elaborate construction 
criterion released for primary 
and secondary schools in 
Shanghai (2004)
• Large-scale off-school tutoring 
prohibited (2006)
• An evaluation schedule for 
primary and secondary 
students’ comprehensive ability 
released in Shanghai (2006)
• Policies to promote educational 
equity in the suburbs (2007)
• Shanghai participates in 2009 
PISA, and tops the rankings
• Overall revitalization of the 
education system: educational 
thought, systems, content, and 
methods
• Weakening of previous 
obsession with examinations
• Revision of learning styles; 
move away from subject-
centered rote learning to 
integrated problem solving
• Emphasis on equity and 
quality of educational 
opportunity for rural and 
migrant populations
• Achievement of almost 
universal (99.7 percent) 
primary and secondary 
education in 2009
• Generation of international 
attention for Shanghai’s 
educational achievement 
and practices
For the lifelong 
development 
of every 
student 
(2010–present)
• The release of the Outline 
of National Medium- and 
Long-Term Education 
Reform and Development 
Plan (2010)
• The ratio of education 
expenditure to GDP 
reaches 4 percent (2012)
• Promotion of the 
separation of 
administration, running, 
and evaluation in 
education domain from 
the government’s 
functions (2015)
• The joint construction of 
National Education 
Comprehensive Reform Base 
between Shanghai municipality 
and the central government 
(2010): To speed up 
modernization process of 
Shanghai education, via 
strengthening of local ability to 
support national strategies
• Criterion for running 
compulsory schools released 
(2011)
• Green Indicators of Academic 
Quality of Primary and 
Secondary School Students 
released (2011)
• Shanghai tops the rankings in 
PISA 2012, again
• Notice for executing pilot 
construction of school-based 
educational quality guarantee 
system, Shanghai (2015)
• Acknowledgment of the issues 
of cultural diversity; students’ 
individual requirements; and 
teachers’ work, professional 
development, and life quality
• Expansion of policies to 
strengthen weak schools
• Transformation of the 
government’s administrative 
functions from detailed 
guidance to evaluations, to 
emphasizing school autonomy 
and accountability
• Development of high-quality 
tertiary and vocational skill 
and information and 
communications technology 
programs
• Rise in interest in developing 
Shanghai and China as 
competitive global education 
models
Note: PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment. 
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Notes 
 1. National Bureau of Statistics of China 2013 (http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery .htm 
?cn=C01&zb=A0306&sj=2010).
 2. China’s educational structure consists of six years of primary education, three years of 
junior secondary education, and another three years of senior secondary education.
 3. China Statistical Yearbook: Education 2013 (http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2013 
/ indexeh.htm). 
 4. The Chinese government has issued guidance to maintain an enrollment ratio of 
1:1 in academic vs. vocational secondary schools.
 5. Private education literally translates into “managed by people” in Chinese to 
 deemphasize the profit nature of pure private education.
 6. A number of international schools or schools established by other countries, such as 
the German or American schools, are in operation and admit only non-Chinese 
 students; these schools are considered outside of citizen education and are not subject 
to oversight by the county or district Bureaus of Education.
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C h A P T E R  2
Systems Approach to Analyzing 
Education Policies and Linking 
Them to Implementation and 
Learning Outcomes 
Introduction
The main guiding principles for the background studies and this report are the 
World Bank’s Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) and 
further linking of policies to implementation and learning outcomes. Too often 
education systems and policies are partitioned separately into, for example, 
teachers, financing, curriculum, assessment, and so on, without attempting to 
bring them together. Although not completely, the report adopts the SABER 
tools for collecting information on policy and institutions in multiple domains 
including teachers, school financing, school autonomy and accountability, assess-
ment, and private provision in education, so as to form a comprehensive picture 
of the basic education system in Shanghai.
Another common tendency for education policy analysis is to examine the 
various education inputs and attempt to link them with learning outcomes. This 
approach has been heavily influenced by the education production philosophy 
and tends to ignore the complicated education process that happens within class-
rooms and within every student-teacher interaction. This report attempts to fill 
some part of the education black box by collecting information on policies and 
institutions, as well as information on the extent to which the policies have been 
implemented at the school level, and then linking this information with learning 
outcomes as measured in the Programme for International Assessment (PISA) 
(figure 2.1). In this way, efforts were made to link performance with the specific 
practices and policies that mediate between mere inputs and outcomes and that 
may be replicated in other settings or countries. 
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Measuring Policy Intent and the SABER Instruments
Efforts to collect and document policy information for specific country educa-
tion systems are numerous. However, consistent criteria for data collection are 
absent, nor is there a common framework that would allow policies to be com-
pared and benchmarked against “good practices.” Researchers and policy makers 
often find themselves in a sea of policy information and have to rely on their own 
knowledge and experience to interpret the data and come up with recommenda-
tions. Recently the World Bank Education Global Practice developed SABER—
the Systems Approach for Better Education Results—as a policy information 
collection and diagnostic tool for analyzing and comparing the different pol-
icy domains of education systems across the globe. SABER is primarily used 
to  measure expressed and explicit policy intent, usually based on official and 
 published policy information. The existing set of SABER modules include those 
presented in figure 2.2. 
Of the set of policy domains in figure 2.2, early childhood development, 
teachers, school finance, school autonomy and accountability, and student assess-
ment were selected for this report’s in-depth assessment in Shanghai. Early child-
hood development was later excluded from this report because basic education 
in China (and thus in Shanghai) is defined to include only the six years of pri-
mary education and three years of junior secondary education. A separate China 
and Shanghai SABER on early childhood development will be produced. 
Each SABER module has a number of policy goals that are backed by a thor-
ough review of education research evidence to date on what matters for educa-
tion. Each policy goal is further broken down into a number of policy levers, that 
is, specific policy actions that the government can take to achieve the policy 
goals. All the data in this report were collected in Shanghai using the SABER data 
collection instruments to ensure comparability with other education systems. 
Data collection instruments comprise a set of specific indicators constructed to 
measure to what extent each policy lever has been achieved.
A scoring rubric is used to analyze the policy data collected and further clas-
sify each policy lever into four levels—latent, emerging, established, and 
advanced (table 2.1). A “latent” score signifies that the policy behind the indica-
tor is not yet in place or that there is limited engagement in developing the 
related education policy. An “emerging” score indicates that the policy in place 
Figure 2.1 The Black Box of Education Production
Education inputs Student
achievement
Quality of 
policies and
institutions 
Policy
implementation
Source: Adapted from Rogers 2015. 
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reflects some good practices but that policy development is still in progress. An 
“established” score indicates that the program or policy reflects good practices 
and meets the minimum standards but may be limited in its content and scope. 
An “advanced” score indicates that the program or policy reflects best practices 
and can be considered on par with international standards.
Each chapter that follows is organized according to the specific SABER goals 
included in the policy domain. The rating attached to each goal has been fully 
discussed and verified with the respective SABER teams and adheres strictly to 
the rubric for scoring the particular goal. Whenever applicable, data collected 
from the school surveys were used to shed light on implementation of these poli-
cies, that is, the extent to which the government’s policy intent has been trans-
lated into school-level implementation.
Figure 2.2 SABER Domains or Policy Areas
Education
cycles
Education
resilience
Equity and
inclusion
Quality resources
and system support
Governance and
finance
Early
childhood
development
Student
assessment
Teachers
ICT EMIS
School health
and school
feeding
Engaging the
private
sector
Workforce
development
Tertiary
education
School
finance
School
autonomy and
accountability
Learning
for all
Source: Abdul-Hamid 2014.
Note: EMIS = education management information system; ICT = information and communications technology; 
SABER = Systems Approach for Better Education Results. 
Table 2.1 SABER Scoring Rubric
Latent
   
Emerging
   
Established
   
Advanced
   
Reflects policy is not 
in place, or limited 
engagement
Reflects some 
good practices; 
policy work still 
in progress
Reflects good 
practices, with 
some limitations
Reflects international 
best practices
Note: SABER = Systems Approach for Better Education Results.
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Measuring Policy Implementation
In many countries, policy intent or statements are not always implemented 
because of various constraints such as lack of resources, capacity, or political will. 
In some low-income countries, the gap between policy and implementation can 
be quite large. Measuring the extent to which policies are implemented, espe-
cially at the school level, will establish a stronger link between policies and 
 student learning outcomes. Therefore, in addition to assessing education policies 
using the SABER modules, the report makes serious efforts to collect data and 
use existing studies to substantiate the extent to which official policies are indeed 
being implemented at school or even classroom levels.
Most relevantly, the team designed questionnaires and collaborated with 
Shanghai Normal University to develop and administer a survey to 153 school 
principals to understand education practices in relationship to the policy goals 
under each SABER module. The sample of 153 schools comprises junior second-
ary schools that participated in both the 2009 and 2012 PISA. PISA adopts a 
random sampling strategy to select a sample of schools and students representa-
tive of the participating country’s or region’s student body. Therefore, the results 
from this 153-school survey can be said to be reflective of education practices in 
Shanghai.
Additional data and information were gleaned from existing studies, both 
Chinese and international, on the efficacy of specific policies, though most tend 
to have very small samples. For example, education expenditure data were used 
along with information on teacher salaries from labor force surveys. Studies 
related to the school-level teaching-research group were also referenced to high-
light the important practice of school-level professional development.
Connecting Policy Intent, Implementation, and PISA Learning 
Outcome Measures
A further step toward better understanding policy impacts is to link policies and 
implementation with student learning outcomes. Rigorous impact evaluations 
are rare, unfortunately. This report draws on PISA 2009 and PISA 2012 cross-
sectional data to investigate which school-level characteristics (both policies and 
practices) are associated with the mathematical, reading, and scientific literacy 
and problem-solving skills of 15-year-olds in Shanghai. In particular, the report 
addresses the way in which different school characteristics are associated with 
students’ mathematical, reading, and scientific literacy. For each program (lower 
secondary, upper secondary general, and upper secondary vocational), PISA 
scores on the three domains are subjected to a regression estimation using school 
characteristics, and controlling for individual and family background characteris-
tics. Furthermore, because Shanghai aims to develop into a globally competitive 
city with a young generation of innovative and critical thinkers with strong 
problem-solving skills, the analysis also took advantage of the new problem-
solving module in the 2012 PISA to examine the impact of family and school 
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characteristics on students’ problem-solving skills. In this way, the report 
attempts to establish an analytical loop connecting policies, implementation, and 
student outcomes.
Limitations of the Study
The limitations of this study need to be acknowledged up front. The PISA and 
SABER instruments employed for this study, put together, measure only a few 
segments of the complex and multilayered system of education in Shanghai. 
PISA measures students in the school system only on their academic perfor-
mance, and only on a select few subjects and competencies. Similarly, the SABER 
instruments are intended to assess the policy and institutional environment and 
diagnose areas for improvement. Neither of these instruments fully capture the 
intricacies of Shanghai’s current educational systems and processes. To overcome 
this limitation, effort has been made to supplement information through surveys 
with school principals, interviews with key education thinkers in Shanghai, 
and detailed discussions with officials on the Shanghai Municipal Education 
Commission. However, it must be noted that principal surveys (N = 153), 
though sampled randomly to be representative of the population in Shanghai, 
were administered through self-reporting and hence are subject to associated 
biases.
Additional limitation comes from the existing overlaps in the policy goals and 
indicators measured in different SABER modules, namely SABER–Teachers, 
SABER–Finance, SABER–School Autonomy and Accountability, and SABER–
Student Assessment. These overlaps have led to associated repetition in docu-
mentation of findings, as is evident in subsequent chapters of this report. 
Nevertheless, this exercise has allowed us to comprehensively look at issues 
through multiple policy lenses.
References
Abdul-Hamid, Husein. 2014. “What Matters Most for Education Management Information 
Systems: A Framework Paper.” SABER Working Paper 7, World Bank, Washington, 
DC. http://wbgfiles.worldbank.org/documents/hdn/ed/saber/supporting_doc 
/ Background/EMIS/Framework_SABER-EMIS.pdf. 
Rogers, H. 2015. “Tools to Measure Teacher Performance and Skills.” World Bank, 
Washington, DC. http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/Event/ECA 
/ central-asia/1%20Tools%20for%20measuring%20teacher%20performance 
__ Halsey%20Rogers__Bishkek.pdf. 

   19 How Shanghai Does It • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0790-9 
C h A P T E R  3
Attracting and Developing an 
Excellent Teaching Force 
Introduction
Teachers undisputedly constitute the most important input in education. It is no 
exaggeration to say that any time a student and a teacher interact some learning 
is taking place. This report uses the Systems Approach for Better Education 
Results (SABER) teacher module (SABER–Teachers) to collect and analyze 
policy and institution data on 10 core teacher policy areas (see box 3.1). The 
policy data from SABER are complemented with data gathered through princi-
pal surveys (N = 153), key informant interviews with teachers and education 
officials of the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission, and review of diverse 
policy and research literature.
SABER–Teachers analyzes the teacher policy data collected in the 10 areas in 
box 3.1 to assess each system’s progress in achieving eight teacher policy goals 
(see figure 3.1): (1) setting clear expectations for teachers, (2) attracting the best 
into teaching, (3) preparing teachers with useful training and experience, 
(4) matching teachers’ skills with students’ needs, (5) leading teachers with 
strong principals, (6) monitoring teaching and learning, (7) supporting teachers 
to improve instruction, and (8) motivating teachers to perform. World Bank 
(2013) offers greater details on SABER–Teachers and the evidence base for the 
instrument design. 
Overall, as demonstrated in table 3.1, it has been ascertained on the basis of 
SABER–Teachers that Shanghai’s policy environment for teachers can be scored 
between “established” and “advanced.” 
Policy Goal 1: Setting Clear Expectations for Teachers (Advanced)
Shanghai has clear standards for student achievement. The “Municipal Primary 
and Secondary School Curriculum Plan” provides overall guidelines on learn-
ing objectives, curriculum structure, standards for curriculum design, learning 
materials, and evaluation across all subjects from first grade to twelfth grade 
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Figure 3.1 Eight Teacher Policy Goals under SABER–Teachers
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Source: World Bank 2013. 
Box 3.1 Teacher Policy Areas for Data Collection under SABER–Teachers
 1. Requirements to enter and remain in teaching
 2. Initial teacher education
 3. Recruitment and employment
 4. Teachers’ workload and autonomy
 5. Professional development
 6. Compensation (salary and nonsalary benefits)
 7. Retirement rules and benefits
 8. Monitoring and evaluation of teacher quality
 9. Teacher representation and voice
10. School leadership
Source: World Bank 2013. 
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in Shanghai. Furthermore, for each subject, the city has released curriculum 
 standards that specify the knowledge areas and skills students need to acquire 
every year.
Table 3.2 provides an example of learning objectives for first and second grade 
Chinese. It demonstrates that the objectives include both quantifiable indicators 
(for example, recognize approximately 2,000 common Chinese characters and 
write 1,000 characters) and descriptions of competencies. Similarly, table 3.3 
shows selected objectives for first and second grade math. The curriculum stan-
dards serve as important references that align teachers’ daily work with students’ 
academic achievement. 
Table 3.1 SABER–Teachers Scoring, Shanghai, 2015
Policy and resource framework (Goals and indicators) SABER score
Setting clear expectations for teachers    
1. Setting clear expectations regarding student learning and official tasks    
2. Providing useful guidance on the use of teachers’ work hours    
Attracting the best into teaching    
1. Ensuring entry requirements to attract talented candidates    
2. Offering competitive pay    
3. Ensuring appealing work conditions    
4. Offering attractive career opportunities    
Preparing teachers with useful training and experience    
1. Ensuring minimum standards for preservice teacher training programs    
2. Ensuring that teacher entrants are familiar with classroom practices    
Matching teachers’ skills with students’ needs    
1. Providing incentives for teachers to work in hard-to-staff schools    
2. Providing incentives for teachers to teach critical shortage subjects    
Leading teachers with strong principals    
1. Investing in the development of qualified school leaders    
2. Expecting principals to support and improve instructional practice    
Monitoring teaching and learning    
1. Ensuring data on student achievement are available to inform teaching 
and policy    
2. Setting systems to assess and monitor teacher performance    
3. Providing multiple mechanisms to evaluate teacher performance    
Supporting teachers to improve instruction    
1. Providing opportunities for professional development    
2. Ensuring that professional development activities are collaborative and 
focus on instructional improvement    
3. Ensuring that professional development is based on perceived needs    
Motivating teachers to perform    
1. Linking career opportunities to performance    
2. Providing mechanisms to hold teachers accountable    
3. Linking teacher compensation to performance    
Note: Scoring rubric: Latent (    ), Emerging (    ), Established (    ), Advanced (    ). 
SABER = Systems Approach for Better Education Results. 
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As an illustration of how the curriculum standards are achieved, the survey of 
principals (see chapter 2) confirms that 90 percent of the schools surveyed 
require teachers to design detailed teacher lesson plans based on the standards 
and supervise the implementation status of the teaching plans. In addition, 
81 percent of the schools regularly organize teachers to attend workshops to 
study the curriculum standards for their subjects.
There are explicit expectations for teachers’ tasks. The Teachers Law of the 
People’s Republic of China 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the Teachers Law) 
defines the general obligations of teachers. At the provincial level, not only 
should teachers fulfill teaching contracts and carry out the school teaching 
plan suggested by the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission (table 3.4), 
but they should also dedicate themselves to the moral, physical, and intellec-
tual development of students and organize relevant learning activities for 
students. Teachers are also expected to improve their own moral ethics and 
pedagogical expertise. In Shanghai, teachers’ responsibilities extend beyond 
the classroom and encompass both extracurricular activities and professional 
development. 
The official working time for teachers is eight hours every day for five days a 
week, including both teaching and nonteaching hours. Overtime hours worked 
during the weekend are compensated. The education system in Shanghai clearly 
recognizes the need for teachers to spend time outside the classroom. On aver-
age, teachers in Shanghai report spending 14 hours per week on actual teaching, 
that is, more than 5 hours less than the Teaching and Learning International 
Survey (TALIS) 2013–14 average of 19.3 hours per week (figure 3.2). However, 
teachers in Shanghai report spending more time per week than in other TALIS 
Table 3.2 Selected Learning Objectives for First and Second Grade Chinese
By the end of second grade, students will be able to
1. Read Pinyina correctly; know how to use a dictionary; recognize approximately 2,000 
common Chinese characters and write 1,000 characters 
2. Understand textbook content; express opinion after reading passages
3. Listen to other people carefully and communicate actively
4. Write several complete sentences to express opinion
5. Participate in activities at the class, school, and community level
Source: Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2005.
a. Pinyin is the standard system of Romanized spelling to transcribe the Mandarin pronunciations of 
Chinese characters.
Table 3.3 Selected Learning Objectives for First and Second Grade Math
By the end of second grade, students will be able to
1. Understand and compare numbers; add, subtract, multiply, and divide; make 
estimates
2. Solve simple math equations and apply to practical problems
3. Calculate the circumference and area of various shapes
4. Understand statistical charts and perform simple analysis such as calculating the mean
Source: Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2005.
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countries on planning their lessons and student counselling (OECD 2014). 
Additionally, teachers in Shanghai seem to spend relatively less time, 8 percent 
of their total class time, on keeping order in the classroom compared with the 
TALIS 2013–14 average of 12 percent of class time (figure 3.3). Overall, it has 
been estimated that despite the relatively fewer number of hours spent on teach-
ing per week, the great majority of teachers’ class time in Shanghai is spent on 
actual teaching and learning, 86 percent compared with the TALIS 2013–14 
average of 79 percent (OECD 2014).
Nationally, the “Provisions for Rewarding Teachers and Educators” (1998), 
released by the Ministry of Education, guide teachers and provide them with 
incentives to engage in curriculum design, school plan development, and 
research activities. Teachers with outstanding achievement in both teaching 
and nonteaching tasks are honored with the title of “model teacher” and a 
monetary reward. At the city level, regulations stipulate that teachers should 
spend time on instructional improvement to strengthen subject knowledge 
and pedagogy.
Table 3.4 Teaching Time by Subject, Primary Education
Subject Teaching time
Chinese, math, and English 35 min./class × 15 classes per week (first and 
second grades)
35 min./class × 13 classes per week (third through 
sixth grades) 
Music, physical education, and arts 35 min./class × 18 classes per week
Other subjects 35 min./class × 16 classes per week
Source: Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2005. 
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Policy Goal 2: Attracting the Best into Teaching (Advanced)
Teaching is a well-regarded profession in Shanghai with an established set of 
entry requirements. Primary school teachers need to have at least a three-year 
tertiary college degree (da zhuan, equivalent to the International Standard 
Classification of Education [ISCED] 5B level) and secondary teachers need to 
have at least a four-year bachelor’s degree (equivalent to the ISCED 5A level). 
In addition to the academic requirements, all candidates must pass a written test 
to obtain the teacher certificate to be eligible to teach in primary and secondary 
schools in Shanghai. In the recruitment process at the school level, candidates 
participate in interviews and a mock teaching assessment during which they 
teach a mini lesson to demonstrate their teaching competencies. Over the years 
competition for teaching positions in Shanghai has become fierce. A Shanghai 
teacher job fair held in the winter of 2014 confirmed that even a master’s 
degree from an elite or overseas university is no guarantee that the  candidate will 
be able to land a job. Schools and principals tend to put high priority on peda-
gogical skills. 
To attract even more candidates to the teaching profession, Shanghai provides 
multiple pathways into teaching. One pathway is through the teacher prepara-
tion programs at three-year or four-year tertiary institutions. Those training 
 programs equip students with subject knowledge, pedagogical skills, and some 
Figure 3.3 Distribution of Weekly Class Time Spent on Various Teaching and Nonteaching 
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practical experience inside the classroom (commonly six months’ practice before 
graduation). Students graduate with a teaching degree and make up a significant 
proportion of the candidates for the profession. In addition, anyone who has the 
minimum educational qualification and successfully obtains the teacher certifi-
cate can apply to be a teacher (see box 3.2). Those pathways allow for more 
flexible entry points, so that both recent graduates and talented professionals 
have the opportunity to become teachers. Among the 153 schools surveyed, on 
average, 85 percent of teachers were graduates of teacher preparation programs. 
The central government also provides incentives to increase the pool of 
 teaching candidates and encourage teacher retention. Since 2007, six nationally 
affiliated teacher preparation colleges have offered free tuition and living 
 stipends to teacher candidates who agree to stay in the teaching profession for 
more than 10 years after graduation (at least 2 years in rural areas). Shanghai in 
particular launched two talent recruitment plans in 2014 to proactively recruit 
high-quality candidates who do not necessarily have a teaching degree: one plan 
recruits  candidates from Shanghai’s four top universities, and the other hosts 
teacher recruitment fairs in Beijing’s top universities to encourage candidates to 
come to Shanghai.
Teacher pay is appealing and varies according to performance and years of 
 service. In Shanghai, the common perception of the teaching profession is that it 
is a financially stable, middle-class career. Indeed, the Teachers Law stipulates that 
Box 3.2 Obtaining a Teacher Certificate
The process of obtaining a teacher certificate in China underwent major changes in 2012. 
Before 2012, the process differed based on the candidate’s academic background. Candidates 
from teacher preparation programs at three-year or four-year tertiary institutions needed to 
fulfill two requirements to receive the certificate upon graduation: pass the exams for educa-
tion studies and education psychology studies and obtain a certificate of proficiency in speak-
ing Mandarin. Candidates from other tertiary programs (nonteaching) needed to fulfill one 
additional requirement: pass a 30-minute subject-specific mock teaching session (15 minutes 
of teaching and 15 minutes of interview) conducted by the local education commission.
In 2012, Shanghai was selected to pilot the national teacher certificate reform. All eligible 
candidates now need to pass a national exam to receive the certificate. The exam consists of a 
written section and a subject-specific interview. For basic education, the written exam includes 
two subjects: (1) comprehensives, covering teaching philosophy, education laws and regula-
tions, ethics, cultural literacy, and general abilities; and (2) teaching knowledge and abilities, 
covering the foundation of education, student guidance, classroom management, subject 
knowledge, class design and implementation, evaluation (primary education only), and 
 psychology (secondary education only). Secondary school teachers also need to participate in 
a subject-specific examination. Only candidates who have passed the written test can proceed 
to the interview stage for receiving the certificate.
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teachers’ average salary should be equal to or higher than the average salary of civil 
servants in China. Shanghai’s GDP per capita topped RMB 90,100 in 2013, while 
the average starting salary for new teachers was approximately RMB 80,000, or 
89 percent of GDP per capita. This starting salary for new teachers is comparable 
to that in other countries around the world (table 3.5): in Finland, the average 
starting salary for new teachers was 89 percent of GDP per capita; in Japan, the 
rate was 84 percent; the Republic of Korea’s new teachers received 113 percent 
of GDP per capita; while U.S. teachers were paid 79 percent of GDP per capita 
(OECD 2011a).
The average annual salary for all school-level teachers in Shanghai was RMB 
100,472 in 2010, the highest in the nation; the national average was only RMB 
37,786 (Shan 2013). A 2014 survey of wages in urban units by employment sec-
tor confirmed that the overall education profession (including public and private 
and all levels from preprimary to senior secondary) has an average wage of RMB 
96,165 in Shanghai, which is much higher than the RMB 56,580 average at the 
national level (China Statistical Yearbook 2015).
In addition to a comfortable and stable salary, permanent full-time teach-
ers are entitled to medical and retirement benefits in Shanghai. Furthermore, 
Shanghai has introduced a performance pay salary structure that divides the 
teaching salary into two parts: (1) a base salary that varies according to years 
of service and teaching rank; teachers with longer years of service, a higher 
rank (accredited based on evaluations), or extra responsibilities have a higher 
base salary; and (2) a performance-based salary. The 30 percent of the wage 
bill dedicated to merit-based awards to teachers is further divided into 
three components: (1) an occupation-related allowance, set by the Shanghai 
Bureau of Human Resources and Social Security and the Shanghai Bureau of 
Finance; (2) a workload allowance, based on the number of classes teachers 
teach every month and municipal guidelines; and (3) a performance reward. 
Teachers with outstanding performance during the year receive a higher 
 performance reward.
Nationally, the level of compensation appears less attractive because educa-
tion financing is primarily the responsibility of local governments. Because local 
governments vary in fiscal capacity, their capacity to compensate teachers also 
varies. According to a 2014 national salary survey (China Statistical Yearbook 
2015), the average salary of professionals working in the education sector was 
RMB 56,580, ranking 10th lowest out of 19 sectors and slightly higher than the 
Table 3.5 New Teachers’ Salary in Comparison with GDP per Capita
Nation or economy Percent of GDP per capita
Shanghai 89
Finland 89
Japan 84
Korea, Rep. 113
United States 79
Source: OECD 2011a. 
Attracting and Developing an Excellent Teaching Force  27
How Shanghai Does It • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0790-9 
national average of RMB 56,360 across all sectors (figure 3.4). Although the 
education sector encompasses a wide range of professions and positions, these 
statistics provide a glance into teacher pay at the national level. 
Evidence from past research suggests that the compensation package factors 
into individuals’ decisions to become teachers (Boyd et al. 2006; Dolton 1990; 
Wolter and Denzler 2003). The appealing salary level and benefits in Shanghai 
aid in attracting new teachers. Furthermore, teachers with outstanding perfor-
mance and substantial length of service can make several times as much as new 
teachers do. This salary distribution structure to a certain extent encourages 
teacher retention and provides incentives to teachers to invest in continuous 
improvement of their knowledge and skills. However, the actual performance-
based incentives that principals have the autonomy to distribute constitute up to 
9 percent of total teacher salary. This level of performance reward might not be 
sufficient to motivate the intended level of outstanding teaching practices. 
Working conditions are appealing. All schools in Shanghai must comply with 
infrastructure standards as a prerequisite for school establishment. Schools also 
must comply with sanitation standards and are regularly inspected. Primary 
and secondary schools generally supply each teacher a computer to assist with 
daily tasks.
Student-to-teacher ratios are also conducive to establishing adequate  working 
conditions in Shanghai. In 2012, the student-teacher ratio was 16:1 for primary 
schools and 12:1 for secondary schools, on par with other high- performing 
 countries (figure 3.5). The city also sets the maximum ceiling for class size so 
Figure 3.4 Average Wage in Various Employment Categories, China, 2013
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that no class should exceed 40 students. The difference between the student-to-
teacher ratio and average class size is due to the way teaching and learning are 
organized. As in many East Asian countries, teachers in China and Shanghai are 
trained, recruited, and organized by subject starting from teachers of first grade. 
Each key subject teacher is responsible for teaching his or her subject specialty. 
Career advancement mechanisms are in place to attract qualified individuals 
to the profession. Teachers can apply for both academic and administrative posi-
tions within the school system to assume greater responsibilities. Furthermore, 
unlike many other systems in which one is either a teacher or not a teacher, 
teachers have the opportunity to advance professionally throughout their teach-
ing careers through a very explicit five-tier ranking system (table 3.6). 
Figure 3.5 Average Student-to-Teacher Ratio for Primary Schools, 2012–13
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Table 3.6 Tiered Ranking System for Teachers
Rank Requirements
Third-grade teachers One to three years of service
Second-grade teachers Three to five years of service + third-grade teacher rank obtained + 
school-level internal evaluation
First-grade teachers At least five years of service + second-grade teacher rank obtained + 
school-level internal evaluation + district-level external evaluation
Senior-grade teachers At least five years of service + first-grade teacher rank obtained + 
school-level internal evaluation + district-level external evaluation
Outstanding teachers Only granted to teachers with many years of service and outstanding 
teaching practices
Source: Adapted from Education Bureau of Jiading District of Shanghai 2014.
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Under the system, teachers are evaluated regularly for promotion to a higher 
rank, which is accompanied with a salary increase, based on their years of service 
and teaching performance. Out of the 153 schools surveyed, 97 percent have 
established a specific committee to evaluate teachers’ qualifications for promo-
tion. A selective number of “outstanding” teachers have been hired as professors 
in teaching preparation universities to provide practical guidance to teacher 
candidates. This career ladder provides an effective mechanism to nurture excel-
lent educators and retain them in the teaching profession.
Policy Goal 3: Preparing Teachers with Useful Training and 
Experience (Established)
The initial education requirement in Shanghai for teacher candidates could be 
enhanced. Currently, a three-year tertiary education (equivalent to the ISCED 5B 
level) is required for primary school teachers, and a four-year university education 
(equivalent to the ISCED 5A level) is required for secondary school teachers. In 
practice, however, the academic requirement is more stringent. Overall, 97 percent 
of the schools surveyed have a minimum academic requirement of a four-year 
bachelor’s degree when making hiring decisions. And among the existing teaching 
force, the survey indicates that 94 percent of teachers already possess bachelor’s 
degree qualifications. The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
2012 Shanghai survey shows that 97.6 percent of teachers have teacher certificates, 
with very little variation between schools (standard deviation = 16 percent).
Therefore, it is time for Shanghai to make a policy change to reflect the 
higher entry requirement. Most Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and high-performing East Asian countries require 
teacher applicants to have at least a bachelor’s degree equivalent to ISCED 5A, 
as in Korea and Singapore. Finland requires teachers to have a research-oriented 
master’s degree (OECD 2011a).
Opportunities exist for teacher trainees and new teachers to gain classroom 
experience. Teacher education programs at three-year and four-year tertiary insti-
tutions in Shanghai generally have a six-month classroom teaching component 
built into the curriculum. This preservice classroom experience allows teacher 
entrants to apply their pedagogical methods and gain concrete skills in classroom 
management.
According to the survey results, 86 percent of the schools require teachers 
to have completed two weeks to 24 months of in-classroom teaching as part of 
their preservice training. Furthermore, all first-year basic education teachers in 
Shanghai are required to obtain classroom experience through a one-year in-
service induction program to facilitate transition to the teaching job and before 
hiring is finalized. This time also serves as a probationary period. The induction-
probation program requires teachers to spend 50 percent of their time teaching 
in the classroom and 50 percent receiving professional development at district 
teacher training centers where they receive training on ethics, pedagogy, and 
student activity design. This program creates a supportive environment for new 
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teachers to share issues they encounter in their first year of teaching and provides 
targeted training to strengthen their teaching skills. If new teachers do not meet 
the various requirements during the one-year probation or fail to pass the evalu-
ations organized by the training center and the schools, schools are not obligated 
to formally hire them. The probationary period also allows new teachers them-
selves to reflect on the profession and determine if teaching is indeed their 
 calling. They are allowed to not sign a teaching contract if they decide not to 
become teachers or want to find another school in which to work.
Both during this probationary period and after becoming part of the regular 
teaching force, teachers become part of the school teaching-research group, 
which gathers teachers together by subject. These groups frequently engage in 
various professional and instructional activities such as mentoring, peer coaching, 
demonstration lessons, preparing lesson plans jointly, and studying new curricu-
lum standards and pedagogy. The structure and activities become integral to a 
teacher’s teaching and work life in school. Details of the teaching-research group 
are discussed later.
Shanghai teachers generally have a very high level of content knowledge, 
 especially in the core subject areas of math, Chinese, and English. Figure 3.6 shows 
that the average scores on a teacher test in Chinese, mathematics, and English are, 
respectively, 105, 110, and 123 out of a possible 150 for a selected sample of rural 
Figure 3.6 Teacher Test Scores and Passing Rates in Rural Shanghai
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teachers in Shanghai. The lowest score is in music, which is not part of the content 
required for either high school entrance or college entrance (Xu 2014). Urban 
teachers are expected to have even higher content-related competencies.
Policy Goal 4: Matching Teachers’ Skills with Students’ Needs 
(Established)
Shanghai provides teachers and principals with incentives to work in hard-to-
staff schools. These schools are usually in the rural and suburban districts where 
transportation takes much longer and schools admit more migrant and disadvan-
taged students, conceivably exacerbating inequality in learning outcomes. 
Recognizing this issue, Shanghai recently launched a number of initiatives to 
build a stronger teaching and leadership force in the rural districts. Those initia-
tives center on flexible and temporary transfer or rotation of teachers and admin-
istrators with built-in incentives and help leverage the city’s resources to serve 
underprivileged populations and allow struggling schools to catch up (box 3.3). 
•	 Teachers who choose to work at rural schools in Shanghai could receive prior-
ity in admission to graduate schools and accreditation of higher teacher ranks, 
one-time monetary stipends, and compensation.
•	 Every year about 20 outstanding teachers from central districts are placed in 
twinning schools in rural or suburban districts.
Box 3.3 An Account of a Teacher’s Experience, Jinshan
The Story of Ms. Jinjin Yuan
Ms. Jinjin Yuan is an outstanding teacher from central district who was temporarily transferred 
to a suburban district of Jinshan. “I was deployed to teach in the Jinshan District, right after 
being promoted to “outstanding teacher” rank. Most friends considered this an inconvenience 
and called it “a gift with imperfection.” However, after a few months of teaching there, I had 
gained much professionally from this experience. Furthermore, I could see the changes I was 
making to the Jinshan early childhood education. This is really a heart-warming gift for me.”
Ever since Ms. Yuan was deployed to Jinshan and become the head of the teacher-research 
group, she has brought with her a wealth of teaching experience to share with the fellow teach-
ers in the new school. She believes that teacher evaluation should not just be based on end-of-
the-year tests, but rather should be based on the extent to which the teacher has incorporated 
the value of “process is more important than outcome” in his or her teaching. She actively 
encouraged teachers to carefully teach and observe children, and constantly synthesize and 
reflect on classroom practices. Ms. Yuan quickly gained the trust and respect of other teachers 
and contributed to a positive culture of teaching and research. More and more teachers would 
visit Ms. Yuan’s office to discuss pedagogy. The Jinshan Bureau of Education founded the 
“JinJin Teaching Lab.” More than 60 teachers applied to be one of the 10 students of the “Lab.”
Source: Translated from China Education Daily 2015 (http://sc.cqn.com.cn/jiaoyuzhiliang/280476.html). 
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•	 A system of principal rotation has been set up; in 2013, the city deployed nine 
skilled principals from central districts to schools in the rural districts to serve 
as mentors and offer management advice for two years.
•	 “Senior-grade” teachers that choose to teach in rural districts can receive an 
extension of retirement of one to five years.
The transfer of teachers across schools is relatively rare in Shanghai. Changing 
schools is usually at the teacher’s own initiative, in which case the teacher will 
go through the same recruitment process as new teachers, including an evalua-
tion of credentials and past teaching performance.
Overall, Shanghai has not faced any critical shortage of teachers in any 
 particular subjects in basic education, partly thanks to the steady stream of 
teacher entrants from teacher preparation programs and other pathways. 
Furthermore, schools have different levels of autonomy in hiring teachers based 
on their individual demand. Hiring practices differ across districts. In some dis-
tricts, schools can post positions directly. However, candidates still need to take 
and pass the district-level exam to be eligible for positions within the district. In 
some districts, candidates need to pass the district-level exam first before apply-
ing for any school-specific position. Only in a few districts (usually in rural 
Shanghai) do schools have full autonomy to hire based on a candidate’s back-
ground and the school’s own needs. Across those different hiring practices, how-
ever, schools generally have the opportunity to hire the teachers they need.
However, it might be helpful to conduct a school-level analysis to gain a more 
nuanced picture of teacher demand and supply for specific subjects. Some 
schools, particularly in rural districts, might have difficulty recruiting talented 
professionals in certain subjects. This may particularly be true for subjects that 
are not compulsory and are not subject to the senior secondary school or college 
entrance exams, such as arts, music, and physical education. In this case, the city 
needs to develop targeted incentives to attract more qualified candidates, such as 
a higher base salary or more flexible career advancement pathways.
Policy Goal 5: Leading Teachers with Strong Principals (Established)
School surveys indicate that a school principal in Shanghai has the following 
typical profile: a bachelor’s degree (83 percent), 40–50 years old (80 percent), 
with an average duration in the position of 5.5 years.
Requirements for principals are stringent, and districts in Shanghai use differ-
ent approaches to select principals. For example, in Jiading District, all interested 
individuals must obtain a principal eligibility certificate to be considered a quali-
fied candidate. The requirements for the certificate include a written test, 
 academic credentials, and years of service in teaching and school management. If 
there is an opening for a principal position, the district will select from the pool 
of candidates with the qualifying certificates. The district of Changning uses a 
different approach. Every two years, schools within the district recommend 
qualified teachers and administrators as candidates for the position of principal. 
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The group of candidates recommended by all schools form a cohort of potential 
contenders for positions within the district. They receive training regularly in 
preparation for becoming principals. This approach could potentially equip 
future principals with the necessary leadership and management skills, even 
before the job.
Research shows that rigorous in-service and leadership training and support 
are associated with gains in student achievement (Gates et al. 2014). Effective 
school principals can enhance teacher motivation and accountability. A study 
on schools in the United States finds that for the best principals, the rate of 
teacher turnover is highest in grades in which teachers are least effective 
(Branch, Hanushek, and Rivkin 2013). This finding supports the belief that 
improvement in teacher effectiveness provides an important channel through 
which principals can raise the quality of education (Branch, Hanushek, and 
Rivkin 2013). 
Principals in Shanghai participate in various kinds of leadership programs 
based on their years of service. First-year principals face particular challenges as 
they make the transition into the new position. In 2013, Shanghai launched the 
“New Principal Training Plan” to build a strong cadre of new principals in basic 
education. The Shanghai Municipal Education Commission collaborated with 
Shanghai Normal University to develop a one-year training program, aligned 
with the newly released “Professional Standards for Basic Education Principals” 
to focus on six key topics: school planning, internal management, school culture, 
instructional development, teacher growth, and adjustment to the external envi-
ronment. The program takes place once a week and includes group lectures, 
individual research projects, field visits, and mentoring by experienced principals 
to new principals.
Salary is linked to performance for principals in Shanghai. Principals’ salaries 
include three components: base salary, rank-related salary, and performance-
based salary. Similar to that for teachers, the performance-based salary consists 
of an occupation-related allowance, a workload allowance, and a performance 
reward. Principals can also be promoted through a progressive ranking system 
from fourth-grade (lowest) to first-grade and outstanding (highest). The criteria 
for promotion include credentials, years of services, school management, and 
leadership in instructional development, teaching force enhancement, and stu-
dent performance. Principals are required to teach at least two classes every week 
to be qualified for a promotion. The rank of a principal not only carries salary 
implications, but also serves as an indicator of competence for further career 
advancement. The performance-based portion of a principal’s salary is linked to 
overall school performance. Although districts implement their own rules related 
to the performance-based portion of principals’ salaries, the key factor is the end-
of-year district evaluation of schools.
Principals assume the role of instructional leaders in Shanghai. In 2012, 
the Ministry of Education released “Professional Standards for Basic Education 
Principals” as a key reference for capacity building and management of the 
 principal force. The standards include six main areas, with requirements on 
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 professional skills and knowledge that principals need to possess; instructional 
development is identified as one key area (table 3.7). 
Principals are not only expected to be familiar with students’ learning targets 
at different stages of schooling and the related curriculum standards, but they are 
also considered the leader of curriculum reform and development of the school-
based curriculum. The policy requires principals to observe classes regularly and 
provide feedback to teachers on instructional improvement. Some schools in 
Shanghai appoint one principal specifically in charge of instructional develop-
ment. Among the 153 principals surveyed, more than two-thirds (69 percent) 
had observed between 31 and 50 classes during the past semester, and 15 percent 
had observed more than 50 classes, reflecting a consistent practice of principal 
class observations (table 3.8). After the observations, 99 percent of the principals 
Table 3.7 Requirements for Professional Skills under “Professional Standards for Basic 
Education Principals”
Area Selected requirements on professional skills
1. School planning  i. Lead the planning and implementation of school development plans 
 ii. Monitor school development and make adjustments accordingly 
2. Internal management  i. Establish school personnel and finance regulations 
 ii. Ensure school safety and establish emergency management policies 
3. School culture  i. Define the school education philosophy 
 ii. Facilitate the organization of school cultural and science-related events 
4. Instructional 
development
 i. Execute curriculum-related guidelines and support the development 
and implementation of school-based curriculum 
 ii. Observe classes and provide instructional guidance 
 iii. Lead and organize research activities and education reform to create a 
comprehensive learning assessment system 
5. Teacher growth  i. Ensure that every teacher fulfills the 360-hour professional development 
requirement 
 ii. Develop professional development plans for individual teachers and 
provide targeted training for young teachers 
 iii. Protect the rights of teachers and create a performance-based 
incentive system 
6. Adjustment to the 
external environment
 i. Support parent-teacher association’s involvement in school operations 
 ii. Organize events for parents to understand students’ development 
 iii. Encourage and organize teachers and students to participate in 
community events 
Source: Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2009 (http://www.shmec.gov.cn/web/xxgk/newsearch_do.php? 
pagenumber=2&searchinfo=%3A%3A%BB%A6%BD%CC%CE%AF%C8%CB%3A2009%3A%3A%3A%3A0%3A%3A&select=3). 
Table 3.8 School Principals’ Class Observations, School Principals Survey (N = 153)
Number of classes observed in the 
last semester
Number of principals 
observing
Percentage of principals 
observing
Fewer than 30 25 16
Between 31 and 40 67 44
Between 41 and 50 38 25
Between 51 and 60 14 9
More than 60 9 6
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indicate that they provide feedback to the teachers, using methods such as 
 specific discussion sessions with teachers (76 percent) and written feedback 
(9 percent) (table 3.9). Furthermore, principals frequently use various commu-
nication tools to interact with students, teachers, and parents. Based on the 
 survey, 86 percent of the principals host individual meetings with students, 
teachers, and parents; 46 percent use online tools such as WeChat (a Chinese 
message application); and 61 percent have a designated letter mailbox for receiv-
ing feedback. 
The principals surveyed demonstrate extensive professional knowledge. More 
than 95 percent of the principals have either substantial or some knowledge of 
students’ physical and mental development stages; learning objectives and 
 curriculum standards for main subjects; curriculum design, implementation, and 
evaluation; and usage of learning material (table 3.10). With regard to instruc-
tion, 99 percent of the principals have a good grasp of pedagogical theories 
including student learning behaviors, teachers’ pedagogical role, and the knowl-
edge construction process. However, the principals have some catching up to do 
in the use of information and communications technology (ICT) for learning. 
Even though most of the principals can use multiple media resources (81  percent) 
and Microsoft suites (88 percent), only 46 percent have knowledge and experi-
ence in ICT classrooms (such as distance interactive learning). About 46 percent 
are skilled in using electronic learning materials as a teaching resource, and only 
17 percent are experienced in developing such materials. 
Principals have substantial autonomy in making decisions to support teaching. 
Principals in most districts can hire new teachers and dismiss ineffective 
 teachers, thus being able to make decisions beneficial to student learning out-
comes (only a small number of districts use centralized teacher recruitment and 
distribution). In practice, however, principals rarely dismiss teachers directly. 
The common practice is to demote ineffective teachers to staff positions, such as 
lab technicians, to avoid direct conflict between the principal and the teacher. 
Table 3.9 School Principals’ Feedback to Teachers after Class Observation, School 
Principals Survey (N = 153)
Feedback mechanisms
Number of 
principals observing
Percentage of 
principals observing
No feedback, but observing the class as a 
criterion for teacher evaluation 1 1
Communicating with observed teacher 
immediately after class 9 6
Holding specific feedback discussion 117 76
Written feedback 14 9
Indirect feedback via teaching effectiveness 
and teacher ranking evaluation 4 3
Others 5 3
Invalid 3 2
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Principals also have the authority to determine the performance-based portion 
of teacher salaries to reward strong performers. With those levers, principals play 
a key role in pedagogy support and teacher management.
Policy Goal 6: Monitoring Teaching and Learning (Advanced)
Adequate data on student learning outcomes are available to inform teaching and 
policy. Assessments in Shanghai follow a multilevel model. At the school level, 
students participate in weekly or biweekly subject quizzes to demonstrate their 
progress in each learning unit. Schools administer midterm and final examina-
tions for key subjects (Chinese, math, English, plus physics and chemistry in 
secondary school) every semester to evaluate overall student outcomes. As the 
designers and graders of the assessments, teachers have complete information 
about students’ scores. School homework is regularly assigned and feedback 
 provided. The results of the assessments inform their teaching practices—for 
example, they can rearrange lesson plans to repeat certain concepts and theories. 
Teachers can also use the results to tailor after-class help sessions for individual 
students. The average score on midterm and final examinations for every class 
is often available to all teachers teaching the same subject in the same grade. 
Table 3.10 School Principals’ Professional Knowledge in Shanghai, School Principals 
Survey (N = 153)
percent
Knowledge area Very familiar Familiar Not very familiar Unfamiliar
Students’ physical and mental 
development stages 80 20 0 0
Learning objectives of main 
subjects 49 47 3 0
Curriculum criteria of main subjects 45 51 3 1
Curriculum design, 
implementation, and evaluation 63 36 1 0
Usage of learning material 79 20 1 0
Usage of multiple media 32 49 16 2
Production of teaching materials 
(for example, PowerPoint 
presentations) 41 47 10 1
Usage of information and 
communications technology (for 
example, distance interactive 
instruction) 14 46 36 3
Usage of electronic material 12 34 39 16
Development of electronic 
teaching material 4 13 42 41
Construction of school curriculum 
system based on information 
and communications 
technology 5 25 40 30
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The availability of data serves a diagnostic purpose: it encourages teachers 
to identify areas for improvement in instructional practice; it also allows the 
school to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of teachers to target professional 
development activities.
Shanghai administers citywide examinations at the end of the compulsory 
nine-year education period. At the end of ninth grade, students take the 
 written senior secondary school entrance examination in the subjects of 
Chinese, math, English, physics, and chemistry. Physical education, lab opera-
tions, and the moral ethics of students also factor into their final examina-
tion scores. The total score on the examination determines the type of 
senior  secondary school in which students will enroll: admission into highly 
selective model senior secondary schools requires outstanding performance 
on the examination. Roughly half of the students who do not achieve good 
results will enroll in technical and vocational schools while the other better-
performing half generally enrolls in general and model senior secondary 
schools. At the end of twelfth grade, students take a nationwide college 
entrance exam (gao kao), the score of which determines whether and in which 
type of university the student will be able to enroll. 
Leaders at the district level and the school level have full access to the data on 
student outcomes. Districts use the data to evaluate overall school performance, 
while schools use the data to assess the effectiveness of individual teachers.
Shanghai has been a pioneer in participating in international assessments 
in China. The city was the top performer in the PISA in both 2009 and 2012. 
Results on PISA have been used for country-level comparisons.
Teacher performance is monitored through multiple mechanisms. All schools 
in Shanghai regularly monitor teacher performance. Under the 2012 State 
Council’s “Advice on Strengthening the Teaching Force,” schools are encouraged 
to carry out a comprehensive teacher monitoring and evaluation process that 
does not solely focus on student test results. The assessment should also take into 
consideration teachers’ moral ethics, competence, and contribution to the school. 
The school principal and senior teachers conduct classroom observations to 
monitor teacher performance. In addition, districts organize regular supervision 
of teaching at each school. The capacity of the teaching force is a core indicator 
in district-level school evaluations. Furthermore, all workers in China, teachers 
included, have a personnel file that tracks work-related ranks, rewards, and pun-
ishments. If a teacher decides to transfer, the personnel file will be reviewed by 
the receiving school. In practice, 90 percent of the schools surveyed also create 
an individual professional development profile for each teacher, which often 
includes the teacher’s development goals, the name and type of research papers 
published, the teacher’s training experience, and his or her achievements such as 
awards and titles. Therefore, a system is in place to track teacher performance 
over time.
Teacher performance is evaluated using various sources. At the school 
level, the principal conducts annual teacher performance evaluations with the 
involvement of other senior administrators or senior teachers. The evaluation 
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encompasses multiple dimensions: a self-evaluation of strengths and weak-
nesses, classroom observations of teaching practices, student performance, 
 participation in research activities, and interaction with students are all taken 
into consideration. The comprehensive assessment allows principals to gain a 
clear understanding of where each teacher stands and offers a mechanism 
through which principals can provide teachers with yearly feedback to improve 
performance.
Policy Goal 7: Supporting Teachers to Improve Instruction (Established)
Professional development is an essential part of teacher responsibilities. In 
Shanghai, all new basic education teachers are required to complete 360 hours 
of professional development during the first five years of their teaching careers, 
which is equivalent to nine days every year. If a teacher wants to apply for a 
senior-grade rank, he or she must complete another 540 hours of training, 
equivalent to 67.5 days. Not only do teachers receive most of the training free 
of charge, but they are also reimbursed for their transportation and accommo-
dation expenses. This training requirement provides a base guarantee that 
every teacher receives appropriate development opportunities and professional 
 support, especially when they first enter the profession. According to the school 
survey results, on average, schools spend 7 percent of their total  operational 
expenditures on teachers’ professional development. In addition, 92  percent 
have set up specific policies on teacher training; 71 percent have created 
 policies evaluating teachers’ professional development; and 73 percent have 
created policies providing teachers with incentives to undertake professional 
development.
A series of experimental studies has found that professional development 
activities of less than 14 hours appear to have no effect on teachers’ effectiveness. 
Meanwhile, learning opportunities averaging about 50 hours over a period of 
6 to 12 months, with well-designed and content-specific materials, were asso-
ciated with gains of up to 21 percentile points on the achievement tests used 
to evaluate student learning (Darling-Hammond, Wei, and Andree 2010). 
Shanghai meets this critical requirement quite well. However, the required 
duration of professional development in Shanghai is slightly lower than that 
in neighboring high-performing countries like Japan, Korea, and Singapore 
(figure 3.7). 
Additionally, much of the professional development is designed to be 
school-based and collaborative and to pay particular attention to instructional 
improvement. Basic education in Shanghai has a long history of establishing 
professional communities to improve teachers’ instructional competencies. 
Among the multiple professional development options, two practices merit 
particular attention: teaching-research groups (box 3.4) and lesson observa-
tions (box 3.5). These activities expose teachers to best instructional practices 
and leverage every teacher’s knowledge and skills to contribute to the 
improvement of the  collective teaching community. 
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Figure 3.7 Officially Required Days of Professional Training per Year, Secondary Education
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Sources: Data from OECD 2009; World Bank 2011.
A similar model is in effect in Japan, the Lesson Study Approach, which is an 
interesting example of a simple and sustainable in-service training model (see 
box 3.6). Job-embedded teacher-to-teacher support and in-service training pro-
vide contextually relevant professional development opportunities to teachers. 
In addition to the teaching-research groups and lesson observations, at the city 
level Shanghai provides tiered professional development that targets teachers with 
different backgrounds. For novice teachers, Shanghai uses the one-year  in-service 
induction program as mentioned above. For teachers with a number of years of 
experience, Shanghai launched a program in 2014 to encourage group collabora-
tion for conducting research and developing curriculum. In the program’s first 
year, 32 groups were awarded a total of RMB 300,000 as financial support for 
their three-year projects. For experienced teachers, the city aims to develop among 
them a team of research talent with “dual skills”—teaching and management skills 
for leading the teaching field. A number of experienced  teachers and principals 
have received training to further hone their pedagogical and management skills. 
Under the dual-skills training, 3,000 principals and teachers have benefited and 
70 have been appointed principals of Shanghai’s model schools.
Teachers’ professional development is aligned with perceived needs. The 
“Municipal Primary and Secondary School Curriculum Plan” stipulates that 
school leaders should create targeted teacher training plans based on the results 
of each teacher’s evaluation. New teachers are assigned mentors to help 
strengthen their performance. If a teacher receives an unsatisfactory result in an 
evaluation, he or she is paired with a supervisor or senior teacher to receive moni-
toring and help. Clear and explicit standards for teaching and learning  provide 
another link between teacher professional development and perceived needs.
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Box 3.4 Teaching-Research Groups in China
China has been promoting teaching-research groups since 1957. The core objective of such 
groups is to allow teachers to conduct research and exchange ideas and resources on peda-
gogy and curriculum so as to improve their instructional capacity and teaching quality.
The structure of these teaching-research groups is commonly organized into four tiers: 
national, provincial or municipal, district, and school level. At the municipal level, Shanghai’s 
Municipal Education Commission Teaching-Research Office (founded in 1949), is the key 
agency responsible for designing curriculum plans, developing and updating teaching mate-
rial, conducting analysis of basic education quality, proposing reforms, and organizing teacher 
training. In particular, the office organizes city-level systematic teaching-research activities 
and collects best teaching practices from districts and schools for dissemination and promo-
tion. Each district in Shanghai also hosts a Teaching-Research Office. The Teaching-Research 
Office at the district level is often housed in the district’s Teacher Training Colleges or Centers, 
which have a mandate for in-service teacher training.
At the school level, teaching-research groups function as a professional development 
 platform consisting of teachers of the same subject. In larger schools, the groups are often 
further divided by grade. Each group has a leader who is responsible for organizing the activi-
ties and introducing novice teachers to the active learning community. The leader is also held 
accountable for overall teacher development in the group. The groups normally meet for two 
to three hours every week. In every teaching-research group, the major activities include
• Teacher professional development
• Coaching and guidance by senior teachers for junior teachers
• Induction of new teachers (almost 99 percent of surveyed schools have induction programs)
• Research on new subject content and pedagogical practices (84 percent of surveyed 
schools have established an overarching research topic for all teachers, 81 percent encour-
age individual-topic research, and 88 percent provide research topic options for teachers)
• Teacher performance evaluation by teachers within the same group, based on the fre-
quency, intensity, and achievements in the group activities.
The collaborative nature of teaching-research groups allows for the growth of the entire 
teaching community, rather than a few individuals. The tiered network of teaching-research 
groups at the municipal, district, and school levels enables quick and far-reaching dissemina-
tion of curriculum best practices.
In practice, teaching-research groups are a core aspect of teacher activities: 99 percent of 
the 153 schools surveyed host Teaching-Research Groups for different subjects and 100 per-
cent have specific requirements on teaching-research activities; 44 percent host teaching-
research group activities once a week and 53 percent host the activities once every two weeks. 
Some 85 percent of schools provide funding for the groups while 100 percent encourage 
teachers to participate in research projects. In addition, 92 percent of the principals surveyed 
consider school-level activities to be highly important for teachers’ professional development, 
29 percent put high importance on the Municipal Teaching-Research Office, and 59 percent 
consider the district-level Teaching-Research Office highly important.
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Box 3.5 Lesson Observations, Shanghai
Lesson observations take place throughout a teacher’s career in Shanghai. Within the school, 
junior teachers engage in regular lesson observations of senior teachers to learn best 
 practices. Reciprocally, senior teachers observe junior teachers’ lessons to provide feedback. 
Sometimes teachers teaching the same subject observe each other’s practices to provide peer 
feedback. This model allows teachers to benefit from one another’s experience and serves as a 
supportive mechanism to bring new or struggling teachers to the level of their peers. There are 
lesson competitions (gong kai ke) at the school, district, and city levels. Teachers prepare a 
 lesson and showcase it to the school community or a larger audience at the district or city 
level. Those with the best instructional practices are rewarded and the lesson is shared with 
the teaching community at large. Participation in those lesson competitions is also an impor-
tant factor in teacher evaluations. 
Tennessee has imported the model of lesson observations in its pilot Teacher Peer Excellence 
Group (TPEG). A group of 18 school principals traveled to China in 2013 to learn the practice. 
Upon their return, TPEG was rolled out in a number of schools in the state. Under TPEG, a group 
of teachers engage in collaborative lesson planning and peer lesson observations. Actionable, 
specific feedback is provided by the team to further refine the teaching practice. Preliminary 
research on this program shows encouraging results in teacher evaluations (Cheshier 2015). 
Box 3.6 Japan’s Lesson Study Approach
In Japan kenkyuu jugyou (research lessons) are a key part of the learning culture. Every 
teacher periodically prepares a best possible lesson that demonstrates strategies for achiev-
ing a specific goal (for example, students becoming active problem-solvers or students 
learning more from each other) in collaboration with other colleagues. A group of teachers 
observes while the lesson is taught and the lesson is usually recorded in a number of 
ways, including videotape, audiotape, and narrative or checklist observations that focus on 
areas of interest to the instructing teacher (for example, how many students volunteered 
their own ideas). Afterward, the group of teachers, and sometimes outside educators,  discuss 
the lesson’s strengths and weakness, ask questions, and make suggestions for improving the 
lesson. In some cases the revised lesson is given by another teacher a few days later and 
observed and discussed again. 
Teachers themselves determine the theme and frequency of research lessons. Large study 
groups often break up into subgroups of four to six teachers. The subgroups plan their own 
lessons but work toward the same goal, and teachers from all subgroups share and comment 
on lessons and try to attend the lesson and follow-up discussion. For a typical lesson study, the 
10–15 hours of group meetings are spread over three to four weeks. While schools let out 
between 2:40 and 3:45 p.m., teachers’ work days do not end until 5 p.m., which provides 
 additional time for collegial work and planning. Most lesson study meetings occur during the 
box continues next page
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Policy Goal 8: Motivating Teachers to Perform (Established)
Opportunities for promotion are linked to performance. As mentioned, the 
 performance of teachers that seek promotion to a higher rank must be evaluated. 
All new teachers in Shanghai have a one-year probationary period. At the end of 
their first year, teachers who do not pass the annual evaluation are not granted a 
contract to continue teaching. This screening mechanism ensures that all new 
teachers are qualified to continue teaching.
Accountability mechanisms are in place for teachers. According to State 
Council’s “Advice on Strengthening the Teaching Force,” teachers need to 
 complete 360 hours of professional development during their first five years of 
teaching to assist in the transition to the teaching career and ensure that teachers 
have a baseline level of knowledge and skills. Furthermore, principals at every 
school conduct annual teacher performance evaluations to identify strong teach-
ers as instructional leaders and assist weak teachers with improvement. Of the 
schools surveyed, 98 percent have written documentation of their evaluation 
systems for both teachers and students. The “Guidelines for Regular Accreditation 
of Primary and Secondary Teachers (Tentative)” require teachers to be accredited 
once every five years to continue teaching. Requirements include passing 
the teacher performance evaluation and fulfilling 360 hours of professional 
development. According to the Teachers Law, teachers can be dismissed for mis-
conduct, child abuse, and poor performance.
In addition to these explicit mechanisms, there is a strong sense of professional 
accountability among teachers and principals in Shanghai. As put by one teacher 
in Shanghai, 
Teachers always have the option of spending 10–15 minutes to review the home-
work and previous day work with the students so that challenging knowledge 
points where students make the most mistakes can be further elucidated. These 
10–15 minute periods make a world of difference in enhancing student grasp of the 
knowledge points. Most of teachers in Shanghai routinely do this. (Personal inter-
view with Mr. Xia, a veteran teacher, and current dean of education department, 
Shanghai Normal University, 2015.)
Box 3.6 Japan’s Lesson Study Approach (continued)
hours after school lets out. The research lessons allow teachers to refine individual lessons, 
consult with other teachers and get colleagues’ observations about their classroom practice, 
reflect on their own practice, learn new content and approaches, and build a culture that 
emphasizes continuous improvement and collaboration. Some teachers also give public 
research lessons, which expedites the spread of best practices across schools; allows princi-
pals, district personnel, and policy makers to see how teachers are grappling with new subject 
matter and goals; and gives recognition to excellent teachers.
Source: Darling-Hammond, Wei, and Andree 2010, 4. 
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Some compensation is linked to performance. In a teacher’s monthly salary, the 
performance-based proportion is allocated based on the overall results from the 
teacher evaluation. Another performance-based incentive is based on the teacher 
ranking framework. High-performing teachers can apply for higher teacher ranks, 
which entail a higher base salary. Since the implementation of performance pay in 
2009 (through the Ministry of Education statement “Guidance about Performance 
Based Pay in Compulsory Education”), the impact of these mechanisms has been 
evaluated. The main positive impacts include (1) reducing the teacher pay dispar-
ity between districts, as teachers in the remote rural districts tend to benefit most 
from performance pay; (2) contributing to the balanced development of core 
versus noncore subjects given that teaching hours are directly linked with pay so 
noncore teachers have equal incentive to teach the noncore subjects as the core 
subjects; (3) further motivating teachers to engage in professional development 
because a portion of pay is based on a performance evaluation.
However, a few challenges have emerged with regard to the design and imple-
mentation of the performance schemes. First, the magnitude of the performance 
pay may not be significant enough, especially for a few central districts that 
already have a higher base pay for teachers. Second, because the scheme is also 
based on years of experience, academic qualifications, and workload, the pay of 
those teachers who do not reach the established minimum standards will actually 
be lower than before the scheme. Finally, the performance pay scheme consoli-
dated several fragmented subsidy and in-kind benefit schemes, and as a result, 
some teachers felt that their overall level of pay and benefits may have decreased.
Much controversy surrounded the performance pay scheme when it was 
 initially implemented. Going forward, it is important to continue research into 
the impact of the scheme to determine how teachers respond to the incentives. 
Understanding teachers’ attitudes toward specific incentive programs is crucial to 
the success and effectiveness of this policy (OECD 2011b). It is also important 
to review the administrative processes through which incentives are introduced 
because procedural complications could be detrimental to the original intent of 
the policy itself (Lewis and Springer 2008). 
Summary
The use of SABER–Teachers questionnaires to assess teacher-related policies and 
practices in Shanghai yields a comprehensive picture of the way in which teach-
ers are selected, developed, supported, and evaluated. Based on the rubrics, this 
exercise finds that Shanghai scores at least “established” in all eight policy goals 
related to teachers, including (1) setting clear expectations for teachers, 
(2) attracting the best into teaching, (3) preparing teachers with useful training 
and experience, (4) matching teachers’ skills with students’ needs, (5) leading 
teachers with strong principals, (6) monitoring teaching and learning, (7) sup-
porting teachers to improve instruction, and (8) motivating teachers to perform.
Figure 3.8 summarizes the essence of teacher development policies 
in Shanghai. A three-pillar teacher development system effectively promotes 
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teaching excellence in Shanghai. Teachers are provided with a career ladder, sup-
ported with elaborate school-based professional development and in-service 
training through teaching-research groups, and their performance is evaluated 
accordingly and linked to career progression and performance pay. This compre-
hensive professional development framework incorporates multiple layers of in-
service training, evaluation of teacher performance, and a structured career ladder 
that provides both motivation and a mechanism for teachers to progress in their 
careers, which is key to Shanghai’s demonstrated excellence in education. 
The benchmarking and implementation survey also points to a number of 
areas in which Shanghai can focus its future reform efforts on teachers. Areas 
such as teacher distribution and the implementation and impact of performance 
pay based on the teacher career ladder were not explicitly assessed but turn out 
to be important dimensions.
First, the teacher recruitment entry criteria should be upgraded to require at least 
a bachelor’s degree. This practice will bring Shanghai up to the level of most 
of the OECD and other developed Asian countries. In reality, most of the appli-
cants already have a bachelor’s degree. The explicit recognition of the higher 
requirement will reduce unnecessary inefficiency in the recruitment process. 
Moreover, it will send a positive signal for the teaching profession. 
Figure 3.8 Shanghai’s Teacher Development Framework
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Source: Adapted from Zhang, Ding, and Xu 2016. 
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Additionally, Shanghai could increase the explicit number of professional 
development days. The formal, course-based professional development require-
ment in Shanghai (9 days) is slightly lower than in neighboring high-performing 
countries like Japan (10 days), Singapore (13 days), and Korea (14 days). On the 
other hand, Shanghai clearly stands out in its multiple layers of teacher profes-
sional development, with particular emphasis on school-based activities and 
teacher research groups.
Another area for improvement is the equitable distribution of teachers, especially 
qualified and experienced teachers, between rural and urban districts, and 
between model schools and regular schools. SABER does not fully address 
this issue and further analysis of the matter is warranted. Sufficient related 
research seems to indicate that more qualified and experienced teachers tend to 
 concentrate in high-performing and urban districts. Furthermore, anecdotal 
 evidence shows that rural and low-performing school districts are more likely 
to be  understaffed in nontesting subjects such as arts, music, and physical 
 education. Another shortage area may be in special education. As Shanghai moves 
toward mainstreaming special education students into regular classrooms, teach-
ers trained in special education will be in higher demand. It would be helpful to 
conduct a more detailed school-level analysis in the future to gain a more nuanced 
picture of teacher distribution and demand and supply for  specific subjects. 
Finally, very little research is available concerning the implementation and impact 
of the current teacher career ladder and performance pay system. Much  anecdotal 
evidence suggests that promotion of teachers within the professional ladder and 
the distribution of performance pay may in practice be overly tied to research 
and  publication, to the extent that some teachers are forced to forge research data 
and purchase publications just to satisfy the requirements for promotion. There 
have also been reports that the criteria may not be entirely transparent. 
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C h A P T E R  4
Financing Education for 
Quality and Equity 
Introduction
The Finance module of the Systems Approach for Better Education Results 
(SABER–Finance) takes stock of five aspects of school finance policies: (1) school 
conditions and resources, (2) allocation mechanisms, (3) revenue sources, 
(4) education spending, and (5) fiscal control and capacity. Data gathered through 
surveys with 153 principals, key informant interviews with teachers and officials 
of the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission, and review of local and global 
policy and research literature are used to complement the SABER policy instru-
ments to shed light on the extent to which policies are implemented.
SABER–Finance analyzes the collected data to assess whether the education 
finance system effectively realizes six policy goals: (1) ensuring basic conditions 
for learning, (2) monitoring learning conditions and outcomes, (3) overseeing 
service delivery, (4) budgeting with adequate and transparent information, 
(5) providing more resources to students who need them, and (6) managing 
resources efficiently (see figure 4.1). This instrument also provides a holistic 
review of whether each education finance system is making progress in achieving 
adequacy, equity, and efficiency. The scope of the analysis is limited primarily to 
public schools. 
Overall, it has been ascertained on the basis of SABER–Finance that Shanghai’s 
policy environment for educational finance can be scored between “established” 
and “advanced” (table 4.1). 
Policy Goal 1: Ensuring Basic Conditions for Learning (Advanced)
Detailed policies are in place ensuring basic educational inputs of infrastructure, 
learning materials, and teachers. Specific regulations stipulate the basic require-
ments for school infrastructure inputs such as safety and environmental construc-
tion standards, square footage per student, drinking water, hygienic facilities, and 
electricity in Shanghai. In addition to physical infrastructure, learning materials 
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Figure 4.1 Six Policy Goals under SABER–Finance
Ensuring basic
conditions for
learning
School
finance
Managing resources
efficiently
Monitoring learning
conditions and
outcomes
Overseeing service
delivery
Providing more
resources to students
who need them
Budgeting with
adequate and
transparent
information
Source: Vegas and Coffin 2013. 
Note: SABER = Systems Approach for Better Education Results.
are readily available for students. As of 2007, schools are required to provide free 
textbooks to students. The municipal textbook supervision committee annually 
produces a catalog of approved textbooks for schools to select and order from 
designated local bookstores. The national government has also released guidelines 
for schools to improve the conditions of their libraries and computer labs to aid 
learning. The provision of infrastructure and learning materials can contribute to 
student learning by enabling an environment conducive to learning for students 
and adequate working conditions for teachers.
With regard to teacher qualifications, primary school teachers are required 
to have at least a three-year tertiary vocational college degree (equivalent to 
the International Standard Classification of Education [ISCED] 5B level) and 
secondary teachers need to have at least a four-year bachelor’s degree (equivalent 
to the ISCED 5A level). However, in practice, more than 97 percent of current 
teachers in Shanghai already possess bachelor’s degrees (table 4.2). Only 
1.3  percent of teachers have three-year vocational degrees. As mentioned in 
chapter 3, this educational requirement can be strengthened to be equivalent to 
requirements for basic education teachers in other high-performing countries, 
who often have a bachelor’s degree equivalent to ISCED 5A. 
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Shanghai has also established guidelines for staffing norms in basic education 
to ensure a sufficient number of teachers are available. Each class should have no 
more than 40 students. The student-to-teacher ratio should be approximately 
21:1 in urban districts and 18:1 in rural districts. In secondary education, the ratio 
should be approximately 18:1.
However, in practice, disparities between schools still exist in the level of basic 
inputs. The 2015 National Compulsory Education Quality Monitoring Assessment 
revealed that in general public schools are better endowed than private schools 
in Shanghai and urban schools do better than rural schools (table 4.3). 
Urban and central districts in Shanghai tend to have more generous 
 teacher-to-student ratios and attract more highly qualified teachers compared 
Table 4.1 SABER–Finance Scoring, Shanghai
Policy and resource framework (Goals and levers) SABER score
Ensuring basic conditions for learning     
1. Setting policies to ensure basic inputs    
2. Establishing learning goals     
Monitoring learning conditions and outcomes    
1. Setting systems to monitor learning conditions     
2. Setting systems to assess learning outcomes     
Overseeing service delivery     
1. Setting mechanisms to verify availability of physical resources at schools    
2. Setting mechanisms to verify availability of human resources at schools    
Budgeting with adequate and transparent information    
1. Setting an informed budgeting process    
2. Ensuring comprehensiveness and transparency of the budgeting process     
Providing more resources to students in need     
1. Providing public resources to students from disadvantaged backgrounds    a
2. Setting school fees to represent a share of income for low-income families     
Managing resources efficiently     
1. Setting systems to verify the efficient use of educational resources     
2. Ensuring regular audits of education expenditures     
Note: Scoring rubric: Latent (    ), Emerging (    ), Established (    ), Advanced (    ). 
SABER = Systems Approach for Better Education Results.
a. In consultation with the SABER–Teacher team; the reason behind the score of “emerging” was the fact that Shanghai’s 
“disadvantaged” students need to update their status on a yearly basis.
Table 4.2 Actual Qualifications of New Teachers in Junior Secondary Schools in Shanghai
percent
Minimum requirement Overall Public Private Urban Rural
Three-year tertiary vocational college 1.3 1 3 0 4
Four-year bachelor’s degree 97.4 98 95 99 96
Master’s degree 1.3 1 1 1 0
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with suburban and rural districts (figures 4.2 and 4.3). The disparities can be 
mainly attributed to the cumulative results of the uneven fiscal capabilities of the 
districts. The same national monitoring report also confirms that Shanghai has 
the least disparity in the level of inputs compared with other provinces of China. 
Learning goals have been established in Shanghai’s education system with 
regard to completion, progression, and knowledge and skills. The city has estab-
lished a set of completion and progress goals for basic education. For primary 
education, the target enrollment rate is 100 percent and target graduation rate is 
Figure 4.2 Cross-District Differences in Teacher-to-Student Ratios in Shanghai Primary and 
Junior Secondary Schools
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Table 4.3 School Resources by Type of School in Shanghai
ratio (standard deviation)
Proportion of 
qualified 
teachers
Condition of 
teacher 
shortage Class size
Richness of 
extracurricular 
activities
Student-to-
teacher ratio
Quality of 
physical 
infrastructure
Quality of 
educational 
resources
Public 0.94 (0.18) 0.93 (2.86) 38 (22) 1.91 (2.25) 10.11 (9.65) −0.36 (2.54) 0.02 (2.82)
Private 0.84 (0.26) 1.03 (3.25) 41 (16) 2.5 (1.45) 15.21 (12.08) −0.48 (3.49) −0.17 (3.95)
Overall 0.94 (0.2) 0.94 (2.88) 39 (21) 1.96 (2.22) 10.55 (10.38) −0.37 (2.63) 0.01 (2.93)
Source: Data from OECD 2012. 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. 
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99 percent or higher. For secondary education, the graduation rate goal is 90  percent 
or higher. The city’s basic education system also has to fulfill goals for grade repeti-
tion (less than 1 percent for primary education and less than 2 percent for second-
ary education) and a 0 percent dropout rate. In addition, more than 95 percent of 
students need to pass a physical education exam and more than 80 percent of 
students are expected to participate in extracurricular activities in arts and science. 
These specific learning goals would allow the education finance system to more 
effectively channel resources to inputs that contribute to quality education. 
Shanghai has made significant strides in basic education performance. In 2014, the 
city’s student progression rate to senior secondary school reached 97 percent.
Shanghai’s education system sets learning objectives on the knowledge areas 
and skills students need to master as they progress through basic education, as 
specified in the curriculum standards for each subject. Schools administer 
 midterm and final examinations to assess students’ progress in achieving these 
learning objectives. In addition, the city administers graduation examinations 
at the end of fifth grade and ninth grade to assess citywide student learning out-
comes. The learning objectives enable teachers to align their daily work with 
students’ learning. They also allow the school finance system to measure success 
in achieving quality education.
Figure 4.3 Cross-District Differences in Proportion of Teachers with higher-than-Required Certificate in 
Shanghai Primary and Junior Secondary Schools
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Policy Goal 2: Monitoring Learning Conditions and Outcomes 
(Established)
Learning conditions in schools are closely monitored. The city collects informa-
tion on many aspects of schools, including drinking water, hygienic facilities, 
electricity, libraries, laboratories, and qualified teachers. Districts in Shanghai also 
conduct regular school inspections to verify whether policies on learning condi-
tions are strictly implemented. This close monitoring ensures that schools are 
held accountable for providing basic educational inputs. In addition, the school 
census is produced annually to provide up-to-date data on student enrollment 
and teacher information at the school level. Each district collects the data from 
its schools and submits it to the city for data compilation at the municipal level 
once every year (enrollment data are submitted once every semester) through an 
electronic system. Some schools also collect more detailed information from 
students, such as family background, for the schools’ own use in developing tai-
lored education strategies. However, Shanghai has some catching up to do in its 
use of information technology in school data collection. Although 95 percent of 
the schools indicate that their student registration profiles (with basic student 
background information) are completely or mostly in an electronic format, only 
72 percent keep student growth profiles (with more detailed information on 
student achievement over the years) and 67 percent keep teacher professional 
development profiles completely or mostly in an electronic format.
The Asian region contains some of the world’s most advanced information-
driven societies, as well as some that are at the very early stages of development. 
Among the most developed countries with information policies are China, Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, and Singapore. Japan is moving toward achieving total and 
easy access to information driven by the u-Japan Policy Package.1 Singapore’s 
e-Gov2 and Korea’s “Informatization” policies3 strive for complete coverage. The 
availability of information on students, teachers, and infrastructure in an elec-
tronic format allows policy makers to retrieve information promptly and monitor 
trends and changes in learning conditions to make timely adjustments in resource 
allocations. In an effort to enhance the collection of data on education and its 
subsequent analysis, Shanghai is building a comprehensive education manage-
ment information system (EMIS) that integrates basic education statistics such 
as enrollment and teacher attendance and more detailed student learning out-
comes. This EMIS can be an effective tool for tracking student growth and con-
ducting specific analyses of student learning. It is, however, important to study 
how improved access to education information and data on competency and 
satisfaction levels of students, teachers, and parents as well as groups most 
directly affected by education policies is being analyzed and used. Additionally, 
how are the level of electronic data collection and the resources being allocated 
to the process being measured? What is the rate of achievement across various 
groups? Efforts need to be made to better understand the relationship between 
improving access to data and achievement to effectively reform and use the pres-
ent EMIS in Shanghai. 
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City and nationwide student exams are administered annually to measure 
student learning outcomes. In addition to monitoring school inputs, a high-
quality education system collects regular information on student learning out-
comes. As mentioned in SABER–Teachers (chapter 3), all students take the 
city-level graduation examination (zhong kao) at the end of ninth grade. This 
exam also serves as the selection test for senior secondary school, making it a 
high-stakes test as well. Scores from the test determine whether students will 
progress to senior secondary school and which type of senior secondary school 
they will enter. At the end of the senior secondary level (twelfth grade), students 
take a college entrance examination (gao kao) that determines whether and 
where a student will go to college.4 The data from these assessments help policy 
makers track progress on curriculum standards and trends in student learning 
outcomes. Policy makers also have access to the assessment data disaggregated by 
district and by school, and each school has student-specific performance scores. 
School Evaluations
Although the city sets targets for completion and progression to encourage over-
all achievement, and data can be disaggregated by school, schools are not evalu-
ated based on their students’ scores or rate of enrollment in senior secondary 
schools. Because the student population profile differs substantially across 
schools, this policy discourages schools from being heavily score driven and does 
not penalize schools that host a large number of academically challenged or dis-
advantaged students. Two types of school evaluations are conducted in Shanghai:
1. Regular school supervision is conducted by each district’s education supervi-
sion office. According to the national “Regulations for Education Supervision” 
and Shanghai’s “Advice on Promoting School Developmental Supervision and 
Evaluation (tentative),” the district’s education supervision office visits district 
schools at least once a year. The comprehensive supervision uses each school’s 
development plan as an important reference point and encompasses pedagogi-
cal, operational, and personnel aspects.
2. Shanghai has also been implementing a comprehensive school evaluation 
 system that goes beyond student achievement assessments—the “Green 
Indicators of Academic Quality of Primary and Secondary School Students”—
since 2011. The instrument comprises questionnaires for students, teachers, 
and principals. It aims to assess school quality in a holistic fashion, including 
students’ motivation for learning, academic burden, and student-teacher rela-
tionships (see table 4.4). Every year, the city selects a random sample of schools 
in basic education across districts for the assessment. In 2011, 804 schools/
principals along with 63,640 students (fourth graders and ninth graders) and 
9,445 teachers participated. The students took academic performance assess-
ments, filled out surveys, and were tested for physical health. The teachers 
and principals completed a survey. The city uses the results to evaluate the 
overall academic quality of basic education and reveal gaps for improvement. 
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In addition to an annual municipal report on the assessment results, the city 
produces a report for each district. Rather than ranking districts based on the 
results, the purpose of the district-level report is to identify more contextual 
areas of strengths and weaknesses for each district. 
Results of school evaluations are analyzed by the bureaus of education in the 
districts as well as in the municipal office to form an overall assessment of the 
quality of education in the city, and to identify specific areas where performance 
may be weak. This information is then used to develop teacher training programs 
targeting the most challenging areas. The city also uses these data to identify 
weak or low-performing schools for additional management and financing inter-
ventions such as “entrusted management” (weituo guanli),5 a policy initiative 
launched by the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission in 2007. 
Policy Goal 3: Overseeing Service Delivery (Established)
Shanghai has established a city-level system to determine the annual school 
 calendar along with mechanisms to monitor learning materials and physical 
resources at schools. Every year, the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 
releases a school-year calendar that sets the beginning and end of each academic 
semester. For school year 2014, the fall semester started on September 1 and 
ended on January 31 (22 weeks). The spring semester started on February 27 and 
ended on June 30 (19 weeks). Municipal stipulation of instruction time facili-
tates coordination of textbook distribution and citywide examinations and 
ensures that resources are used to maximize quality learning time.
Based on the annual class instruction plan and Shanghai’s school calendar, the 
average number of intended hours per year of total instruction time in primary 
schools is 765 hours. This figure is less than the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) average reported in 2013 (table 4.5) 
but greater than in countries like Japan, Korea, and Finland. However, further 
investigation is warranted to better understand the qualitative differences 
between classroom instruction time in different countries. 
Table 4.4 Green Indicators of Academic Quality of Primary and Secondary 
School Students
1. Student’s academic performance
2. Student’s learning motivation
3. Student’s academic burden
4. Student-teacher relationship
5. Teacher pedagogy
6. Principal’s leadership in curriculum development
7. Effect of student’s socioeconomic background on achievement
8. Student’s moral behavior
9. Student’s physical and mental health
10. Progress on Indicators 1–9
Source: Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2011. 
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To ensure timely delivery of learning materials, Shanghai designates a number 
of bookstores in the city for textbook distribution. Before the start of the school 
year, the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission coordinates with these 
bookstores on textbook selection and delivery. The bookstores then partner with 
schools before and during the beginning of the school year to deliver textbooks. 
This system allows bookstores to have quick and accurate information about 
demand for textbooks and respond accordingly, thus preventing delays in text-
book distribution.
Several policies are in place in Shanghai to regulate the construction of safe 
and proper school facilities. The city has established steering committees on 
school construction safety at both the city and the district levels, with members 
from various relevant departments, specifically charged with monitoring con-
struction progress and related expenditure. To facilitate high-quality construction 
of school facilities, schools in Shanghai are exempt from paying certain types of 
construction-related expenses, such as sewage fees and land registration fees.
Shanghai has a mechanism in place to verify teacher attendance, and substi-
tute teachers are provided if there are absences. In Shanghai, teacher absence is 
not a common issue; the principal of each school closely monitors teacher atten-
dance. In addition, the district conducts unannounced supervisory visits to 
schools and inspects teacher attendance. Teachers who are absent without 
approval are subject to possible dismissal. If a teacher is absent for a short period, 
other teachers of the same subject will substitute. If a teacher goes on longer-
term maternity or sick leave, the school will hire substitute teachers.
According to the results of the principals’ survey, the most common practice 
when facing a teacher shortage is to hire retired teachers as substitute teachers 
(61 percent of those surveyed). Sometimes, schools also borrow teachers from 
peer schools for a short period (17 percent). In addition, each district main-
tains a pool of substitute teachers who are seniors in tertiary teacher prepara-
tion programs or new graduates, who can substitute for  teachers on leave with 
short notice. Therefore, students are guaranteed to have a teacher present in 
the classroom.
Table 4.5 Average Number of Intended Instruction hours per Year, 
Primary Education
Country Average number of intended instruction hours per year
Australia 953
Canada 919
Finland 654
Japan 754
Korea, Rep. 632
Netherlands 940
OECD average 802
Shanghaia 765
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2013, table D1.1). 
a. Shanghai’s figure is calculated on the basis of information provided by the Shanghai Municipal Education 
Commission in 2015.
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Policy Goal 4: Budgeting with Adequate and Transparent Information 
(Established)
Shanghai creates its education budget based on clear guidelines. The “Provision 
on Budget Management for Institutions” produced by the Shanghai Municipal 
Education Commission specifies the criteria for education funding. Budget allo-
cation for each school in Shanghai follows a four-step process:
1. Each school prepares a budget including explanatory information to the dis-
trict for evaluation. Every school in Shanghai prepares a three-year plan to set 
development goals. The development plan serves as an important basis for 
each school’s budget proposal. Schools also take into consideration staff, enroll-
ment, and special programs when preparing their budgets. The staff association 
at each school, made up of approximately 30 percent of teachers and staff, is 
also involved in providing suggestions and feedback in the budget preparation 
process. The district compiles the budgets into a master version to submit to 
the district’s Department of Finance.
2. The Department of Finance evaluates the proposal and provides an approved 
estimated budget to schools with feedback.
3. Schools adjust their proposed budgets based on feedback from the Department 
of Finance and submit the revised versions to the district. The district again 
compiles the budgets to submit to the district’s Department of Finance for a 
second round of evaluation.
4. After the district-level Departments of Finance approve the budgets of the 
schools within their districts, the master budget is delivered to the municipal 
government for approval. The approved budget is then allocated to districts, 
which in turn distribute the budget to district schools.
By implementing this rules-based process, not only do schools have the 
autonomy to reflect their needs in their proposed budgets, but the city is able to 
quickly respond to education expenditure needs and stay apprised of resources 
allocated to each school for accountability. Districts play a key role in basic 
 education financing.
At the end of the fiscal year, the city collects data on actual education expen-
diture to provide information for future budget planning. In addition to the 
annual budget process, Shanghai also plans for education expenditures on a 
multiyear basis. The city engages in both three-year and five-year budget plan-
ning for education funding.
Education budgeting is based on adequate and transparent information and 
made available to the public. In addition to the four-step budgeting process, to 
ensure adequate funding for education Shanghai adheres to the national “three 
increases” guideline specified in the 2006 amendment to the 1986 Compulsory 
Education Law of the People’s Republic of China: (1) the increase in education 
funding should be higher than the increase in the city’s regular revenue; (2) per 
capita student funding should increase every year; and (3) teacher salaries and 
student per capita operational funding should increase every year.6 
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Shanghai has consistently emphasized the importance of education in its 
human development agenda. The municipal government’s expenditure on educa-
tion topped 3.5 percent of GDP in 2013. It is important to note that the relatively 
low rate of public expenditure on education as a share of GDP, compared with 
other high-performing systems (see table 4.6), can be attributed to the city’s con-
tinuous economic growth along with a small school-age population, rather than 
an overall low level of investment. In fact, the city requires that all districts devote 
no less than 16 percent of their public expenditures to education. If districts have 
difficulty financing their budget allocations, the city will transfer funds from well-
resourced districts to subsidize public education. In reality, 43 percent of the 
schools surveyed indicated that lack of funds has never been a reason for termi-
nating any education initiative; 47 percent indicated that they have rarely encoun-
tered the problem; and only 9 percent have faced the problem multiple times. 
Even though Shanghai devotes a smaller proportion of its GDP to education, 
because of its large revenue base, its total public education expenditure per student 
far exceeds the average for China nationwide at every level of education (table 4.7). 
Public schools receive allocations for personnel and operational expenditures. 
Personnel expenditures cover salaries and benefits and are based on the number 
Table 4.6 Public Expenditure on Education as a Share of GDP
Country or economy Public expenditure on education as share of GDP (%)
China (2013) 4.2
Finland (2011) 6.8
Hong Kong SAR, China (2013) 3.8
Japan (2012) 3.9
Korea, Rep. (2011) 4.9
Singapore (2013) 2.9
Shanghai (2013) 3.5
United States (2011) 5.2
Sources: UNESCO Institute for Statistics 2015 (http://data.uis.unesco.org/Index.aspx?queryid=181); China 
Statistical Yearbook 2014, “2013 Public Expenditure on Education”  (http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2015 
/ indexch.htm); Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 2015, “2013 Shanghai GDP” (http://www.stats-sh .
gov.cn/sjfb/201401/266386.html).
Table 4.7 Total per Student Public Expenditure by Level of Education, 2013
U.S. Dollars
Shanghai China
Preprimary 3,504 1,066
Primary 3,810 1,377
Junior secondary 5,193 1,878
Senior secondary 7,861 2,109
Secondary vocational 7,300 2,281
Higher education (bachelor’s degree) 8,783 4,841
Higher education (vocational) 6,094 2,759
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China 2013 (http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01&zb 
=A0306&sj=2010) and China Statistical Yearbook: Education 2013 (http://www.stats.gov.cn / tjsj/ndsj/2013 
/ indexeh.htm). 
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of teachers and staff at the school. Nonsalary operational expenditures are mainly 
distributed in the form of a per student allocation. The Shanghai Municipal 
Education Commission sets annual standards for the minimum per student allo-
cation. For example, the 2014 guidelines require the per student allocation to be 
no lower than RMB 1,600 for primary schools, and no lower than RMB 1,800 
for secondary schools. Each district can choose to increase the amount based on 
its own revenue. Operational expenditures also include training fees for teachers 
(based on the number of teachers) and administrative expenses (such as work-
related transportation, meals, and meetings). The district is responsible for mak-
ing allocations for school renovation and construction. According to the survey 
conducted with 153 school principals, the operational budget is commonly used 
to cover the following items: utilities (99 percent of schools use the operational 
budget for this item), purchases of learning materials (90 percent), office sup-
plies (98 percent), training (91 percent), equipment purchases (95 percent), and 
building and facility maintenance (94 percent).
In the funding allocation scheme, student performance is deliberately excluded 
from the criteria so that schools enrolling students with academic challenges are 
not disadvantaged. However, schools in high-revenue districts (usually in the 
central area of Shanghai) tend to have better education resources because these 
affluent districts not only have a higher absolute level of revenue but also can 
afford to invest more than the 16 percent threshold (established by the Shanghai 
municipal office).
The planned and executed municipal education budget is comprehensive and 
publicly available. Every year, the Shanghai municipal government releases a 
report to the public on the previous year’s execution of the city-level budget 
and budget planning for the coming year, which includes a section on education. 
The education section covers (1) the current year’s budget; (2) a summary of 
budget data for both revenue and expenditure; (3) the previous year’s bud-
get outturn; and (4) an explanation of the budget implications of new policy 
 initiatives. All education expenditure information is collected, consolidated, 
and made available within 10 months of the end of the fiscal year. In addition, 
district-level budget data are available online. A number of schools also publish 
their planned and executed education budgets on the school website for public 
viewing. This prompt and comprehensive documentation presents policy mak-
ers with information on the efficiency of budget execution and allows for public 
monitoring. At the school level, 80 percent of schools surveyed present the 
school’s executed budget to the staff association once or twice a year as a finance 
monitoring measure.
Policy Goal 5: Providing More Resources to Students Who Need Them 
(Established)
Shanghai has specific policies at the district and household levels to assist 
 students from disadvantaged backgrounds with education expenses. Tuition is 
free for basic education (first through ninth grades) in Shanghai, and the city 
Financing Education for Quality and Equity  59
How Shanghai Does It • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0790-9 
abolished the textbook and miscellaneous fees in 2007. All other fees for basic 
education, such as extracurricular activities, uniforms, and meals are determined 
at schools’ discretion. Furthermore, to reduce the prevalence of tutoring, in 2013 
the city released guidelines stipulating that schools are not allowed to offer com-
pensated tutoring or after-school classes. Nor can public schoolteachers offer paid 
tutoring sessions outside the school.
Shanghai released “Advice on Program to Improve Student Nutrition at 
Compulsory Education Level,” which allocates funding to schools to provide free 
lunches to students whose family incomes are below the poverty line, or whose 
parent(s) has a rural residence. For senior secondary (grade 10–12) expenses, poor 
families can apply every year for an education subsidy of between RMB 1,000 
and RMB 3,000. In addition, eligible families with special economic hardships or 
with children with disabilities can apply for an exemption from tuition every 
year and receive RMB 2,000 as an annual education subsidy. These targeted assis-
tance programs in Shanghai’s education finance system  provide more resources 
to poor families, contributing to more equal educational opportunities.
In addition to municipal policy regulations, 70 percent of the schools surveyed 
address educational access for children of migrant families (see box 4.1), disabled 
Box 4.1 Education of Migrant Children in Shanghai
Because of rapidly increasing rates of urbanization and migration in China, it has been difficult 
for urban authorities to accommodate the basic development needs of the swelling popula-
tions of the country’s big cities. For example, in Shanghai, the number of nonlocals increased 
from 1.7 million in 1986 to 9.6 million in 2012, swelling to almost 40 percent of the city’s popula-
tion (Ming 2014). In 1996, the Ministry of Education drafted the “Provisional Act Regarding the 
Education of School-Age Children of the Floating Population,” stating that public schools had 
an obligation to enroll children with local residence permits. However, this requirement pre-
sented several challenges. In 2006, the revised Compulsory Education Law again emphasized 
the host government’s responsibility for migrant children. But it also mentioned the principle 
of “enrollment in nearby schools.” Before 2008, migrant students in Beijing and Shanghai were 
only entitled to public schooling if their parents could produce the “Five Licenses”: temporary 
residence permit, proof of employment, proof of residence, certificate from the place of origin 
showing that the family could not provide caregiving support to its children there, and the 
hukou booklet (Ming 2014). In 2006, Human Rights Watch estimated that as many as 90 percent 
of migrant workers did not have all five licenses and hence had difficulty seeking public educa-
tion services. The National Population and Family Planning Commission estimated in 2012 that 
3.5 percent of migrant children in Beijing were not attending school; 5.1 percent of migrant 
children in Shanghai, and 5.3 percent of those in Guangzhou were not in school, while the 
national average was 2 percent.a Although the government of Shanghai reduced these license 
requirements from five to two, in Beijing, the five license requirement is still in effect and posing 
obstacles for public school enrollment of migrant children (Ming 2014). 
box continues next page
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children, and children from disadvantaged families in their school development 
plans. The ratio is much higher for public schools (75 percent) than for private 
schools (55 percent) and for rural schools (74 percent) than for urban schools 
(67 percent). Overall, another 27 percent address the issue in their daily work, 
but not in the school plans, suggesting that in practice the educational access of 
the disadvantaged student population is of substantial concern to schools. 
Policies to address equity in basic education tend to concentrate more at the 
school and district levels rather than being aimed at individual students. At the 
district level, Shanghai implements an “education levy” to transfer resources 
more equitably. Under the policy, all districts collect an education tax, part of 
which is transferred to the municipal level. The municipal government then 
redistributes the proceeds of the tax to districts with poorer schools as additional 
education funding. Districts in the rural area of Shanghai are major beneficiaries 
of this policy given that they often host more socioeconomically disadvantaged 
students and generate lower district income revenue.
At the school level, Shanghai uses a number of financing, management, and 
twinning strategies aimed at improving the performance of poorly perform-
ing schools. The most prominent model is the “entrusted school” management 
 system, which involves additional financing, management, and professional sup-
port from high-performing schools to low-performing schools. Unlike the charter 
school movement in the United States, for example, the entrusted school man-
agement model often entrusts management to another high-performing school 
rather than to a private entity.
Financing and Management of “Entrusted Schools”
The Shanghai Municipal Education Commission has been far ahead of its coun-
terparts in other provinces in ensuring equality of access to quality schools. In 
1994, almost five years before the rest of the country, Shanghai eliminated the 
The Shanghai Municipal Education Commission recognizes the importance of making 
sure that migrant students obtain a quality education and has therefore adopted a policy of 
integration. According to OECD (2010, 96), Shanghai is among the cities that have dealt with 
migrant children with “reason and sympathy.” The municipal government is committed to 
 providing the nine-year basic education to all Shanghai residents including eligible migrant 
children. As of 2015, Shanghai defines eligibility criteria as (1) one of the parents having held 
the Shanghai Temporary Resident Card for more than three years, and (2) one of the parents 
having had an employment certificate in Shanghai for two years. In addition to neighborhood 
public schools, Shanghai also has a program of purchasing enrollment spaces from private 
schools to admit eligible migrant children for free. 
a. China Labour Bulletin 2013 (online). “Migrant workers and their children.” http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/migrant 
-workers-and-their-children.
Box 4.1 Education of Migrant Children in Shanghai (continued)
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“key school” system. The Chinese system of education had a long tradition of key 
schools, or public schools that received greater resources than other schools and 
were more selective. Shanghai requires its students to attend their local neigh-
borhood school at the primary and lower secondary levels rather than compete 
for limited spots at key schools. The positive impacts of this reform included (1) 
no more high-stakes exams for students’ entry into key schools, (2) a more inclu-
sive and heterogeneous distribution of the student population by class and abil-
ity, and (3) alleviation of parents’ stress for school choice at the primary and 
lower  secondary levels. To further improve all children’s chances to attain a high-
quality education, the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission in 2007 
launched a noteworthy initiative called entrusted management to provide finan-
cial and technical assistance to low-performing schools in Shanghai. This initia-
tive was based on the findings of a school development experience in Pudong 
District (see box 4.2). 
Entrusted schools (weituo guanli), a prominent approach to education 
financing in Shanghai, was a model specially developed to improve the 
 quality of education in low-performing schools, particularly in rural areas. 
Box 4.2 The Origin of Entrusted Management Model of Shanghai: The Pudong 
Experience
history: “Entrusted management” originated from the development experience of Pudong 
District in Shanghai. Since 2005, the government in Pudong has carried out entrusted man-
agement on a trial basis. A low-performing public school, Donggou Senior Secondary School, 
was entrusted to the Shanghai Education Management Consulting Center, with financial sup-
port from the government. Within four years, Donggou Senior Secondary School was trans-
formed from a “low-tier school” to a well-recognized top-level school among the public 
schools. This success attracted a great deal of public attention, especially in view of the rural-
urban disparity in school quality and culture in Shanghai. 
Policy initiative: In 2007, the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission began to roll out 
this entrusted management model to more schools in the city. The newly developed model 
has kept the essence of the Pudong experiment. High-performing public schools or well-
regarded specialized education organizations located in the center of Shanghai City may take 
over the management of low-performing schools, backed with financial support and monitor-
ing from the government. In this model, while the original ownership of the entrusted low-
level schools remains unchanged, the top-level schools entrusted with the low-level schools 
have the right to make decisions in school management and core teaching-learning practices. 
The focus rests on the holistic development of the school culture and improvement of the 
quality of education. In practice, high-level schools or specialized education organizations 
work together with entrusted low-level schools to develop a three-year or five-year school 
development plan that lays the groundwork for the long-term development of entrusted 
schools and helps prevent the entrusted schools from reverting to their original status. 
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Under this  system, the municipal government devotes a special budget to 
provide  incentives to strong schools or specialized education organizations to 
support weak schools through a memorandum of understanding or a contract. 
School leaders (usually principals) from strong schools are deployed to partici-
pate in the management of weak schools. The memorandum of understanding 
specifies the details of the technical assistance to be provided by the new 
management team. Through this pairing of school leaders, weak schools learn 
strategies for achieving high performance and gain capacity in school manage-
ment and instructional practices. Funds are only released upon satisfactory 
achievement of performance indicators specified in the contract.
The pairing has been found to contribute to capacity building in weak 
schools. Reportedly, in 2007 the number of senior-grade teachers increased by 
more than 5  percent in 51 percent of the weak junior secondary schools that 
were involved in the entrusted management program, and increased by more 
than 10 percent in 29 percent of such schools (Shen 2007).
According to Tan (2013), in her detailed analysis of Shanghai’s education 
model, the entrusted management program can take either of two formats: (1) to 
strengthen school leadership by replacing the school principal in a weak school, 
or (2) to support the existing leadership by sending good teachers. Quality is 
assured by periodic monitoring and evaluation by the Shanghai Education 
Evaluation Institute (regarded as a third-party evaluator) at the initial, middle, 
and final stages. The evaluation combines self-evaluation from entrusted and 
entrusting entities themselves along with evaluation from experts. In the self-
evaluation process, the entrusting schools or organizations design the self- 
evaluation instrument based upon their development plan, and then evaluate 
themselves according to this instrument, specifying the objectives, actions, 
empirical evidence for these actions, outcomes, and effectiveness that correspond 
to each indicator. In the evaluation conducted by experts, the experts critically 
examine the changes over time, distill lessons learned, and point out problems to 
be resolved in the future. 
To further increase students’ chances of entering high-performing senior sec-
ondary schools, the Shanghai authorities in 2007 introduced a “quota allocation 
policy” (minge fenpei fa). Under this policy high-performing experimental schools 
will have to set aside a quota of 18 percent7 of senior secondary school vacancies 
to all students graduating from junior secondary schools in each district. Chances 
of entering high-performing senior secondary schools, within the specified quota, 
will be based on merit and available to all students (Tan 2013). 
Special Education
The World Health Organization recommends that countries provide main-
stream programs and services that “address the barriers that exclude persons 
with disabilities from participating equally with others in any activity and service 
intended for the general public, such as education” (WHO and World Bank 
2011, 264). Most OECD countries generally provide mainstream education 
services for students with special needs (box 4.3). Shanghai has special schools 
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Box 4.3 Special Education Provision in Other Countries
Japan
Based on specific disabilities, special education is provided in three ways: in special schools, in 
special classes and resource rooms within normal schools, or within the normal classroom. 
Whenever possible, Japanese educators try to keep students with mild to moderate learning 
disabilities in class and on track with their peers. Separate schools are reserved for students 
who cannot learn the same way as children in normal schools, including students who are 
blind, deaf, or otherwise handicapped. In 2003, 1.6 percent of Japanese students in primary 
and lower secondary school received special education. For students with minor learning dif-
ficulties, classmates are expected to help one another. This process is mutually beneficial 
because tutoring another student reinforces the concepts for the stronger student. Overall, 
the entire process reinforces the sense of community within the classroom.
Singapore
The Ministry of Education and the National Council of Social Services fund special education 
schools that are typically structured around the type of disability. However, there are long 
waiting lists for admission. Special needs education is available through the postsecondary 
level, where students with intellectual disabilities are prepared for the workforce through spe-
cial training programs. Whenever possible, the government encourages students to join the 
mainstream educational system, either initially or after having met certain benchmarks in spe-
cial education. To help facilitate this mainstreaming, Special Needs Officers are placed in main-
stream schools to help students with conditions such as dyslexia or high-functioning autism. 
The ministry also announced that in the coming years, they hope to have 10 percent of all 
primary and secondary school teachers trained in special education. Singapore does not 
require students with special needs who are unable to attend a mainstream school to com-
plete compulsory education. The Singapore government estimates that those who cannot or 
do not attend school comprise 0.01 percent of the population.
Korea
The Ministry of Education requires that there be at least one special school in each province to 
serve the estimated 2.4 percent of Korean students who need special education. The majority 
of special schools are comprehensive, serving students of all ages with severe handicaps. 
Students with mild to moderate special needs are encouraged to remain in the mainstream 
schools, either enrolled in special classes within the school, or in a combination of special and 
mainstream classes according to ability. In 2007, the Ministry of Education instituted a pro-
gram intended to integrate special needs education into mainstream education as much as 
possible. Central components of this program were the creation of more jobs for special needs 
teachers in mainstream schools and professional development for mainstream teachers to 
prepare them to work with students with special needs. Currently, the ministry is in the process 
of expanding compulsory special needs education to children as young as age four, upgrading 
vocational opportunities for teenage special needs students, and establishing special needs 
support groups in colleges.
box continues next page
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for students with hearing, visual, and speech disabilities, as well as schools for 
mentally challenged children and those with autism. Students with disabilities or 
special needs do not yet commonly join mainstream education; however, the 
Shanghai Municipal Education Commission is working to develop formal special 
education pathways in mainstream and special schools, including the develop-
ment of separate curricula and teaching materials (NCEE 2014). Additionally, 
they have established formal certificates for special education teacher training 
and have been working toward setting standards for preservice teacher training 
in special education. 
In 2014, the commission announced plans to offer individualized education to 
children with disabilities who receive medical care. This plan comprised a com-
prehensive approach integrating expertise from teachers and doctors to design a 
unique curriculum for each child based on his or her needs. It involves assign-
ment of community doctors to local schools to provide regular support to teach-
ers and parents of children with special needs. As of 2014, Shanghai was reported 
to have more than 9,000 registered disabled students with conditions including 
blindness, deafness, autism, learning difficulties, and Down’s syndrome (NCEE 
2014). Shanghai could consider establishing and strengthening a comprehensive 
education system that allows students with special needs to be systematically 
integrated into the same classrooms as nondisabled children, to the extent appro-
priate, so that all children, as they become adults, are fully engaged with society 
and, later, the labor market. 
Finland
In 2010, 23.3 percent of comprehensive school students in Finland received extra instruction 
from a school-based Special Needs Education Teacher in the subjects in which the student 
needed help. Of this group, 12 percent received aid for a speech disorder, 40.5 percent received 
help in reading or writing, 23.7 percent for learning difficulties in mathematics, 9 percent for 
learning difficulties in foreign languages, 5.5 percent for adjustment difficulties or emotional 
disorders, and 8.9 percent for other learning difficulties. Students classified as having more 
intensive learning difficulties, including severely delayed development, severe handicaps, 
autism, dysphasia, and visual or hearing impairment (1.2 percent of the school population in 
2010) were educated in a special education school. Special education teachers are important 
in the process of diagnosis and intervention, but it is not up to them alone to identify students. 
Each school has a group of staff that meets twice a month to assess the success of individual 
classrooms and potential concerns within classrooms. This group, comprising the principal, 
the school nurse, the special education teacher, the school psychologist, a social worker, and 
the classroom teachers, determines whether problems exist, as well as how to rectify them. If 
students are considered to need help beyond what the school can provide, the school helps 
the family find professional intervention.
Source: NCEE 2015. 
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Policy Goal 6: Managing Resources Efficiently (Advanced)
Systems are in place to verify the use of educational resources. It is important to 
review education expenditures against the planned education budget, to hold 
actors in the school finance system accountable for their use of resources. Under 
the “Regulations on Primary and Secondary School Finance,” schools in Shanghai 
must use allocated funding within defined categories. All purchases made by the 
school need to be supported by documentation and receipts. Because teacher 
salaries are a major education expenditure, a personnel database can help track 
related expenses. Shanghai has a personnel database that is updated comprehen-
sively at least once every year. The database is also updated whenever a teacher 
is hired or dismissed at the school level because the school needs to report the 
procedure to the district immediately for approval. Although this procedure 
allows personnel changes to be accounted for promptly, more regular updates of 
the personnel database might be helpful along with checks against the payroll 
database to make adjustments in salary distributions.
In addition to teacher salaries, capital cost for construction of school facili-
ties is a major educational expenditure. The legal and regulatory framework 
for school construction requires Shanghai to use an open competition method 
for procurement. School construction contracts are all based on open bidding. 
Each district in Shanghai has a specific office that helps schools with the 
 public bidding process and receives complaints. This transparent process 
ensures the efficient use of funding for school construction and is less condu-
cive to corruption.
Education expenditures are audited regularly in Shanghai. Under the 
“Regulations on Primary and Secondary School Finance,” schools are required 
to submit reports on education expenditure and revenue to district and munic-
ipal Departments of Finance every year. According to the survey results, 
98 percent and 96 percent of the schools have specific policies on finance 
management and capital management, respectively, to ensure strict financial 
compliance. In addition to financial reporting, schools are required to have 
internal financial supervision of the budget, revenue, expenditures, monetary 
transfers, and the validity of data on enrollment and teachers. Those internal 
audits can provide education authorities with timely information on each 
school’s management and allocation of funds. The municipal and district Audit 
Offices also carry out external audits of school expenditure and revenues to 
verify the use of resources throughout the year. Schools that fail internal or 
external audits receive legal sanctions.
Summary
The application of SABER–Finance paints a positive picture of public education 
financing in Shanghai, with ratings at “established” or “advanced” for the six pol-
icy goals of (1) ensuring basic conditions for learning, (2) monitoring learning 
conditions and outcomes, (3) overseeing service delivery, (4) budgeting with 
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adequate and transparent information, (5) providing more resources to students 
who need them, and (6) managing resources efficiently.
Shanghai’s public investment in education, about 3.5 percent of GDP, is 
slightly lower than the 4.2 percent average nationwide. However, the key 
objectives of public finance for education in Shanghai clearly focus on ensuring 
a minimum level of learning conditions and standards from basic infrastructure 
to teachers and other inputs. Learning outcomes are monitored, but Shanghai 
deliberately no longer uses student learning outcomes as an explicit financing 
measure. If there is any link between school evaluation and financing of 
schools, Shanghai strives to undertake school evaluation in a comprehensive 
fashion through the “Green Indicators of Academic Quality of Primary and 
Secondary School Students.” Poorly performing schools and districts are pro-
vided with additional fiscal transfers as well as specific support arrangements, 
such as the entrusted school model, which provides management, pedagogical, 
and financial assistance.
Shanghai could potentially improve the provision of information and com-
munications technology (ICT) in schools and reduce class size further. ICT 
includes the provision of basic information technology infrastructure for teaching 
and EMIS activities. Although 95 percent of schools indicate that their student 
registration profiles (basic student background information) are completely or 
mostly in an electronic format, only 72 percent report that their student growth 
profiles (which include more detailed information on student achievement over 
the years) and 67 percent report that their teacher professional development 
profiles are completely or mostly in an electronic format. Additional investment 
in upgrading ICT and reducing class size will inevitably have implications for the 
education budget.
Another key feature of Shanghai’s public financing for education is a focus on 
improving poorly performing schools. In fact, unlike many school systems in 
which top schools are rewarded, Shanghai does not offer financing incentives for 
well- performing schools; instead, multiple financing and management approaches 
target low-performing schools. These mechanisms include additional fiscal trans-
fers to low-performing districts, the entrusted school management system, and the 
practice of reserving a certain proportion of seats in the highly sought-after model 
senior secondary schools especially for graduates of low-performing schools.
Because of the boom in the population of migrant children during the 
past decade, policy awareness of the requirement to meet the needs of 
“ disadvantaged” students and pockets of the population has been heightened. 
Shanghai has been proactive in enacting new policies and approaches to 
expanding education services to migrant and other disadvantaged children. 
However, further efforts can be made—the current eligibility criteria of 
three years of residency and employment may be too stringent and need to be 
relaxed to allow more migrant children to enroll in local public or government- 
sponsored private schools and receive free compulsory education. The practice 
of requiring poor children to update their poverty status every year may also 
carry too much stigma for the children and their families.
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Special education is another area with room for improvement. Shanghai has 
special schools for students with hearing, visual, and speech disabilities, as well 
as schools for mentally challenged and autistic children. However, because the 
city has not yet developed an integrated education environment, students with 
disabilities or special needs do not commonly join mainstream education 
classrooms.
Shanghai would benefit from a comprehensive household survey to acquire a 
full picture of migrant and special education children’s educational needs and 
constraints. For example, it would be important to understand the burden on 
migrant and other disadvantaged populations caused by private education expen-
ditures, and the disparities in total education expenditures between residents and 
nonresidents, and between poor and more well-to-do populations.
Finally, Shanghai could further improve the performance-based incentive 
system for teachers and for low-performing schools.
Notes
 1. Japan Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2007). Structure of the 
“u-Japan Policy Package.” http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_seisaku/ict/u-japan_en 
/ new_plcy_pckg.html.
 2. Singapore Government (2015). E-Gov. http://www.egov.gov.sg/about-egov-introduct
ion;jsessionid=7559CB3C3647CA0C9CD859B01C519124.
 3. Korea Agency for Digital Opportunity and Promotion (2007). “Korea’s Informatization 
Policy to Deliver ICT Use in Everyday Life.” http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups 
/ public/documents/unpan/unpan036280.pdf.
 4. For a long time, most Chinese provinces required separate tests for graduation and for 
selection into higher levels of education. Many provinces have recently decided to 
merge the two tests into one, as Shanghai has done.
 5. This model requires urban districts in Shanghai, which tend to have developed better-
performing schools and richer educational resources, to assist relatively weaker or 
underperforming schools in the outskirts or rural districts. High-performing schools 
may even be paired with relatively low performing schools in the same district.
 6. The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China (2006), “People’s 
Republic of China Compulsory Education Law” (http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2006 
-06/30/content_323302.htm); and Shanghai Education Commission (2006), “Notice 
of Strengthening Reform of Guarantee Mechanism of Rural Compulsory Education 
Fund” (http://www.shmec.gov.cn/attach/xxgk/2495.htm).
 7. An alternate figure of 30 percent was provided by Shanghai’s education officials.
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C h A P T E R  5
Balancing Autonomy and 
Accountability 
Introduction
The Autonomy and Accountability module of the World Bank’s Systems 
Approach for Better Education Results (SABER–School Autonomy and 
Accountability) documents and analyzes school-based management policies 
aimed at increasing autonomy and accountability at the school level and 
within the education system in Shanghai. It measures the extent to which 
education policies enable school autonomy and accountability. It uses five 
indicators to assess the degree of autonomy and accountability: (1) school 
autonomy in budget planning and approval, (2) school autonomy in person-
nel management, (3) participation of the school council in school finance, 
(4) assessment of school and student performance, and (5) school account-
ability (table 5.1). 
School autonomy is a form of school-based management in which schools 
are given decision-making authority over all or some aspects of their opera-
tions, often with the involvement and collaboration of parents and communi-
ties, including budget management; the hiring, transfer, and firing of personnel; 
and the assessment of teachers and pedagogical practices (Demas and Arcia 
2015; Arcia et al. 2011). The degree of autonomy or specific aspects of auton-
omy, and the involvement of stakeholders, vary greatly from one school system 
to another. 
School accountability is the acceptance of responsibility and being answerable 
for one’s actions. Accountability measures can include (1) complying with the 
rules and regulations of school governance, (2) reporting to those with oversight 
authority over the school, and (3) linking rewards and sanctions to expected 
results (Demas and Arcia 2015; Arcia et al. 2011). 
Based on the SABER rubric for School Autonomy and Accountability, 
Shanghai was rated “established” in all policy goals except for role of the school 
council in school governance and school accountability, where it was rated 
“emerging.”
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Policy Goal 1: Level of Autonomy in Planning and Management of 
the School Budget (Established)
School budgets are prepared and proposed by schools, reviewed by the districts, 
and finally approved by the municipal government. The “Provision on Budget 
Management for Institutions” produced by the Shanghai Municipal Education 
Commission stipulates a four-step process for budget preparation and allocation 
(see SABER–Finance in chapter 4 for the detailed process).
In this collaborative process, schools take the initiative to prepare their opera-
tional budgets, taking into consideration the number of students and staff and 
the school’s program offerings. This process allows schools to make budget 
Table 5.1 SABER–School Autonomy and Accountability, Shanghai
Policy and resource framework (Goals and indicators) SABER score
Level of autonomy in planning and management of the school budget    
1. Legal authority over management of the operational budget    
2. Legal authority over management of nonteaching staff salaries    
3. Legal authority over management of teacher salaries    
4. Legal authority to raise additional funds for the school    
5. Collaborative budget planning    
Level of autonomy in personnel management    
1. Autonomy in teacher appointment and deployment decision    
2. Autonomy in nonteaching staff appointment and deployment decision    
3. Autonomy in school principal appointment and deployment decision    
Role of the school council in school governance    
1. Participation of the school council in budget preparation    
2. Participation of the school council in financial oversight    
3. Participation of the school council in personnel management    
4. Participation of the school council in school activities    
5. Participation of the school council in learning inputs    
6. Transparency in community participation    
School and student assessment    
1. Existence and frequency of school assessments    
2. Use of school assessments for making school adjustments    
3. Existence and frequency of standardized student assessments    
4. Use of standardized student assessments for making school adjustments    
5. Publication of student assessments    
School accountability    
1. Guidelines for the use of results of student assessments    
2. Analysis of school and student performance    
3. Degree of financial accountability at the central, regional, municipal, local, and 
school levels    
4. Degree of accountability in school operations    
5. Degree of learning accountability    
Note: Scoring rubric: Latent (     ), Emerging (     ), Established (     ), Advanced (     ). 
SABER = Systems Approach for Better Education Results.
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requests that are tailored to their needs and potentially increases the efficiency 
of financial resource allocations. The district Department of Finance makes rec-
ommendations on revising individual school’s budgets, and the municipal gov-
ernment grants final approval of the budget. Therefore, two layers of monitoring 
ensure that school budgets are appropriately designed. After receiving the 
approved budget, schools have the autonomy to execute the budget within the 
defined categories (see SABER–Finance for detailed categories). For example, 
the personnel-related budget is based on the number of teachers and staff and is 
distributed to pay employees’ salaries; training fees are used exclusively for 
teacher professional development.
Public schools in Shanghai are not allowed to fund-raise, but they have the 
right to request changes in their operational budgets under a number of circum-
stances, such as unexpected accidents or changes and changes in school finance 
policies.
Schools in Shanghai have some, but limited, influence on teacher pay. The 
central government of China, the city, and the school all participate in regulating 
the salaries of public school teachers hired in the bian zhi system (box 5.1). The 
salary for teaching staff consists of base salary and performance-based salary 
(70 percent of the wage bill is for base salaries and an additional 30 percent is to 
be distributed for merit-based incentives). The central government released 
guidelines for setting both components. Overall, the Teachers Law (1993) stipu-
lates that teachers' average salary should be equal to or higher than the average 
salary of civil servants in China. The base salary standards follow the national 
Box 5.1 The Bian Zhi System of China
Being a teacher has long been considered the equivalent of having an “iron rice bowl” in 
China—an occupation with job security and a stable salary and benefits. Although teachers in 
public schools are not officially considered civil servants in China, they are contracted by the 
government under the bian zhi system (some private schools also contract teachers under this 
system). Bian zhi is similar to the concept of lifelong tenure. A teacher has to pass a specific 
exam and obtain approval from the district Department of Education to be granted a bian zhi. 
Teachers with a bian zhi are entitled to medical benefits, a housing stipend, and pensions, 
while temporary or substitute teachers do not have such privileges. According to “Advice on 
Creating Standards for Primary and Secondary Teachers and Bian Zhi Establishment,” the ratio 
of teachers and staff who have bian zhi to students should be 1:19 at the primary level and 
1:13.5 at the lower secondary level in urban areas. 
Major cities such as Shanghai and Beijing recently decided to end the lifelong tenure of 
teachers. All basic education teachers in Shanghai now have to renew their teacher certifica-
tion and be evaluated once every five years. Teachers need to have five consecutive renewals 
to obtain tenure. This initiative gives the government and schools more leverage in improving 
teacher performance by exerting pressure on teachers to be more dedicated to teaching.
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“Primary and Secondary Teachers Salary Standards” (1988). Instruction for the 
performance-based salary component is set forth in “Guidance on the 
Implementation of Performance Pay at Basic Education Level.” The municipal 
government has autonomy to decide on the specific standards for the base salary, 
that is 70 percent of the wage budget, in accordance with local living standards 
and economic development. Individual schools decide on how to distribute the 
remaining 30 percent of the wage budget for merit-based incentives. This three-
party mechanism ensures that all teachers are guaranteed a competitive salary 
level, while giving schools a degree of autonomy to provide teachers with an 
incentive for better performance. 
Globally, schools continue to have limited autonomy in determining teacher 
remuneration. According to a 2013 Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) report on governance, assessments, and account-
ability, in most countries and economies, very few individual schools have sig-
nificant influence over teachers’ salaries. On average across OECD countries, 
about 70 percent or more of students are in schools whose principals reported 
that only national or regional education authorities (or both) have considerable 
responsibility for establishing teachers’ starting salaries and determining teach-
ers’ salary increases (OECD 2013). In contrast, school principals and teachers 
seem to have greater responsibility for decisions related to selecting and hiring 
teachers, dismissing teachers, formulating the school budget, and deciding on 
budget allocations within the school (OECD 2013). A similar trend is observed 
in schools in China. 
Schools in Shanghai have more say in determining the salaries of nonteaching 
staff. Under the overall guidelines released by the central government, “Primary 
and Secondary Teachers and Staff Salary System Reform Plan” (1985), the salary 
standards for nonteaching staff should be based on the salary standards for state 
administrative staff and the salary standards for teachers. Using the guidelines 
released by the central government as a minimum standards reference, the 
municipal government and schools have the discretion to create more specific 
standards for nonteaching staff salaries.
Comparing Private and Public Schools
In Shanghai, the school survey results provide a glimpse into principals’ actual 
level of autonomy. Table 5.2 compares results of surveys with 153 school 
 principals from public and private schools, demonstrating that, as in many other 
countries, private school principals in Shanghai generally have a higher level of 
autonomy than public school principals do. However, public schools in Shanghai 
also enjoy a fair amount of autonomy, especially in personnel management. The 
area with the lowest autonomy in the public schools is the ability to raise funds. 
According to OECD (2013), schools within a country or an economy 
show varying degrees of autonomy in allocating resources. This within-country 
variation was found to be fairly low in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Romania, and Turkey, where school principals reported similar levels of 
 autonomy in allocating resources. However, in Chile; the Czech Republic; 
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Indonesia; Macao SAR, China; Peru; the Slovak Republic; the United Arab 
Emirates; and the United Kingdom, the report shows that some schools are 
permitted to allocate resources whereas for other schools these decisions are 
made by national or regional education authorities. Notably, in virtually all 
participating countries or economies, private schools tend to have more auton-
omy in allocating resources than public schools. Similarly, in most participating 
countries or economies upper secondary schools tend to have more autonomy 
in allocating resources than do lower secondary schools. 
Policy Goal 2: Level of Autonomy of Personnel Management 
(Established)
In Shanghai, schools have different levels of autonomy for appointing and dis-
missing teachers. In some districts, schools can post positions and hire candi-
dates directly; these candidates then participate in the district-level exam to 
apply for bian zhi. In some districts, candidates need to pass the district-level 
bian zhi eligibility exam before they are able to apply for school-level positions. 
However, a small number of districts (mostly in rural Shanghai) allow schools 
to recruit teachers on their own, based on candidates’ background and school 
needs. If participating in a school-level recruitment process, all teacher candi-
dates must be interviewed and conduct a mock teaching session organized by 
the school, in addition to having the necessary academic qualifications (three-
year tertiary college degree for primary school teachers and four-year bachelor’s 
degree for secondary school teachers) and a teacher certificate. Schools do not 
need to receive approval from the municipal level for review of teacher 
appointments, but they do need to coordinate closely with the district 
Department of Education to ensure that hired teachers can receive bian zhi 
from the district. Based on the survey results, 81 percent of principals have 
actual authority to hire teachers (77 percent for public schools and 92 percent 
for  private schools); 16 percent have only notional authority; and 4 percent 
Table 5.2 Level of Autonomy, Public and Private School Principals (N = 153)
percent
Area of autonomy
Yes Only on paper No
Public Private Public Private Public Private
Authority to set and manage 
salaries of teachers and staff 26 74 35 16 39 11
Authority to set and manage 
benefits of teachers and staff 63 84 30 11 7 5
Authority to raise funds 11 37 8 11 81 53
Authority to create financial 
budget 71 79 22 11 8 11
Authority to recruit teachers 77 92 18 8 5 —
Authority to dismiss teachers 17 74 49 26 35 —
Note: — = not available. 
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have no such authority. The autonomy to dismiss teachers appears to be 
more limited: 31 percent have actual authority (17 percent for public schools 
and 74 percent for private schools), 43 percent have notional authority, and 
26 percent have no such authority. 
Teacher transfers are not common in Shanghai. Each district has the author-
ity to establish guidelines on transferring teachers. For example, in Qingpu 
 District of Shanghai, schools report their teacher hiring needs to the district. The 
district compiles this information and publicizes it to all teachers in the district. 
Interested teachers are encouraged to submit applications for transfer to the 
original and receiving schools. After successful application to both schools, the 
district Department of Education grants final approval for the transfers. Usually 
only teachers with bian zhi can apply to transfer. The teacher’s bian zhi and the 
affiliated benefits can be preserved with the transfer. 
Although there is no specific policy with regard to nonteaching staff, such as 
administrative, maintenance, and security staff, the hiring and deployment pro-
cess is generally more flexible. Candidates apply for open nonteaching positions 
announced by individual schools; schools have the autonomy to conduct inter-
views and make appointments.
Shanghai has no uniform municipal-level policy on the appointment and 
deployment of principals, but districts have the authority to establish their own 
processes. For example, in the district of Changning, schools recommend quali-
fied teachers and administrators as candidates for the principal position every 
two years. The group of candidates recommended by the schools form a cohort 
of potential candidates. They receive regular training in preparation to be princi-
pals. Furthermore, Shanghai is developing a four-grade career advancement rating 
system for school principals. Principals will be evaluated for promotion to a 
higher grade based on their professional knowledge and management of schools. 
The promotion not only comes with a higher salary, but it also builds the princi-
pal’s reputation for future advancement, thus serving as an effective principal 
performance incentive.
Policy Goal 3: Role of the School Council in School 
Governance (Emerging)
School management and the role of the school council are conceptualized and 
implemented differently in China and Shanghai. Public schools are legally the 
responsibility of principals. Public schools are not mandated to have school coun-
cils as part of the management structure. The system of principal responsibility 
is key to school management in China and has several components: (1) the prin-
cipal, (2) the (political) party secretary and party committee, (3) a teacher and 
staff representative committee, and (4) parent-teacher associations.
Complementing the principal responsibility system is the parallel party 
management system. All public entities in China also have a party secretary; 
this person is an integral part of school management jointly with the school 
principal. The party secretary and the party committee of every public school 
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participate in decision making concerning major school events. Together, they 
are responsible for moral and political education and alignment with party 
principles. Another key mechanism for school management is the teacher and 
staff representative committee, which is democratically elected and partici-
pates in a range of decision-making issues. The primary areas for decision mak-
ing include formation of the school charter, development plans, annual work 
plans, main reforms, cultivation of school culture and spirit, personnel, teacher 
development plan and implementation, allocation of teacher and staff perfor-
mance pay, annual budget, main construction projects, school safety regula-
tions, admission and graduation recommendations, international exchanges, 
and so on.
In making major school decisions, principals propose topics and initially 
 conceptualize strategies and plans in consultation with the party secretary, 
 followed by extensive consultation within the school. If the principal and party 
secretary do not reach consensus on the main direction and approach, the discus-
sions in the teacher and staff representative committee will be delayed. When 
the principal and party secretary agree, a teacher and staff management meeting 
will be called and chaired by the school principal to discuss the topic (Shanghai 
Municipal Education Commission 2011). 
Since 2012 and as part of national and municipal efforts to modernize the 
education system, China and Shanghai have published guidelines for the estab-
lishment of parent-teacher associations (PTAs), including detailed terms of refer-
ence, eligibility criteria, composition, election process, and duration of the term. 
The rights and responsibilities of PTAs have largely been confined to facilitating 
and supporting school management, plus parent and home education of children. 
The terms of reference make no provision for PTAs to intervene in the teaching 
and learning operations of schools, although one clause does provide for PTAs to 
offer input to teacher evaluations.
PTA members commonly include parents and school principals; 46  percent of 
the schools in the survey also include teachers. According to the surveyed prin-
cipals (N = 153), the main responsibilities of PTAs include (1)  promoting com-
munication and collaboration between schools and parents, (2)  participating in 
and monitoring school management, and (3) supporting teaching and learning.
For private schools, the Private Education Promotion Law (2003) requires 
and guides the establishment and implementation of school councils in private 
schools. The law requires private schools to establish school councils with 
decision- making power (see table 5.3 for key responsibilities of school councils 
and principals). The council, headed by the chairman, should consist of at least 
five members, including the school founder, principal, teacher representatives, 
and staff representatives. One-third of the council members need to have at least 
five years of work experience in education. The survey results correspond with 
the policy: the school councils of the majority of the 39 private schools in 
the survey include the school principal (97 percent) and teacher representatives 
(95 percent); the school councils of 82 percent of the schools also include 
prominent members of the local community. 
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In Shanghai, the school council is responsible for raising operational funds for 
the private school. The principal has final responsibility for preparing the school 
budget, while the school council has legal oversight authority on budget issues 
(table 5.4). The Private Education Promotion Law gives school councils legal 
recognition and the authority to audit and review the school budget. 
The school council does not have the legal right to appoint, transfer, or remove 
teachers. However, it does have the right to determine teachers’ salary levels and 
bian zhi quota. The principal has the responsibility to appoint and remove teach-
ers and staff. 
Each private school might have its own procedure given that there is no city-
level policy, guideline, or manual regulating participation of the community or 
the school council in school activities and learning inputs. Nor does any city-level 
document exist on the election terms of council members. Private schools do 
receive guidance and support from the Office of Private Education of the 
Shanghai Municipal Education Commission. Table 5.4 shows the involvement of 
school councils in the operation of private schools as indicated by the survey. 
Table 5.4 School Board Involvement in Private Schools, Data from Principal Survey (N = 153)
Question: Are your school boards generally involved 
in the following school affairs? Percent of respondents answering “yes”
Appointment and dismissal of school principal 95
Budget preparation 71
Budget supervision 84
School development plan creation 79
Fund-raising 45
Teaching-related matters 21
Table 5.3 Key Responsibilities—Private School Board and Principal
School board Principal
1. Appoint and dismiss the principal 1.  Implement the decisions made by the school 
council
2. Modify the school charter and develop 
school regulations
2.  Implement school development plan; prepare 
annual work plan, school budget, and school 
regulations
3. Set school development plan and approve 
annual work plan
3.  Appoint and remove school teachers and staff; 
implement rewards and sanctions
4. Raise operational funds; review and audit the 
budget and final expenditure report
4.  Organize pedagogical and research activities; 
ensure education quality
5. Determine salary and bian zhi quota of 
teachers and staff 
5. Manage daily school operations
6. Determine the division, merger, or closure of 
school campuses
6.  Other responsibilities delegated by the school 
council
7. Decide other important matters
Source: China’s Private Education Promotion Law (2003).
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School councils (or “boards” for Shanghai’s private schools) are viewed as an 
important element in SABER–School Autonomy and Accountability’s rubric. An 
advanced score on this policy goal encompasses the following aspects:
•	 School councils have a voice in the planning and preparation of the budget at 
the school level and, depending on the law, may share responsibility with the 
school principal.
•	 School councils have the legal right to oversee appointments, removals, or 
transfers of teachers; the legal authority to voice an opinion; and legal oversight 
on all learning inputs to the classroom.
•	 Formal instructions, manuals, and mandates are available for organizing volun-
teers to plan, implement, and evaluate school activities.
•	 There are provisions for regularly scheduled elections of school council mem-
bers and defined term limits and guidelines for calling general meetings.
With such authority, school councils can serve as a bridge that connects school 
administrators with parents, community members, and students. Through 
school councils, parents and community members are able to exercise power on 
school management issues, focus on the improvement of learning tailored to 
students’ needs, and hold schools accountable for their decisions. The model of 
local cooperation and local accountability has the potential for improving teacher 
performance and student learning outcomes.
In Shanghai, school-based management or autonomy in public schools is 
clearly more at the level of principals and party secretaries than school councils. 
Public schools do not have school councils but follow the principal responsibility 
system, whereby principals make key delegated decisions, usually in consultation 
with party secretaries and increasingly in consultation with teacher-staff associa-
tions. The involvement of the larger community and parents directly in the 
management of school affairs is still rare in Shanghai, except in private schools. 
PTAs are often operational now, even in public schools, since 2012 with the 
government’s efforts to modernize the education system. However, PTAs are a 
relatively new phenomenon and currently play only a limited role in school 
management.
Policy Goal 4: School and Student Assessment (Established)
As mentioned in chapter 4 on school financing, there are currently two types of 
school assessments or evaluations in Shanghai: (1) the regular annual school 
supervisory visit, which is conducted by each district’s Education Supervision 
Office; and (2) the sample-based “Green Indicators of Academic Quality of 
Primary and Secondary School Students,” which also includes a module on stu-
dent assessment. 
Results of school evaluations are analyzed by the bureaus of education in the 
districts as well as in the municipal office to form an overall assessment of the 
quality of education in the city and in each of the districts, and also to identify 
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specific areas where performance may be weak. This information is then used to 
develop specific teacher training programs targeting the most challenging cur-
riculum areas. The city also uses this information to identify the weak or low-
performing schools for additional management and financing interventions, 
such as “entrusted” management (see chapter 4 for an explanation of entrusted 
management).
City- and nationwide student achievement assessments take place annually 
to provide a picture of student learning outcomes. As mentioned in previous 
chapters, all students take the graduation examinations at the end of ninth grade 
(city level) to progress to the next level. This exam also serves as a selection test 
into high schools. At the end of twelfth grade, students take a college entrance 
examination (gao kao), which will determine whether and where a student will 
go to college. 
The data from these assessments help policy makers track trends in student 
learning outcomes. Policy makers also have access to the assessment data disag-
gregated by district and by school, and each school has student-specific perfor-
mance scores. The wide scope of information available to policy makers facilitates 
more effective and targeted use of resources for improvement of education 
 quality. Unfortunately, because these tests are also placement or selection tests 
for the higher levels of education, they have become high-stakes tests.
Shanghai’s education assessment system has made significant efforts to 
 deemphasize assessment results. To achieve a balanced and equitable educa-
tion system that is not test driven, the government has explicitly decreed 
under the “Regulations on Protection of Minors in Shanghai” that schools can-
not organize any assessments to select students in their transition from pri-
mary to lower secondary school. Although the city sets municipal-level targets 
for completion and progression to promote overall achievement, schools are 
not evaluated based on their students’ scores or rate of enrollment in high 
schools. Nor do schools have official access to the performance of individual 
students on the standardized assessments to avoid extra pressure placed on 
students to obtain a high score. In practice, schools adopt various measures to 
reduce students’ academic burden. Out of the schools surveyed, 94 percent 
have undergone reforms to increase teaching effectiveness and reduce the 
amount of homework; 62 percent have issued regulations on the amount of 
homework teachers can assign to students and carry out regular homework 
inspections; and 77 percent have investigated the issue and made adjustments 
accordingly.
Policy Goal 5: School Accountability (Emerging)
Both national and municipal guidelines for the use of student assessments results 
are in place. The national “Advice on Relieving School Burden and Implementing 
Quality Education in Primary and Secondary Schools” emphasizes the impor-
tance of designing innovative assessments and building a comprehensive assess-
ment system to evaluate basic education quality. At the municipal level, the 
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Shanghai Municipal Education Commission's “Advice on Regulating Teaching 
and Implementing Quality Education in Primary and Secondary Schools” strives 
toward a holistic assessment framework that does not heavily emphasize student 
assessment results. The document stipulates that no district-level exam should be 
carried out for students in first through third grades. For students in fourth 
through eighth grades, only one district-level academic assessment can be car-
ried out every year with a random selection of no more than 30 percent of the 
student population. 
Both guidelines are publicly available online. They call for schools to actively 
communicate with the parents and the community and keep them informed 
of matters related to school and student development through mechanisms 
such as phone hotlines and online communities. As revealed in the school sur-
veys, 99 percent of schools have created a public bulletin board either at the 
school or online to distribute relevant information. Furthermore, to facilitate 
public monitoring, every district in Shanghai hosts an office that receives par-
ents’ complaints on schools. At the municipal level, parents can call a hotline 
number to report school complaints to the Shanghai Municipal Education 
Commission. Verified complaints will lead to inspection and potential sanc-
tions to the school. The availability of those public channels allows parents and 
the community to exercise monitoring power and provide feedback on school 
performance.
Shanghai analyzes standardized student assessment results at the city level. 
However, the goal of the analysis is not to compare schools with each other, but 
rather to understand overall progress and trends of student outcomes in the city. 
Therefore, while some city-level educational statistics, such as the graduation 
rate, may be announced to the public, the results of the detailed analysis are not 
available to parents or to the general public. Individual students’ standardized 
assessment results are only available to the students themselves.
Shanghai’s educational system exhibits a high degree of financial account-
ability at multiple levels. Holding schools accountable for their own financial 
management ensures the efficient use of resources for quality education. 
Schools in Shanghai have to strictly comply with the national “Elementary and 
Secondary School Finance Policy,” which sets out detailed rules on the manage-
ment of budget, revenue, expenditures, surpluses, and capital assets. Failure to 
comply leads to legal sanctions. All schools need to submit thorough expendi-
ture reports at the end of the academic year for review. Based on the national 
policy, schools also create their own regulations to streamline the financial 
management process.
For private schools specifically, Shanghai has released “Guidelines on Financial 
Management for Private Schools in Shanghai” and “Accounting Methods for 
Private Schools in Shanghai.” The two documents include specific rules for finan-
cial management and transparency, reporting requirements to an oversight 
authority, and the consequences for failure to comply. All private schools must 
submit a yearly financial report within four months of the end of the year to the 
Department of Education for review.
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Regulations are in place for enforcing accountability in school operations. 
The Compulsory Education Law (1986) and “Regulation Rules for Primary 
School Management” lay out the rules for all aspects of school operation, includ-
ing the management of enrollment, teaching practices, personnel, administration, 
facilities, and sanitation, and the procedure for reporting to the overseeing 
authority. In addition, under “Advice on Relieving School Burden and 
Implementing Quality Education in Primary and Secondary Schools,” schools are 
required to publicize their annual curriculum plans on their bulletin boards and 
websites two weeks after the start of the academic year. This information is open 
to parents who may offer feedback and suggestions through PTAs, social media, 
or other grievance-redress platforms.
In Shanghai, schools are not allowed to publish student assessment results to 
the public under “Regulations on Protection of Minors in Shanghai.” This policy 
is in place to avoid overemphasis on student scores; eliminate school rankings; 
and reduce exam pressure on students, teachers, and schools.
A number of policies regulate the pedagogical autonomy of schools in 
Shanghai. Although the central government is responsible for setting policies and 
guiding and monitoring matters related to textbook selection under the “Rules 
for Textbook Selection (Draft),” the municipal government has the authority to 
choose textbooks. In certain cases, schools that pilot experimental projects or 
have special needs can apply to choose textbooks on their own.
The “Standards for Regular Primary and Secondary School Teaching 
Equipment” in Shanghai specify the type and volume of teaching equipment for 
different subjects at the primary and secondary school levels, although schools 
have the autonomy to adjust the equipment list based on individual needs.
The central, municipal, and school levels are all engaged in designing the 
curriculum. At the central level, the Ministry of Education sets overall curricu-
lum standards for all subjects. Shanghai has released the subject-specific 
“Curriculum Plan for Regular Elementary and Secondary Schools in Shanghai.” 
Schools have the autonomy to design 30 percent of the curriculum as school-
based curriculum according to each school’s strengths and the area of their 
curricular focus. In practice, the 153 schools surveyed have developed, on aver-
age, 25 school-based courses in the past three years and offer 4 such courses 
every week. In addition to the school-based curriculum, schools provide stu-
dents with a wide range of curriculum resources, including lectures from out-
side speakers (75 percent), extracurricular activities organized at the school 
level (98 percent) and at the district and city level (83 percent), and online 
coursework (25 percent).
Furthermore, teachers have a certain level of pedagogical autonomy: 42  percent 
of the schools surveyed allow teachers to make some pedagogical modifications 
after the curriculum is confirmed, and 39 percent of the schools encourage 
teachers to make innovative teaching efforts. Only 3 percent require teachers to 
strictly follow the curriculum standards with a uniform teaching process.
The school calendar is established at the city level. Every year, the Shanghai 
Municipal Education Commission releases a school year calendar that establishes 
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the start and end of each semester. For example, the 2014 school year starts on 
September 1, and the first semester ends on January 30 (22 weeks). The second 
semester starts on February 27 and ends on June 30 (19 weeks).
However, there are no explicit policies and mechanisms for learning account-
ability toward stakeholders in the form of public forums. Communities and 
parents tend to trust the education professionals in the management of profes-
sional affairs and educational institutions.
Summary
The SABER–School Autonomy and Accountability rubric was used to assess the 
extent to which education policies enable school autonomy and accountability. 
Five sets of indicators assess the degree of autonomy and accountability in the 
following dimensions: (1) school autonomy in budget planning and approval, 
(2) school autonomy in personnel management, (3) participation of the school 
council in school finance, (4) assessment of school and student performance, and 
(5) school accountability.
Overall, the Shanghai system can be described as one with controlled school 
autonomy and a high degree of professional accountability in addition to compli-
ance with regulations and rules. Contrary to most beliefs that the Chinese system 
is highly centralized, a fair amount of autonomy is embedded within the educa-
tion system. The fiscal decentralization policy that began in the 1980s allowed 
Shanghai to be responsible for the provision of compulsory education as well as 
the tertiary education institutions affiliated with the city. Furthermore, Shanghai 
was granted curriculum autonomy for basic education. Therefore, Shanghai has 
full autonomy to finance and manage education affairs within the city, under the 
overall direction of the central government. Given that most of the education 
policies promulgated by the central government are broadly framed, Shanghai 
can exercise a high degree of autonomy within those policies. And because most 
of the key education targets and standards are set as minimum thresholds that 
can be exceeded, to date Shanghai has always surpassed them.
Within Shanghai, schools also operate with a high level of autonomy in con-
sultation with districts and the municipality. In principle, schools determine their 
budgets within the parameters set by the municipality. Schools also can custom-
ize 30 percent of their curricula. Principals further possess teacher hiring and 
firing authority although they rarely exercise this authority, and if they do, 
they do so in consultation with district offices. Schools can manage their own 
operating budgets, including the hiring and firing of nonteaching staff. About 
30 percent of total teacher salaries is also managed at the school level to accom-
modate the difference in teaching loads as well as performance.
Schools are explicitly required to comply with financial management guide-
lines and other broad city-level requirements. Schools undergo annual supervi-
sory visits and are further subject to the comprehensive school evaluation using 
the “Green Indicators of Academic Quality of Primary and Secondary 
School Students.” However, Shanghai has made a deliberate effort to not use 
82 Balancing Autonomy and Accountability 
How Shanghai Does It • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0790-9
student exam results as an explicit mechanism for rewards or sanctions. This 
policy seems to be directly opposite of the path taken, for example, in the United 
States. In fact, Shanghai uses school evaluations to identify weak and poorly per-
forming schools and then provides additional financing and management to help 
those schools improve their performance. This is also contrary to what occurs 
in many countries, where excellent schools are identified and provided with 
 additional rewards.
Of course in reality, the high stakes zhong kao at the end of ninth grade and 
the gao kao at high school graduation have tremendous downstream effects on 
the lower levels of education and continue to influence teaching and learning for 
testing purposes only. Schools continue to be assessed based on their students’ 
performance on those tests. The government is making efforts to introduce 
reforms into the gao kao so that students have multiple chances and so that their 
regular grades may count in the college admission decision. 
An implicit but more powerful type of professional accountability seems to 
be at work in Shanghai. Because principals are required to be instructional 
 leaders, teachers are well trained and supported, and their career ladders are well 
established. Furthermore, because the teaching-research groups allow teachers 
to engage in professional development activities, professional accountability 
becomes more prominent.
Explicit involvement of communities and parents in the schools appears to be 
weak in Shanghai. By law, schools are the responsibility of their principals. Each 
public school is also staffed with party secretaries. In reality, the principals make 
most decisions in school management in consultation with party secretaries as 
well as the teacher and staff management committees. PTAs are set up at some 
schools with some limited functions. School councils are formally required for 
private schools but their roles and responsibilities are limited to nonteaching 
aspects of learning.
However, this finding also indicates that in countries where educational insti-
tutions are strong, especially in the training and selection of good teachers, 
autonomy and accountability in school-based management may not be a neces-
sary condition for success. In these conditions, which are found in many high-
performing countries in Europe and East Asia, trust is the main element of 
accountability. Parents trust and support the system because the empirical 
 evidence—shown by the results in international testing exercises such as the 
Programme for International Student Assessment—indicates that it is producing 
good results. Nevertheless, even in high-performing countries, trust and profes-
sionalism flourish in a context of school autonomy and accountability.
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C h A P T E R  6
Creating an Effective Student 
Assessment System 
Introduction
The student assessment module of the World Bank’s Systems Approach for 
Better Education Results (SABER–Student Assessment) analyzes and bench-
marks student assessment policies according to the available evidence base on the 
components and attributes of an effective assessment system. The module is 
structured around two main dimensions of assessment systems: the types of 
assessment activities that make up the system and the quality of those activities. 
The module aims to promote comprehensive and rigorous assessment systems 
that contribute to quality education.
Assessment Types and Purposes
The evidence base for this module is outlined in the 2012 SABER framework for 
student assessment (Clarke 2012). According to Clarke (2012, 1), assessment is 
the general process of “gathering and evaluating information about what students 
know, understand, and can do to make informed decisions about next steps in the 
educational process.” Assessment systems are composed of three main types of 
assessment activities: classroom assessments; exams; and large-scale, system-level 
assessments. 
•	 Classroom assessments (continuous or formative assessments) are carried out 
as part of daily classroom activities. These reviews assess ongoing teaching and 
learning in individual classrooms and point out areas of achievement and 
needed improvement. Classroom assessments encompass homework assign-
ments, student presentations, and diagnostic quizzes and tests.
•	 Exams punctuate students’ progression through the education system. 
They provide information about individual students for the purpose of 
 selection in decision-making circumstances, such as graduation, admission, 
and certification.
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•	 Large-scale, system-level assessments evaluate the performance of the overall 
education system and provide policy makers and practitioners with relevant 
information for designing and implementing education policy and practice. 
They may be national or international.
Three main drivers determine the effectiveness of the assessment activities in 
any system: the enabling context, system alignment, and assessment quality.
•	 Enabling context refers to the broader context in which the assessment activity 
takes place and the extent to which that context is conducive to student and 
teacher learning. It covers the policy framework for assessment activities; insti-
tutional structures for designing, carrying out, or using results from the assess-
ment; the availability of sufficient and stable funding; and the presence of 
trained assessment staff. 
•	 System alignment refers to the extent to which the assessment is aligned with 
the rest of the education system. This includes the degree of congruence 
between assessment activities and system learning goals, standards, curriculum, 
and pre- and in-service teacher training. 
•	 Assessment quality refers to the psychometric quality of the instruments, pro-
cesses, and procedures for the assessment activity. It covers design and imple-
mentation of assessment activities, analysis and interpretation of student 
responses to those activities, and the appropriateness of how assessment results 
are reported and used. 
SABER–Student Assessment collects and evaluates data on the three assess-
ment types and the related quality drivers (table 6.1). Overall, Shanghai’s ratings 
for classroom assessments, exams, and large-scale assessment are at least “estab-
lished” with some levers at the “advanced” level. 
Classroom Assessments (Established)
SABER–Student Assessment indicates that classroom assessments in Shanghai 
are rated “established.” As demonstrated in table 6.1, the three drivers of effec-
tiveness discussed above are used to score Shanghai’s achievement on classroom 
assessments. 
Policy Goal 1: Enabling Context (Established)
Classroom assessments take place frequently in Shanghai’s education system. 
Students participate in weekly quizzes, oral tests and presentations, and home-
work assignments throughout the academic year. In addition to assessments 
planned by teachers for each individual class of students, students in the same 
grade regularly participate in common weekly or monthly, midterm, or final-
term paper-based assessments.
Both the central government of China and the city of Shanghai have issued for-
mal system-level documents that provide guidelines for classroom assessment—a 
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curriculum standard for each subject. The subject-specific standards include con-
crete knowledge areas and skills that students are expected to acquire every year 
(see SABER–Teachers in chapter 3). Furthermore, each set of standards includes a 
specific section on learning assessments. For example, for math, the national cur-
riculum standard emphasizes that homework assignments and classroom observa-
tions should be weighted equally with quizzes and tests in evaluating student 
performance. Shanghai’s math curriculum standard provides more detailed guide-
lines, identifying classroom assessments as a continuous effort to evaluate and 
analyze student progress throughout the learning process. The standard suggests 
that math assessments should focus on learning interest and attitudes, math cogni-
tive understanding, and the ability to think analytically and innovatively in math 
learning. The standards encourage the use of progress indicators and include sug-
gestions for assessment methods (such as debate, homework assignments, survey, 
and subject-related arts and crafts) and content. In addition, the guidelines provide 
information on reporting assessment results and using the results to improve indi-
vidual students’ performance. Both the central and municipal documents are avail-
able online for the public and teachers to review. Referencing the learning 
objectives listed in the curriculum standards and the guidelines on assessments, 
teachers are able to design effective classroom assessments.
Table 6.1 SABER–Student Assessment, Shanghai
Policy and resource framework (Goals and levers) SABER score
Classroom assessments    
1. Enabling context    
2. System alignment    
3. Assessment quality    
Examinations (lower secondary graduation exam—zhong kao)    
1. Enabling context    
2. System alignment    
3. Assessment quality    
Examinations (senior secondary graduation exam—gao kao)    
1. Enabling context    
2. System alignment    
3. Assessment quality    
National assessment    
1. Enabling context    
2. System alignment    
3. Assessment quality    
International assessment    
1. Enabling context    
2. System alignment    
3. Assessment quality    
Note: Scoring rubric: Latent (     ), Emerging (     ), Established (     ), Advanced (     ). 
SABER = Systems Approach for Better Education Results.
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Policy Goal 2: System Alignment (Established)
To ensure smooth implementation of the municipal curriculum standards and 
the associated assessments, the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 
released “Advice on Curriculum-Standards-Based Teaching and Assessments at 
the Primary School Level” in 2013 to instruct teachers on carrying out teaching 
activities and assessments in accordance with the curriculum standards. The 
document encourages teachers to design formative assessments that reflect stu-
dents’ learning outcomes and that track individual students’ growth, rather than 
focusing on comparing students with one another. Because of the general height-
ened exam pressure in Shanghai, the document specifically stipulates that class-
room assessments cannot take the form of paper-based tests for students in first 
and second grades.
In Shanghai, multiple mechanisms ensure that teachers develop the neces-
sary skills and expertise to carry out classroom assessments. All teachers are 
required to participate in a one-year in-service induction program to enhance 
their pedagogical capacity and competence in carrying out various classroom 
activities, including designing classroom assessments. Furthermore, professional 
development activities such as teaching-research groups and lesson observations 
(see SABER–Teachers in chapter 3) encompass specific components that 
address classroom assessments, such as discussion of the design and analysis of 
assessments. In addition, to equip teachers with updated assessment-related 
knowledge and skills, the city organizes targeted training on assessments for 
teachers and principals. Online resources are also available for teachers planning 
assessment activities.
Policy Goal 3: Assessment Quality (Established)
The education system in Shanghai closely monitors classroom assessment 
 practices. Classroom assessment is a core aspect of a teacher’s performance 
evaluation. When a school principal or the leadership team conducts lesson 
observations, they closely observe the teacher’s assessment activities and evalu-
ate how the activities facilitate student learning. Classroom assessment is also a 
required component of school supervision by the district. To improve classroom 
assessment, the municipal and district-level Teaching Research Offices under-
take regular research projects on the status of student assessments to inform 
policy decisions.
Globally, most schools use assessment data for a combination of purposes 
(box 6.1). In Shanghai, adequate measures are taken to ensure effective use 
of classroom assessments. Assessment results are recorded carefully in stu-
dents’ profiles and teachers’ records. For schools with rigorous information 
systems, student data are imported into the school database. Other schools 
opt for paper-based systems. The assessment results are required to be dis-
seminated to key stakeholders, including school administrators and parents. 
Well-equipped teachers and close monitoring contribute to high-quality 
classroom assessments in Shanghai. The assessments not only evaluate key 
Creating an Effective Student Assessment System  89
How Shanghai Does It • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0790-9 
knowledge areas that students are expected to acquire, but also gauge general 
competencies such as discipline and collaboration. The assessment results 
also serve to diagnose student learning issues, provide feedback to students 
on their learning, inform teaching, communicate with parents about their 
child’s learning, and meet school-level requirements on assessing student 
achievement. 
Examinations
Students take two types of exams at the municipal and national levels: (1) the 
citywide exam at the end of the nine-year compulsory period, which also serves 
as the high school entrance exam; and (2) the high school graduation exam, 
which also serves as the college entrance exam.
Box 6.1 Purposes of Student Assessment and Achievement Data
Assessment practices and purposes (OECD 2013, 148). Based on principals’ responses, 
assessments are most commonly used in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries to 
• Inform parents about their child’s progress
• Monitor the school’s progress from year to year
• Identify aspects of instruction or the curriculum that could be improved
• Make decisions about whether students are held back or promoted
• Compare the school to district or national performance
• Compare the school with other schools
• Group students for instructional purposes
• Make judgments about teachers’ effectiveness
The use of achievement data beyond school (OECD 2013, 152). Achievement data are used 
for accountability purposes involving some stakeholders beyond schools, teachers, partners, 
and students. 
• Posting data publicly: On average across OECD countries, 45 percent of students are in 
schools whose principals reported that achievement data are posted publicly. The average 
is more than 80 percent in the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the United States, and 
the United Kingdom, and less than 10 percent in Argentina; Austria; Belgium; Finland; 
Japan; Macao SAR, China; Shanghai; Switzerland; and Uruguay. 
• Tracking achievement data over time: On average across OECD countries, 72 percent of 
 students are in schools whose principals reported that achievement data are tracked 
over time by an administrative authority. The average is more than 80 percent in 31  countries 
and economies, and 7 percent in Japan. 
Source: OECD 2013. 
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Ninth Grade Graduation or High School Entrance Exam (zhong kao)1 
(Established)
At the end of lower secondary school (ninth grade), all students must take the 
Lower Secondary School Graduation Examination in Shanghai. The subjects 
tested include Chinese, math, English, physics, and chemistry. Physical education, 
lab operations, and moral ethics of students also factor into students’ final exam 
scores. The exam serves the dual purposes of selection into high schools and 
providing information on the overall performance of the basic education system. 
The total score on the exam determines the type of high school in which stu-
dents will enroll: admission into highly selective comprehensive schools requires 
outstanding performance on the exam.
SABER–Student Assessment outlines three broad components of the policy 
framework (table 6.1) on which Shanghai’s achievements are measured. 
Overall, Shanghai scores between “established” and “advanced” on the three 
policy goals pertaining to student assessment at the high school entrance exam 
level (zhong kao). 
Policy Goal 1: Enabling Context (Established)
Formal policy documents authorize the exam. In 2014, the Shanghai Municipal 
Education Commission released “Advice on Lower Secondary School Graduation 
Examination” and “Plan on Lower Secondary School Graduation Examination.” 
Both documents are available online. The first document announces details on 
the exam, including tested subjects, exam structure, scoring methods, and exemp-
tions for students with special needs. The second document provides general 
guidelines on the format and scoring of the exam for each subject. Most subjects 
include multiple-choice questions, essay questions, or a combination of the two.
The municipal government allocates regular funding to carry out the exam, 
covering all aspects from design and administration to results reporting and 
research activities. In addition to financial support, Shanghai has a strong organi-
zational structure and wide public support for the exam. The Shanghai Education 
Examination Center is the designated agency responsible for preparation and 
implementation of the exam. The exam is a well-recognized social event in 
Shanghai, closely followed by students, parents, educators, and the media. No 
political opposition to the exam has arisen. The Shanghai Education Examination 
Center is accountable to the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission.
Effective human resources are guaranteed for the exam. Not only does the 
Shanghai Education Examination Center have an adequate number of full-time 
staff dedicated to the exam, but every year the center also invites experts from 
across the nation to engage in its planning and design. Employees are also given 
opportunities to attend university courses and non-university training courses, 
and funding is provided for attending international programs and courses related 
to education measurement and evaluation.
The exam is closely aligned with the municipal curriculum standards, which 
include learning goals for each subject and are widely accepted by stakeholder 
groups.
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Policy Goal 2: System Alignment (Advanced)
Teachers are provided with information and training opportunities with regard 
to the exam. Based on the 2009 “Advice on Designing Lower Secondary School 
Graduation Examination in Shanghai,” a systematic method is in place for select-
ing and organizing teachers for the design and scoring of the exam. The teacher 
candidates must have substantial teaching experience, and must be recom-
mended by the district Department of Education for involvement in either the 
design or the scoring process. The document stipulates that at least one-third of 
the personnel must change every year, and recommends a maximum three-year 
tenure. The city also organizes systematic training for those teachers, specially 
targeted at equipping them with the competence to conduct exam-related work.
Shanghai has taken some measures to ensure the fairness and quality of the 
exam. At the policy level, special accommodations are provided for students with 
hearing disabilities, and they are exempt from the listening component of the 
English subject test. It might be desirable to stipulate recommendations or alter-
native assessments for students with other types of disabilities.
Policy Goal 3: Assessment Quality (Established)
Because of its primary purpose as a mechanism for selection into high school, the 
zhong kao has become increasingly high stakes for children in Shanghai. The test 
ultimately determines in which type of high school ninth-grade graduates can 
enroll. There are three types of high schools in Shanghai: ordinary general high 
school, model or experimental general high school, and vocational high school. 
Each type of school has a minimum score entry requirement. Model or experi-
mental high schools have the highest required entry score and vocational high 
schools the lowest (or no requirement in some schools) (table 6.2). 
As can easily be imagined, the model and experimental senior secondary 
schools are able to enroll the best graduates and cumulatively attract more highly 
qualified and experienced teachers and create a virtuous cycle of “good students–
good teachers–excellent schools–and more good students.” Model and experimen-
tal senior secondary schools are highly sought after by both parents and children. 
These schools also send more of their graduates to the best universities and col-
leges in China and worldwide. In contrast, vocational senior secondary schools 
tend to enroll predominantly low-performing students. Although recent govern-
ment efforts to revive vocational education and boost the employment rates of 
vocational school graduates are indeed promising, stigma continues to be associ-
ated with vocational education and it is a second choice for most graduates.
Table 6.2 Zhong Kao Entry Score Requirement in 2015
Type of senior secondary school Zhong kao entry score 
Model or experimental senior secondary school 555
Ordinary senior secondary school 475
Vocational senior secondary school 330
Source: Shanghai Municipal Education Commission, 2015, http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/. 
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Coordinated efforts are ongoing to reform the exam to reduce pressure on 
families and students. The format of the various subject exams have undergone 
a number of rounds of change. Physical education was added to the exam in 
2008 to encourage students to be more physically active. Furthermore, in 
response to the recent gao kao reform pilot in Shanghai, the city is planning to 
reform the Lower Secondary Graduation Examination in 2016. 
Twelfth Grade Graduation or College Entrance Exam (gao kao) (Advanced)
Students in Shanghai participate in the national college entrance exams (gao kao). 
Gao kao is a highly competitive and rigorous exam that students across the 
nation have to take at the end of high school (twelfth grade) to progress to ter-
tiary education in China. Students sit for the three-day exam during June. It has 
been administered on a yearly basis since 1977. The exam is mostly paper based, 
plus a physical exam. The tested subjects vary by region, but they commonly 
include Chinese, math, English, and a subject in the humanities or sciences 
 chosen by the student. Although provinces can choose to use the national version 
of the exam questions, many provinces and cities opt to develop their own ques-
tions, which conform to national guidelines. Depending on the subject, exam 
questions can be multiple choice questions, open-ended questions, and essays. 
Whether a student can attend university and which tier of university depends 
almost exclusively on the exam score. 
Most Chinese people would agree that the high-stakes gao kao has taken on 
special significance in Chinese society. As with zhong kao, gao kao results deter-
mine not only whether a student is eligible for college but also which type of 
college. Chinese universities are ranked and grouped into four tiers: The first-tier 
universities, consisting of the elite Chinese universities, mostly centrally man-
aged, aim at producing the best talent in various fields. The second-tier universi-
ties are mainly provincial or city-level universities that aim at producing 
professional-level skills. The third tier universities mainly comprise private col-
leges; and the least attractive, tier four, are diploma-granting technical and voca-
tional colleges, which aim at producing skills. The Ministry of Education 
announces cutoff scores for each tier after the exam (table 6.3). Only those with 
a score higher than the cutoff score for the particular tier are eligible for enroll-
ment in the associated universities. 
Policy Goal 1: Enabling Context (Advanced)
The national policies on gao kao are clear. Every year, the Ministry of Education 
releases a public document authorizing the implementation of gao kao. The 2014 
“Regulations on Tertiary Institutions Admission” provides detailed information on 
all key aspects of the 2014 gao kao process. According to the document, the 
Ministry of Education is the primary body responsible for coordinating gao kao, 
with key participation from the National Examination Center, provincial gao kao 
committees, and relevant tertiary institutions. Not only does the document cover 
the gao kao’s purpose and governance structure, exam registration requirements, 
and collection of student data, it also provides comprehensive regulations on 
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implementation, including how to address inappropriate behaviors in the exams 
(such as cheating, bribing, and leaking exam questions), procedures for students 
with special needs, and the selection and admission process for entry into tertiary 
institutions. 
Fairly strong leadership is in place for the preparation and implementation of 
gao kao. The Ministry of Education delegates primary responsibility for the 
design of the exam questions and the scoring rubric to the National Examination 
Center, provincial gao kao committees, and relevant tertiary institutions. The 
National Examination Center takes the lead in designing the national gao kao, 
while province-specific gao kao questions are developed by provincial-level gao 
kao committees. A number of elite universities in China are also granted permis-
sion to develop their own entrance exam questions for the exclusive use of their 
own admission processes. 
The primary stakeholder groups for the exam include students, universities, 
and high schools, and they have provided continuous support for the exam. The 
results of the exam are acknowledged nationally and used as a primary indicator 
of college admission. Gao kao is also a well-recognized social event in Chinese 
society, garnering wide media coverage around the time the exam is adminis-
tered. Local governments across the country coordinate special traffic and secu-
rity measures to facilitate students’ attendance in the exam. 
Funding for gao kao preparation and implementation is a regular component 
of local education expenditure under the 2014 “Regulations on Tertiary 
Institutions Admission.” Students participating in gao kao also must pay a fee. 
Funding covers all core exam activities, including design of the exam, administra-
tion, data analysis, reporting, and research and development. 
Behind the planning and implementation of gao kao is a strong organizational 
structure. The Ministry of Education steers the process. The ministry sets overall 
policy, reviews provincial exam plans, authorizes the design of exam questions, 
Table 6.3 Gao Kao Minimum Entry Score Requirement in 2015 and 2014, 
Shanghai
Type of college
Gao kao entry 
score (2015) 
Gao kao entry 
score (2014) 
Tier 1: Elite universities Liberal arts majors 434 448
Science majors 414 405
Tier 2: Ordinary universities Liberal arts majors 372 403
Science majors 348 331
Tier 3: Private colleges Liberal arts majors —a —a
Science majors —a —a
Tier 4: Technical and vocational 
education colleges
Liberal arts majors 144b 108b
Science majors 194b 158b
Source: Gao Kao Inquiry System. 2015. “Gao Kao Minimum Entry Score Requirement.”  http://www.eol.cn 
/ html/g/fsx/gedi/shanghai.shtml.
a. Scores may vary significantly from college to college. Aggregate or ranges of scores are not available.
b. Combined score on three subjects—Chinese, math, and English. Other scores are combined scores on 
five or six subjects.
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and monitors implementation. The National Examination Center and provincial 
gao kao committees take the lead in the design of exam questions, scoring, and 
data analysis. The provincial gao kao committees are also responsible for organiz-
ing administration of the exam. This sound institutional structure ensures that 
staff and resources are adequate to execute gao kao smoothly every year. 
Policy Goal 2: System Alignment (Advanced)
The exam is in accordance with national curriculum guidelines and standards. 
Because the exam questions vary by region, they also reflect regional curriculum 
standards, which are widely accepted by all stakeholder groups. Students 
undergo intensive preparation for gao kao, dedicating the last year of high school 
almost exclusively to demanding school drills, practice tests, and after-school 
tutoring sessions. In some regions, gao kao preparation starts on the first day of 
high school. Comprehensive material is available to prepare for the exam. Each 
school provides students with learning material, and various publications with 
practice tests are on the market. Preparation also references past gao kao ques-
tions and a framework document explaining what is measured on the exam. 
Teachers play an important role in gao kao; they are involved in creating and 
selecting exam questions, as well as participating in administering, scoring, and 
supervising the exam. 
Policy Goal 3: Assessment Quality (Advanced)
To ensure that the assessment meets quality standards and is carried out effec-
tively, the “Regulations on Tertiary Institutions Admission” serves as a compre-
hensive technical report, and is available to the general public. The gao kao 
undergoes a rigorous quality assurance procedure, including internal and external 
review, external certification, piloting, and translation verification. The processes 
and results of the exam are closely monitored by mechanisms such as an over-
sight committee and expert review groups. 
All students with a senior secondary or equivalent education are eligible to 
take the exam. Various measures are taken to ensure that gao kao is fair. 
Inappropriate behavior is strictly forbidden in the exam process and such inci-
dents are rare. To ensure the security of the exam questions, they are stored in a 
room with a closed iron gate, five security cameras, and 24-hour supervision. If 
instances of impersonation, copying, collusion among candidates, and cheating 
occur, the exam results are deemed invalid. With strict monitoring, gao kao 
results are widely accepted by all stakeholder groups. 
Students’ test results are confidential. The results are used primarily for selec-
tion into tertiary institutions. One common criticism of the gao kao is that it gives 
students only one chance at the end of their 12-year education to enter a univer-
sity. If a student receives a low score, he or she must study for another year to 
prepare for the exam. Students also have the option of attending less selective 
schools that match their gao kao scores. 
The government has set a 1:1 ratio between enrollment in degree programs 
and enrollment in diploma programs. Entry scores are centrally determined, with 
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research universities (tier one) having the highest entry requirement and the 
technical and vocational colleges having the lowest requirements. Therefore, 
even when Shanghai tries to ease the exam pressure felt by students in basic 
education, the prospect of participating in gao kao inevitably poses a burden on 
students, who undertake intensive exam-preparation drills throughout their edu-
cation before attending university, particularly during the high school years. 
The one-child policy introduced in the late 1970s means that most Chinese 
families today have a single child who increasingly must shoulder the high expec-
tations of two parents and four grandparents. Students in Shanghai are found to 
have one of the heaviest homework loads as revealed by the student question-
naire on the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) tests, with 
about 11 hours per week devoted to homework.
The overemphasis on exam scores has drawn increasing criticism because of 
the tremendous pressure it imposes on students and incentives teachers have 
to teach to the test while overlooking students’ overall development. In 
response, the Chinese State Council released a plan in September 2014 to 
overhaul the college entrance exam and enrollment system by 2020. The 
reform involves major changes to the current gao kao system: the final exam 
score includes results on Chinese, math, and English tests at the end of high 
school and three self-selected subject tests taken throughout high school; 
 students also have two chances in the same year to take the English test. The 
reform is being piloted in Shanghai and Zhejiang Province and started with the 
2014 high school freshman cohort. The pilot experience will be summarized 
and expanded in 2017. By 2020, a new recruiting and enrollment system will 
be established and promoted nationwide. 
National Large-Scale Assessment (Established)
As part of the government’s efforts to monitor the quality of basic education and 
in particular to improve the quality of education in rural and less developed areas, 
China began piloting a national assessment in 2008. During a seven-year piloting 
stage the government developed the testing instruments, piloted them in selected 
schools and counties, and established relevant institutions at national, provincial, 
and county education offices. The State Council formally rolled out the Plan for 
National Compulsory Education Quality Monitoring in April 2015. The plan 
outlines an annual sample-based assessment in two subject areas for fourth- and 
eighth-grade students, thus covering six main subject areas (Chinese, mathematics, 
science, physical education, art, and moral education) within a three-year period.
The first assessment in math and physical education was completed in June 
2015 covering a total of 200,000 students in fourth and eighth grades in 6,476 
primary and lower secondary schools in 323 counties and 31 provinces through-
out China. In addition, about 6,500 principals and 100,000 teachers of math and 
physical education provided feedback through structured questionnaires.2 
In 2011, the Shanghai Municipal Educational Commission launched a series 
of surveys entitled “Green Indicators of Academic Quality of Primary and 
96 Creating an Effective Student Assessment System 
How Shanghai Does It • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0790-9
Secondary School Students.” The general aims of these surveys are to satisfy the 
requirements for connotative development in the educational domain, optimize 
educational management, and build a fine educational ecology. Generally, the 
indicators in these surveys include student academic achievement, student 
learning motivation, student academic workload, teacher-student relations, 
teachers’ instructional styles, principals’ curriculum leadership, the impact of 
students’ socioeconomic background on their academic achievement, students’ 
moral behavior, and annual progress on these indicators. The potential partici-
pants for these surveys include all primary and junior secondary students in the 
compulsory education stage. For 2011, the sampled students were those in 
fourth and ninth grades. The survey instruments included academic tests 
(Chinese language and math for primary students and Chinese language, math, 
foreign language, and sciences for junior secondary students), questionnaires (for 
students,  teachers, and principals), and student physical health monitoring.
International Large-Scale Assessment (Established)
Shanghai is one of the pioneer Chinese cities in participating in international 
assessments. In both 2009 and 2012, the city participated in the PISA. The city 
has also announced plans to participate in PISA 2015, along with a number 
Chinese cities and provinces that will be participating for the first time.
Overall, based on SABER–Student Assessment indicators for these goals, 
Shanghai is rated between “advanced” and “established.” Although Shanghai’s 
performance on PISA has been outstanding, with its cutting-edge provisions for 
ensuring an enabling environment for conducting international evaluation, its 
performance with regard to professional development of teachers on PISA and 
postevaluation use of the assessment data is rated “established,” not “advanced.”
Policy Goal 1: Enabling Context (Advanced)
For both PISA 2009 and 2012, the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission 
released an announcement informing the public of the city’s participation in 
the assessment and seeking the collaboration of all relevant entities in the orga-
nization and implementation. The financial allocation for PISA participation 
came from the commission’s regular research funding, covering all core activi-
ties including participation, implementation, data processing and analysis, and 
research and dissemination of results.
To facilitate the PISA process, Shanghai designed a comprehensive manage-
ment system. For assessment activities on the ground, the city established the 
Shanghai PISA Committee (SHPISA) in 2007 to be in charge of assessment 
implementation and research activities and a Shanghai PISA coordinator was 
appointed. The coordinator was an expert in Shanghai’s education system and 
then president of a local university. For municipal-level coordination and advis-
ing, the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission established a steering com-
mittee comprising four relevant offices under the commission: the examination 
center, SHPISA, the municipal education research center, and the municipal 
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education evaluation center. The committee also invited experts to provide 
advice and suggestions on assessment implementation. This fully staffed PISA 
team not only encompassed experience and expertise to carry out the assessment 
activities effectively and accurately, it also ensured cross-departmental coordina-
tion and wide dissemination of PISA results. As a result, both rounds of PISA 
took place smoothly and without error in Shanghai.
Policy Goal 2: System Alignment (Established)
Shanghai offered a number of opportunities for citizens and students to learn 
about PISA, including workshops, university courses, and funding for attend-
ing workshops. Individuals working in the field, university students studying 
the topic, and professionals interested in assessment all benefited from those 
opportunities.
Policy Goal 3: Assessment Quality (Established)
Shanghai met all technical standards required to have its data included in the 
main portion of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) PISA report. The results were also publicized domestically. A number 
of major Chinese newspapers reported the results on the front page on the day 
the results were released. Extensive media coverage and discussion followed in 
the succeeding months. The results for individual participating schools, however, 
were not made available to schools to avoid academic pressure and competition 
given that the city views the assessment as a diagnostic tool for the entire educa-
tion system rather than an evaluation of individual schools.
For both 2009 and 2012, Shanghai was the top performer among all the par-
ticipating countries and regions, and its performance attracted international 
attention. In the OECD’s PISA publication Strong Performers and Successful 
Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA for the United States (OECD 2011), 
Shanghai’s education system is featured in chapter 4, “Shanghai and Hong Kong: 
Two Distinct Examples of Education Reform in China.” Various media sources 
such as the New York Times and the BBC have published articles analyzing 
Shanghai’s education policies in light of the assessment results. The wide dissemi-
nation of Shanghai’s PISA results has contributed to the global knowledge base 
on international assessments and education reform. Shanghai has also received 
visits from a number of countries including the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Australia to share the characteristics of its education system. In 
November 2015, the United Kingdom entered a Math Teacher Exchange 
Program to offer bilateral pedagogy and exchange of learning ideas between 
Shanghai and the United Kingdom. 
The PISA results have a significant impact on decision making at the policy 
level. Chinese education researchers have conducted in-depth analyses of 
Shanghai’s PISA performance to determine strengths and weaknesses. 
Furthermore, the city organized a number of workshops and seminars discussing 
the results with key stakeholders. Because PISA offers comprehensive data on 
student background, teachers, and students’ analytical skills, the results are used 
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to improve the quality of the curriculum, teacher training, assessment, and 
resource allocation at the system level. The results informed the design of the 
basic education section of Shanghai’s “Medium- and Long-Term Education 
Reform and Development Plan Outline (2010–2020),” a key policy document 
for Shanghai’s education development.
Summary
The application of SABER–Assessment provides a comprehensive picture of 
student assessment in Shanghai, ranging from ongoing classroom assessment to 
citywide and nationwide exams, and further to large-scale national and interna-
tional assessments. Again, careful benchmarking indicates that Shanghai falls 
in at least the “established” category and some aspects are in the “advanced” 
category.
China has a long tradition of exams. The imperial examination, a civil service 
examination system in Imperial China, was used to select candidates for the state 
bureaucracy as early as AD 600 in the Tang dynasty. Student exams today are still 
influenced by this tradition, and selection continues to be the predominant pur-
pose of exams. After a temporary disruption during the Cultural Revolution from 
1966 to about 1976, student assessment in China has evolved into a complex 
multilevel system, with both high-stakes selection tests, diagnostic classroom 
tests, and large-scale sample-based assessments.
Because of high-quality teacher training and the teaching-research group 
structure that fosters ongoing professional development of teachers, including in 
student assessment, China and Shanghai are particularly strong with regard to 
classroom assessment, which is closely linked to ongoing teaching and learning 
improvements at the school level.
Although the government has made significant efforts at the policy level to 
reduce the burden on students by discouraging testing during the compulsory 
period, the gao kao and zhong kao undoubtedly have cast a ripple effect onto the 
system as early as preprimary education. It remains a priority for the government 
to continue to reform the zhong kao and gao kao to reduce its overwhelming 
importance by increasing the frequency of tests, broadening the areas of testing, 
and creating multiple pathways between types and levels of education to allevi-
ate the fear that parents and children have that once they fail the tests, there will 
not be another chance. Shanghai is currently piloting gao kao and zhong kao 
reform and will roll out a revised and more flexible format in 2017–18. 
Future efforts can be directed more toward further development of large-scale 
and sample-based diagnostic tests. China first implemented the national assess-
ment of basic education quality in 2015. There is a tremendous opportunity to 
build capacity to further improve the assessment and use the results effectively 
for policy making, in particular to reduce the vast quality gaps between provinces 
and between rural and urban counties, and between poor and rich areas. More 
Chinese provinces should also be encouraged and provided with incentives to 
partake in international assessments so that a China-wide picture of education 
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quality can be revealed. Shanghai was the only mainland Chinese “province” that 
participated in PISA in 2009 and 2012. In 2015, however, a few more Chinese 
provinces participated.
Finally, China has a strong tradition and capacity for developing and imple-
menting tests. Although cognitive tests have been dominant, more effort can be 
devoted to assessing students social-emotional and other skills that may be 
relevant for the labor market of the future.
Notes
 1. Before 2005, graduates from the ninth grade of basic education had to take two types 
of exam: one graduation test to demonstrate proficiency and eligibility for a certificate, 
another solely for selection into high schools. The two tests were merged into one test 
serving both purposes in 2005.
 2. Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China 2015. “National Compulsory 
Education Quality Monitoring Smoothly Completed” (http://www.moe.edu.cn/jyb 
_ xwfb/gzdt_gzdt/moe_1485/201506/t20150629_191522.html). 
References
Clarke, Marguerite. 2012. “What Matters Most for Student Assessment Systems: A 
Framework Paper.” SABER Working Paper, World Bank, Washington, DC. https://
openknowledge .worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/17471/682350WP00PUBL
0WP10READ0web04019012.pdf?sequence=1. 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2011. 
Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education: Lessons from PISA for the 
United States. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
——— 2013. “School Governance, Assessment and Accountability.” In What Makes 
Schools Successful? Resources, Policies and Practices. Paris: OECD Publishing. http://
www .oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/Vol4Ch4.pdf. 

   101 How Shanghai Does It • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0790-9 
C h A P T E R  7
Linking Policies and Implementation 
to Learning Outcomes 
Introduction
This chapter focuses on analyzing student learning outcomes in Shanghai and 
examines how varying characteristics and education practices across schools are 
correlated with student learning outcomes, as measured by the 2012 Programme 
for International Student Assessment (PISA) results. PISA is designed to mea-
sure the cognitive skills of 15-year-olds, mainly in math, science, and reading. 
The 2012 PISA also included for the first time a module on “problem-solving 
skills,” which is paid particular attention to in this chapter (box 7.1). 
Shanghai’s Performance on PISA 2012
A total of 5,177 students from 155 schools in Shanghai participated in PISA 
2012 (tables 7.1 and 7.2). Sampling was done in strict accordance with 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) protocol 
and quality assurance to generate a representative sample of  15-year-olds in 
school in Shanghai. 
Shanghai continued to be the top performer on all three major domains of 
PISA (mathematics, reading, and science) in 2012. Its mean mathematics score 
of 613 points, representing a 4.2 percent annualized increase from 2009, is 119 
points above the OECD average, the equivalent of nearly three years of  schooling. 
Its mean score of 570 points in reading represents an annualized improvement 
of 4.6 percent since 2009 and is equivalent to more than a year and a half of 
schooling above the OECD average of 496 points. Its mean score in science, 580, 
is more than three-quarters of a proficiency level above the OECD average of 
501 points.
Furthermore, Shanghai also had the largest proportion of top performers 
( proficient at level 5 or 6) in mathematics (55.4 percent), reading (25.1 percent), 
and science (27.2 percent). Particularly, with 30.8 percent of students attaining 
level 6 in mathematics, Shanghai is the only PISA participant with more students 
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Box 7.1 Definitions of PISA Domains
Reading literacy: An individual’s capacity to understand, use, reflect on, and engage with 
written texts, so as to achieve one’s goals, to develop one’s knowledge and potential, and to 
participate in society. 
Mathematical literacy: An individual’s capacity to identify and understand the role that 
mathematics plays in the world, to make well-founded judgments, and to use and engage 
with mathematics in ways that meet the needs of that individual’s life as a constructive, con-
cerned, and reflective citizen. 
Scientific literacy: An individual’s scientific knowledge and use of that knowledge to identify 
questions, to acquire new knowledge, to explain scientific phenomena, and to draw 
 evidence-based conclusions about science-related issues; understanding of the characteristic 
features of science as a form of human knowledge and enquiry; awareness of how science 
and technology shape our material, intellectual, and cultural environments; and willingness to 
engage in science-related issues, and with the ideas of science, as a reflective citizen. 
Problem-solving skills: The problem-solving assessment of PISA 2012 was designed to focus 
as much as possible on cognitive processes and generic skills rather than  domain-specific 
knowledge. Problem-solving competence is defined as an individual’s capacity to engage in 
cognitive processing to understand and resolve problem situations where a method of solu-
tion is not immediately obvious. It includes the willingness to engage with such situations to 
achieve one’s potential as a constructive and reflective citizen. 
Source: OECD 2013, 4, 17. 
Table 7.1 Number of Schools in PISA 2012 Shanghai Sample
Type of school Number of schools
Junior secondary school 60
Mixed senior secondary school 23
General senior secondary school 40
Model or experimental 21
Ordinary 19
Vocational secondary school 32
Total 155
Source: Data from OECD 2012, PISA 2012 database (http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/). 
Note: PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment.
at this top level than at any other level. Moreover, Shanghai is one of the most 
equal education systems among the PISA participants. For example, it has the 
highest proportion of resilient students (19.2 percent), that is, disadvantaged 
students who perform among the top 25 percent of students across all participat-
ing countries and economies after controlling for socioeconomic status. The 
strength of the relationship between mathematics performance and socioeco-
nomic status is also below the OECD average.
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Comparing Performance between Programs
Among 15-year-olds in Shanghai, students attending senior secondary general 
programs achieved the highest scores on all four PISA domains (mathematics, 
science, reading, and problem solving), followed by those attending junior sec-
ondary programs (table 7.3). 
The gap between general and vocational senior secondary students is particu-
larly large. In fact, the average scores of vocational senior secondary students are 
lower than those of general junior secondary students on all four domains 
(figure 7.1). 
Among senior secondary general program students, those attending model or 
experimental schools scored higher than those attending ordinary schools on all four 
domains. If model or experimental school students are compared with vocational 
school students, the largest gap in performances is 178 points (on mathematics).
Table 7.3 Performance on Mathematics, Science, Reading, and Problem Solving, by Program 
and Ordinary versus Model
PISA scores
Subject
Junior 
secondary
Senior secondary 
general
Senior secondary 
vocational Ordinary Model Shanghai
Mathematics 592 684 540 662 718 613
S.E. 6.27 3.71 4.78 5.79 6.26 3.29
Science 566 636 520 625 657 580
S.E. 5.69 3.12 4.15 3.81 5.56 3.03
Reading 554 623 515 608 649 570
S.E. 5.49 3.08 3.95 3.05 5.44 2.86
Problem solving 514 593 493 578 616 536
S.E. 6.01 4.33 4.83 6.93 7.06 3.29
Source: Data from OECD 2012, PISA 2012 database (http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/). 
Note: PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment; S.E. = standard error. 
Table 7.2 Number of Students in PISA 2012 Shanghai Sample, by Type of School and 
Program
Program Type of school Number of students
Junior secondary/general Junior secondary school 1,899
Mixed senior secondary school 433
General senior secondary school 31a
Senior secondary/general General 1,381
Vocational 4a
Mixed 346
Senior secondary/vocational Vocational secondary school 1,083
Total 5,177
Source: Data from OECD 2012, PISA 2012 database (http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/).
Note: PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment.
a. These students attend a general junior secondary program in a general secondary school, or they attend a general senior 
secondary program in a vocational secondary school.
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Figure 7.1 Performance on Mathematics, Science, Reading, and Problem Solving, by Program and 
Ordinary versus Model
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Source: Data from OECD 2012, PISA 2012 database (http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/).
Note: PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment.
Comparative data from the 2012 OECD report reveal that between-school 
variation explains 47 percent of the total variation in mathematics performance 
among students in Shanghai for PISA 2012, slightly higher than Hong Kong SAR, 
China (40 percent); Taiwan, China (40 percent); the Republic of Korea (39 per-
cent); and Singapore (37 percent); but lower than Japan (53 percent) (figure 7.2). 
Additionally, it was found that as much as 58.8 percent of the between-
school difference in Shanghai is explained by study programs (lower vs. upper 
level and vocational vs. general orientation), much higher than the OECD aver-
age (40 percent) and other education systems in the region (for example, 
7.6 percent in Hong Kong SAR, China; 13 percent in Japan; and 35 percent in 
Korea and Taiwan, China).
The following sections first compare the student and school characteristics 
between programs, then investigate, within each program (junior secondary, 
senior secondary general, and senior secondary vocational), how school-level 
characteristics are associated with student performance.
Comparing Individual and Family Background Characteristics between 
Programs
Individual and family characteristics of students attending junior secondary, gen-
eral senior secondary, and vocational senior secondary programs differ significantly 
from each other (table 7.4). A total of 56 percent of general senior secondary 
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Figure 7.2 Percentage of Total Variation in PISA Mathematics Performance Explained by Between-School 
Variation and Study Programs (junior or senior secondary level, vocational or general)
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students are girls, a higher proportion than in vocational senior  secondary and 
junior secondary programs. General senior secondary students, on average, come 
from wealthier families with more home educational resources and cultural pos-
sessions and higher parental education levels than those attending vocational 
senior secondary programs. Parents of general senior secondary students have on 
average almost two more years of education than those of vocational senior sec-
ondary students in Shanghai. About 93 percent of general senior secondary school 
students have attended preschool for at least a year, compared with 85 percent of 
vocational senior secondary students and general junior secondary students. 
Among general senior secondary students, those attending model or experi-
mental schools enjoy more family wealth and home educational resources. 
Parents of model or experimental school students have almost an additional year 
of education compared with those of ordinary school students. Family cultural 
possessions and proportion of students attending preschool do not differ signifi-
cantly between ordinary and model or experimental school students.
Comparing School Characteristics
About 90 percent of the junior secondary schools and vocational senior second-
ary schools are public.1 The proportion of public schools is lowest among 
mixed secondary schools (76 percent), whereas all general senior secondary 
schools are public.
All of the private schools represented in Shanghai PISA 2012 are categorized 
as government-independent because they receive less than 50 percent of their 
core funding from the government. Among the private school student popula-
tion in Shanghai, 36 percent attend private schools with no funding from the 
government; an equal percentage attend schools that rely completely on student 
fees. Half of private school students attend schools that receive about 
10–30  percent of funding from government; 5.8 percent attend schools that 
receive approximately 45 percent of their core funding from the government. In 
contrast, funding sources seem to vary among public schools: among public 
school students in Shanghai, only 60 percent attend schools that do not charge 
Table 7.4 Comparing Individual and Family Characteristics by Program
PISA 
variable
Junior 
secondary
Senior secondary 
general
Senior secondary 
vocational Ordinary Model
All 
programs
female 0.48 0.56 0.51*** 0.56 0.58 0.51
WEALTH −0.87 −0.53 −0.91*** −0.62 −0.47* −0.76
HEDRES −0.15 0.20 −0.14*** 0.10 0.29* −0.03
CULTPOS 0.41 0.68 0.22*** 0.65 0.73 0.46
PARED 12.46 13.80 11.89*** 13.31 14.30*** 12.79
preschool 0.85 0.93 0.85*** 0.93 0.93 0.88
Source: Data from OECD 2012, PISA 2012 database (http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/). 
Note: See variable descriptions in table 7A.1. PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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student fees as a funding source. As shown in figure 7.3, panel a, a small propor-
tion of public schools in Shanghai actually receive less than half of their core 
funding from the government. And 3 percent of the public school student popu-
lation in Shanghai in fact attends public schools that receive more than half of 
their core funding from student fees (figure 7.3, panel b). 
Admissions policies differ significantly among the four types of schools: 
17 percent of junior secondary schools still consider academic performance or 
recommendations from feeder schools for admission. Academic performance or 
recommendations from feeder schools is required for admission to the vast 
majority (92 percent) of general secondary schools, but only for 60 percent of 
vocational secondary schools. This means that the variation in student perfor-
mance across and within senior secondary programs is not only related to school 
quality, but also to the admission process that sorts students according to their 
academic performance before they enter senior secondary school. Considering 
that the PISA was administered not long after the 15-year-olds entered senior 
secondary programs, the correlations presented in the following sections can be 
interpreted both as “what school characteristics predict better student perfor-
mance” and as “what kinds of schools attract better-performing students?”
The main difference between general and vocational secondary schools lies in 
teaching resources: the student-to-teacher ratio is as high as 17 in vocational 
secondary schools, in contrast with 9 in general secondary schools. Moreover, on 
average 99 percent of the teachers in general senior secondary schools hold ter-
tiary qualifications, compared with 92 percent in vocational senior secondary 
Figure 7.3 Distribution of Students by Percentage of Funding from Government versus Student Fees
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schools. In addition, more creative extracurricular activities are available at senior 
secondary schools and mixed secondary schools than at junior secondary schools.
Curiously, measures of student- and teacher-related factors affecting school 
climate are lowest in vocational schools but highest in general secondary schools 
(table 7.5). Given that both measures are based on principals’ reporting (see 
table 7A.1 for detailed definitions of the two measures), it is likely that, instead 
Table 7.5 Comparing Characteristics of Different Types of Schools
PISA variable
Junior secondary 
school
Mixed 
secondary
General 
high
Vocational 
high Total
Organization, competition, and policy
public 0.90 0.76 1.00 0.91*** 0.91
compete 0.73 0.89 0.86 0.87 0.82
academic 0.17 0.61 0.92 0.60*** 0.53
abg_math 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.93 0.94
Teacher
STRATIO 11.52 11.61 9.27 17.23*** 12.22
PROPQUAL 0.93 0.96 0.99 0.92*** 0.95
TCMORALE 0.10 −0.01 0.01 −0.35 −0.04
Shortage_scie 0.38 0.37 0.25 0.45 0.36
Shortage_math 0.36 0.46 0.27 0.42 0.36
Shortage_read 0.33 0.42 0.27 0.32 0.32
Resources
SCMATEDU 0.22 0.01 0.34 −0.10 0.15
SCMATBUI −0.18 −0.39 0.10 −0.19 −0.14
COMPWEB 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.86 0.95
CLSIZE 38.63 39.23 38.11 41.59 39.25
CREACTIV 1.74 2.55 2.76 2.46*** 2.30
Autonomy
RESPRES −0.29 −0.28 −0.46 −0.03 −0.27
RESPCUR −0.71 −0.87 −0.77 0.29 −0.52
Accountability
Ppressure 0.20 0.39 0.17 0.10 0.19
scoretrack 0.68 0.81 0.57 0.41 0.61
Climate
STUDCLIM 0.53 −0.08 0.89 −1.06 0.18
TEACCLIM −0.61 −1.00 −0.23 −1.16 −0.69
Leadership
LEADCOM −0.32 −0.32 −0.26 −0.69 −0.39
LEADINST −0.13 −0.11 −0.24 −0.44 −0.23
LEADPD −0.08 −0.33 −0.29 −0.54 −0.28
LEADTCH −0.80 −0.71 −0.81 −0.87 −0.80
Source: Data from OECD 2012, PISA 2012 database (http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/). 
Note: See variable descriptions in table 7A.1. PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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of measuring the actual extent of disruption, the two variables indicate how 
aware principals are of disruptive student behaviors and teaching practices. Thus, 
caution should be exercised in interpreting these results. 
Among general secondary schools, the only statistically significant difference 
between ordinary and model or experimental schools lies in the  student-to-teacher 
ratio and class sizes (table 7.6): model or experimental schools have relatively 
Table 7.6 Comparing Characteristics of Ordinary versus Model or Experimental 
Secondary Schools
PISA variable Ordinary Model or experimental
Organization, competition, and policy
public 1.00 1.00
compete 0.83 0.89
academic 0.94 0.90
abg_math 0.94 0.89
Teacher
STRATIO 8.80 9.71*
PROPQUAL 1.00 0.99
TCMORALE −0.11 0.14
Shortage_scie 0.23 0.26
Shortage_math 0.35 0.21
Shortage_read 0.28 0.26
Resources
SCMATEDU 0.25 0.44
SCMATBUI −0.11 0.30
COMPWEB 0.99 0.98
CLSIZE 35.25 40.87***
CREACTIV 2.62 2.89
Autonomy
RESPRES −0.52 −0.41
RESPCUR −0.90 −0.66
Accountability
Ppressure 0.17 0.16
scoretrack 0.57 0.58
Climate
STUDCLIM 0.47 1.30
TEACCLIM −0.15 −0.31
Leadership
LEADCOM −0.32 −0.20
LEADINST −0.31 −0.17
LEADPD −0.36 −0.23
LEADTCH −0.99 −0.63
Source: Data from OECD 2012, PISA 2012 database (http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/). 
Note: See variable descriptions in table 7A.1. PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment. 
*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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higher student-to-teacher ratios (10) and larger class sizes (41) than ordinary 
secondary schools. The greater local demand for model schools in general per-
haps explains these differences. This variation also seems to indicate that smaller 
class size and student-to-teacher ratios themselves do not automatically translate 
to learning achievement. Model or experimental school principals reported 
higher levels of student-related factors that affect school climate, suggesting that 
they might be more aware of student disruptive behaviors. 
Estimating Mathematical, Reading, and Scientific Literacy
How are different school characteristics associated with students’ 
 mathematical, reading, and scientific literacy? For each program (junior 
 secondary, senior secondary general, and senior secondary vocational), PISA 
scores are estimated on the three domains (mathematics, science, and read-
ing) using school characteristics, controlling for individual and family back-
ground characteristics. Given that students were sorted into general versus 
vocational programs through zhong kao at the end of ninth grade and not 
long before PISA was administered, separate regression models for each 
program are estimated (junior secondary, senior secondary general, and 
senior secondary vocational). In interpreting the results, we do not intend to 
draw any causal inferences from the estimates; rather, we aim to characterize 
schools with better- versus worse-performing students. We also emphasize 
that the relationship can be interpreted both ways: better-quality schools 
produce better student performance, but they also admit better-performing 
students to start with. 
Junior Secondary
After controlling for student and family background characteristics, differences 
in junior secondary students’ mathematics, reading, and science scores are associ-
ated mainly with public vs. private administration of the junior secondary 
schools: private junior secondary school students, on average, perform better than 
public school students on all three domains, and the differences are statistically 
significant for mathematics and reading scores.
Measures of teachers and teaching resources do not seem to explain variances 
in junior secondary school student performance except that better-performing 
schools on the reading test are more likely to report shortages of teachers of 
Chinese. Among indicators of school resources, creative extracurricular activities 
available at school are related to better performances of students across all three 
domains.
Lower-performing junior secondary schools tend to be more autonomous in 
determining student assessment policies, textbooks, course content, and offerings, 
whereas the curricula for higher-performing junior secondary schools are deter-
mined mainly by regional, local, or national educational authorities. The negative 
association between autonomy in curriculum and performance is statistically 
significant for mathematics but not for reading or science (table 7.7). 
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Table 7.7 Estimates of Mathematical, Reading, and Scientific Literacy Using School 
Characteristics, Junior Secondary
PISA 
variable
Mathematics Reading Science
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Organization, competition, and policy
public −67.73 15.552*** −61.05 13.018*** −28.98 12.954
compete −4.00 12.631 −3.42 10.196 −8.56 10.338
academic 5.70 12.995 6.18 11.888 6.08 9.192
abg_math −12.89 15.591
mixed −16.04 11.003 −14.68 9.546 −13.79 9.826
Teacher
STRATIO −1.12 0.827 −0.29 1.029 −1.12 0.907
PROPQUAL −8.26 47.532 7.58 41.106 −1.76 42.584
TCMORALE 6.13 3.679 2.47 3.470 3.35 3.602
Shortage 7.46 9.688 20.50 9.482* 5.30 8.318
Resources
SCMATEDU 0.65 4.576 4.98 4.139 −1.12 3.969
SCMATBUI 1.83 5.420 −2.79 5.236 2.56 4.910
COMPWEB 34.64 45.579 23.91 47.153 51.95 48.990
CLSIZE 0.15 0.387 0.19 0.366 0.26 0.455
CREACTIV 13.18 4.188** 10.88 3.810** 13.06 3.550***
Autonomy
RESPRES 0.10 7.588 0.99 6.451 10.11 8.840
RESPCUR −13.84 6.857* −8.14 7.644 −11.80 6.582
Accountability
Ppressure 9.73 9.897 9.54 8.457 7.33 8.215
scoretrack −3.32 9.856 −9.86 8.855 −7.54 9.389
Climate
STUDCLIM 4.30 2.976 4.29 2.176 3.68 2.798
TEACCLIM −5.66 4.123 −4.96 3.120 −5.40 3.721
Leadership
LEADCOM −9.02 7.741 −3.69 6.088 −7.09 5.430
LEADINST −0.72 7.643 −2.17 7.424 −2.81 6.990
LEADPD −3.01 5.491 −5.06 5.236 −0.66 5.292
LEADTCH 5.99 8.443 5.31 7.173 2.10 7.164
N 2190 2190 2190
R2 0.349 0.368 0.343
Source: Data from OECD 2012, PISA 2012 database (http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/). 
Note: See variable descriptions in table 7A.1. All models control for individual and family background characteristics, as well as 
grade-level fixed effects. PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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Senior Secondary General
Among measures of school resources, quality of school educational resources is 
significantly and positively related to reading scores in general senior secondary 
schools (table 7.8). Echoing the previous finding that model or experimental 
secondary schools have larger class sizes than ordinary ones, among general 
 secondary school students, a one unit (student) increase in class size is associ-
ated with a 1.5 point higher score on mathematics and reading, after control-
ling for individual and family background characteristics. Among four 
dimensions of school leadership measures, levels of teacher participation in 
school leadership are positively and significantly associated with mathematical 
and reading literacy. 
After controlling for individual and other school characteristics, students from 
mixed secondary schools perform significantly worse across all three domains 
than those from nonmixed general secondary schools. Furthermore, ability 
grouping between mathematics classes is associated with lower performance 
among secondary school students.
Senior Secondary Vocational
For vocational school students, reading scores do not seem to be significantly 
correlated with school-level characteristics after controlling for individual and 
family characteristics (table 7.9). Mathematics performance is, on the one hand, 
correlated with school accountability to parents: students attending schools that 
face pressure from parents score on average 41 points higher on mathematics. On 
the other hand, vocational schools with lower mathematics scores report signifi-
cantly more student-related factors affecting school climate. 
Science performance is significantly and positively related to several mea-
sures of school resources, including quality of physical infrastructure, class size, 
and availability of extracurricular creative activities at vocational senior second-
ary schools.
Individual and Family Background Characteristics
To demonstrate the correlation with individual and family background 
 characteristics, school fixed effects models are used to estimate student perfor-
mance (table 7.10).2 We find a highly significant correlation between back-
ground characteristics and performance across all domains. 
Girls perform worse on mathematics and science and better on reading 
compared with boys. Wealth is negatively correlated with performance. In 
comparison, more family educational resources and cultural possessions are 
associated with better performance. Similar results are found in other 
OECD countries, suggesting that on the one hand, family wealth can 
improve performance by providing more educational and cultural resources, 
but on the other hand, weakens students’ incentives to learn and reduces the 
cost of leisure relative to education (Spiezia 2011). Parental education is also 
positively related to performance. Finally, students who have attended at 
least a year of preschool have a significant advantage across all domains over 
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Table 7.8 Estimates of Mathematical, Reading, and Scientific Literacy Using School 
Characteristics, Senior Secondary General Students
PISA 
variable
Mathematics Reading Science
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Organization, competition, and policy
public 18.99 30.902 2.29 24.317 10.75 28.403
compete 11.52 19.660 22.04 14.438 10.08 14.761
academic 1.63 12.044 5.53 9.225 6.36 11.155
abg_math −37.59 10.819***
mixed −31.88 13.880* −34.02 8.429*** −23.30 8.910*
Teacher
STRATIO 1.58 1.266 1.94 1.336 0.84 1.368
PROPQUAL 67.55 156.502 105.35 142.942 122.46 192.002
TCMORALE 4.62 6.063 2.31 4.616 4.76 5.024
Shortage 1.46 9.339 5.69 6.187 13.22 9.939
Resources
SCMATEDU 4.80 6.134 10.34 4.586* 3.99 5.450
SCMATBUI 2.23 5.720 −4.16 4.417 2.73 4.480
COMPWEB 35.98 54.906 39.21 55.913 42.62 58.661
CLSIZE 1.51 0.752* 1.56 0.581** 0.44 0.819
CREACTIV 13.70 7.936 5.60 5.280 7.74 6.038
Autonomy
RESPRES 15.38 12.577 5.69 10.328 7.16 10.809
RESPCUR −7.24 11.760 −4.74 8.418 −5.66 8.502
Accountability
Ppressure 12.15 10.180 13.02 7.868 2.17 8.867
scoretrack 10.74 9.858 −0.56 7.816 5.78 8.086
Climate
STUDCLIM 2.33 4.479 −1.17 3.456 0.22 3.307
TEACCLIM −2.58 5.623 0.62 4.523 −0.71 4.908
Leadership
LEADCOM −5.69 9.102 −0.52 7.573 −6.79 7.589
LEADINST 4.03 7.428 3.67 6.067 4.27 6.196
LEADPD –11.82 9.151 –7.12 7.612 –5.92 7.151
LEADTCH 21.34 8.198* 15.08 6.772* 6.43 7.871
N 1632 1632 1632
R2 0.227 0.215 0.176
Source: Data from OECD 2012, PISA 2012 database (http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/). 
Note: See variable descriptions in table 7A.1. All models control for individual and family background characteristics, as well as 
grade-level fixed effects. PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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Table 7.9 Estimates of Mathematical, Reading, and Scientific Literacy Using School 
Characteristics, Senior Secondary Vocational
PISA 
variable
Mathematics Reading Science
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Individual and family characteristics
female −17.10 5.186** 20.60 4.875** −13.83 4.995**
WEALTH −12.17 4.016** −6.69 3.400 −9.53 3.508**
HEDRES 6.06 3.220 5.57 2.222* 5.29 2.329*
CULTPOS 5.13 3.061 3.69 2.394 7.73 2.472**
PARED 1.95 0.831* 1.98 0.726** 1.84 0.636**
preschool 28.33 7.672*** 21.86 5.478*** 16.30 5.975**
Organization, competition, and policy
public −67.85 56.197 12.79 40.016 −0.32 36.582
compete −37.81 33.852 −9.39 26.961 30.28 28.534
academic −0.51 18.558 5.29 12.087 4.17 15.045
abg_math −7.20 29.901
Teacher
STRATIO 1.13 0.800 0.98 0.580 0.82 0.704
PROPQUAL 159.09 116.643 14.65 106.227 59.53 89.438
TCMORALE 0.21 4.696 5.01 4.668 4.54 4.411
Shortage 19.37 13.152 11.71 11.603 20.03 11.047
Resources
SCMATEDU 1.95 4.251 3.53 4.123 −0.44 4.118
SCMATBUI 1.68 4.743 −1.61 3.710 8.81 4.263*
COMPWEB 13.07 48.016 7.32 27.565 4.75 26.475
CLSIZE −0.05 1.362 0.79 0.696 1.87 0.930*
CREACTIV 6.39 10.015 4.83 8.278 17.34 6.748*
Autonomy
RESPRES 16.53 10.885 3.17 7.573 −4.68 7.341
RESPCUR 2.53 4.756 −3.62 4.366 −6.86 4.783
Accountability
Ppressure 41.82 18.154* 4.69 15.448 7.85 11.951
scoretrack −5.05 9.330 7.12 7.186 0.68 6.799
Climate
STUDCLIM −14.71 7.046* −2.90 6.834 −0.63 7.340
TEACCLIM 7.12 5.260 −0.79 4.414 −3.89 4.822
Leadership
LEADCOM −14.10 9.693 2.51 7.646 −5.14 8.032
LEADINST 13.78 18.216 14.17 13.496 5.80 12.774
LEADPD 8.43 13.505 −4.49 9.420 13.76 8.678
LEADTCH 5.95 9.848 1.89 6.245 −10.48 7.180
N 1070 1070 1070
R2 0.156 0.166 0.155
Source: Data from OECD 2012, PISA 2012 database (http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/). 
Note: See variable descriptions in table 7A.1. All models control for individual and family background characteristics, as well as 
grade-level fixed effects. PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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Table 7.10 Estimates of Mathematical, Reading, and Scientific Literacy Using Individual and 
household Background Characteristics, Controlling for School Fixed Effects
PISA 
variable
Mathematics Reading Science
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
female −17.89 2.268*** 13.27 1.650*** −15.53 2.101***
WEALTH −6.96 1.664*** −5.49 1.633** −5.87 1.417***
HEDRES 4.62 1.560** 4.19 1.238** 4.95 1.301***
CULTPOS 6.11 1.630*** 4.94 1.222*** 8.40 1.250***
PARED 1.40 0.426** 1.21 0.367** 1.44 0.374***
preschool 31.12 3.879*** 21.30 3.265*** 16.36 3.151***
N 4892 4892 4892
R2 0.54 0.54 0.54
Source: Data from OECD 2012, PISA 2012 database (http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/). 
Note: See variable descriptions in table 7A.1. All models control for fixed effects and grade-level fixed effects. 
PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
those who have not: the differences range from 16 points in science to as 
many as 31 points in mathematics, even after controlling for gender and 
other family background characteristics. 
Problem-Solving Skills
Shanghai ranks sixth on overall problem-solving skills on PISA 2012. As dis-
played in figure 7.4, students in Singapore, Korea, and Japan, followed by stu-
dents in Hong Kong SAR, China, and Macao SAR, China, score higher in 
problem solving than students in all other participating countries and economies. 
Disaggregation of data reveals that students in Hong Kong SAR, China; Japan; 
Korea; Macao SAR, China; Shanghai; Singapore; and Taiwan, China, perform 
strongest on problems that require understanding, formulating, or representing 
new knowledge, compared with other types of problems. At the same time, stu-
dents in Brazil, Ireland, Korea, and the United States perform strongest on inter-
active problems that require students to uncover some of the information 
needed to solve the problem, compared with static problems for which all infor-
mation is disclosed at the outset (OECD 2014). 
Estimating Problem-Solving Skills Using School Characteristics
The same set of school-level characteristics is used to estimate problem-solving 
scores (Model 1), controlling for student and family background (table 7.11). 
The problem-solving assessment of PISA 2012 was designed to focus as 
much as possible on cognitive processes and generic skills rather than domain-
specific knowledge (OECD 2014). However, because the same cognitive processes 
can also be used in mathematics, science, and reading, problem-solving scores 
are positively correlated with the other three domains. For students in Shanghai, 
as much as 71 percent of the problem-solving score reflects skills that are also 
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measured in at least one of the three regular assessment domains; 64.8 percent of 
the variance in problem-solving scores is associated with more than one regular 
domain, and 5.8 percent of the variance is uniquely associated with mathematics 
(OECD 2014). Because problem-solving skills are highly correlated with perfor-
mance in the mathematics, reading, and science domains, which are related to 
school-level characteristics, to account for omitted variable bias, mathematics, 
reading, and science scores are controlled for in the full models (Model 2) used to 
estimate problem-solving scores. 
For junior secondary students, after controlling for math, reading, and science 
scores, problem-solving skills are significantly and positively related to quality of 
Figure 7.4 Problem Solving, Mean Score, PISA 2012
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Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment.
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Table 7.11 Estimates of Problem-Solving Skills Using School Characteristics
PISA variable
Junior secondary Senior secondary general Senior secondary vocational
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient
Standard 
error Coefficient
Standard 
error Coefficient
Standard 
error Coefficient
Standard 
error Coefficient
Standard 
error Coefficient
Standard 
error
Individual and family background
female −34.73 3.101*** −34.83 3.229*** −36.48 3.052*** −28.86 3.371*** −29.34 5.236*** −30.51 4.052***
WEALTH 3.59 2.585 7.64 1.554*** 2.24 2.774 6.02 2.028** −2.56 3.719 5.38 1.961**
HEDRES 9.38 2.331*** 2.08 1.434 4.41 2.149* 2.49 1.581 8.43 2.599** 3.20 1.394*
CULTPOS 1.63 2.287 −6.48 1.481*** −6.33 2.757* −6.66 1.732*** −3.30 2.659 −6.59 1.493***
PARED 2.05 0.784* 0.29 0.403 3.06 0.887** 0.51 0.711 2.00 0.705** 0.29 0.516
preschool 30.56 5.182*** 0.64 3.268 27.59 6.839*** 11.99 4.790* 31.42 6.494*** 9.20 4.385*
Organization, competition, and policy
public −34.43 19.102 23.39 13.083 11.86 29.761 1.45 22.571 −103.47 34.691** −53.80 41.634
compete −2.38 10.367 1.21 11.182 31.84 14.114* 17.22 10.892 −32.46 18.600 −0.44 27.297
academic −2.56 11.124 −8.82 10.201 3.05 14.629 −3.18 11.955 18.89 13.366 13.14 19.956
mixed −4.40 12.634 7.92 12.276 −23.69 13.202 3.30 10.237
Teacher
STRATIO 0.04 0.961 1.00 0.851 3.13 1.495* 1.43 1.733 −1.35 0.858 −2.24 1.047*
PROPQUAL −36.62 42.847 −24.82 37.025 167.40 152.501 130.03 103.232 −34.89 92.405 −173.50 97.933
TCMORALE 6.94 5.178 3.46 4.176 9.01 6.041 5.83 4.681 −3.53 6.864 −5.15 5.862
TCSHORT 0.00 0.002 0.00 0.002 0.23 4.057 1.85 4.459 −5.00 9.602 −6.79 8.049
Resources
SCMATEDU 8.04 4.305 7.84 3.294* 2.90 5.788 −1.36 5.782 −10.45 9.136 −11.51 8.133
SCMATBUI −5.67 5.176 −5.90 3.528 9.07 7.291 8.83 6.102 −8.42 5.451 −8.02 5.582
table continues next page
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Table 7.11 Estimates of Problem-Solving Skills Using School Characteristics (continued)
PISA variable
Junior secondary Senior secondary general Senior secondary vocational
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Coefficient
Standard 
error Coefficient
Standard 
error Coefficient
Standard 
error Coefficient
Standard 
error Coefficient
Standard 
error Coefficient
Standard 
error
COMPWEB 54.06 51.119 31.38 52.898 19.86 41.137 −19.53 63.312 −1.81 35.836 −20.23 30.225
CLSIZE 0.49 0.501 0.40 0.513 0.33 1.072 −0.88 0.876 −1.26 0.955 −1.38 0.656*
CREACTIV 8.01 4.433 −1.38 3.745 7.10 9.612 0.50 6.127 13.22 9.819 13.54 13.641
Autonomy
RESPRES 9.15 8.490 11.03 6.268 11.34 11.146 3.67 7.915 1.58 7.352 −9.42 6.621
RESPCUR −1.52 8.247 6.72 4.264 −10.34 10.693 −3.94 6.416 27.07 8.400** 26.90 8.146**
Accountability
Ppressure 3.26 10.428 −5.56 7.921 17.60 10.149 4.65 11.810 35.78 17.350* 5.34 13.622
scoretrack −4.17 10.580 −1.12 10.931 −2.28 7.721 −7.28 7.668 −23.57 10.338* −26.30 10.103*
Climate
STUDCLIM 4.99 4.971 1.11 4.155 3.74 4.813 2.20 3.102 −7.80 6.678 −0.08 7.195
TEACCLIM −12.30 6.463 −6.70 5.766 −6.59 5.936 −4.38 3.771 14.71 7.613 11.22 8.100
Leadership
LEADCOM 1.38 7.918 6.27 8.485 −0.02 10.276 4.29 7.516 13.37 11.561 17.33 12.987
LEADINST 12.01 6.480 13.63 6.198* −10.02 7.642 −12.85 7.655 −34.37 16.177 −54.36 12.138***
LEADPD −4.89 6.775 −1.63 6.300 −5.10 7.643 3.74 5.396 21.60 10.871 26.43 10.689*
LEADTCH −2.67 6.366 −7.08 6.265 14.28 10.939 −0.23 9.165 1.74 10.118 −0.97 7.687
Main domain performance
Mathematics 0.52 0.047*** 0.48 0.047*** 0.49 0.040***
Reading 0.40 0.067*** 0.36 0.067*** 0.41 0.076***
Science −0.09 0.055 −0.01 0.058 −0.07 0.064
N 2224 2224 1632 1632 1070 1070
Source: Data from OECD 2012, PISA 2012 database (http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/). 
Note: See variable descriptions in table 7A.1. All models contain grade-level fixed effects. PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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school educational resources, as well as to principals’ instructional leadership, 
measured by how often principals promote teaching practices based on recent 
educational research, praise teachers, and draw teachers’ attention to the impor-
tance of pupils’ development.
For general senior secondary students, although student-to-teacher ratios and 
competition from other schools seem to be related to higher problem-solving 
scores in Model 1, the relationship seems to be accounted for in part by perfor-
mances on mathematics, reading, and science, given that the coefficients become 
small and no longer statistically significant once performance on the three regular 
domains is controlled for in Model 2.
The most interesting results are found among vocational senior secondary 
students. After controlling for student and family background, public school 
students score as much as 103 points lower on problem-solving skills than do 
private school students. The gap seems to be accounted for in part by perfor-
mance in mathematics, reading, and science, seeing as the size of the coefficient 
is halved and no longer statistically significant once differences in the three main 
domains are accounted for. Holding mathematics, reading, and science perfor-
mance constant, student-to-teacher ratio and class size are negatively correlated 
with problem-solving scores.
Vocational schools whose curriculum and assessment policies are determined 
by school councils, principals, or teachers, as opposed to national, regional, or 
local educational authorities, score higher on problem-solving skills, even after 
controlling for mathematical, reading, and scientific literacy.
Between the two accountability measures, vocational schools faced with 
parental pressure score higher on problem solving, but the difference goes away 
once mathematical, reading, and scientific literacy are accounted for. In compari-
son, vocational schools whose academic performance is tracked by an education 
authority score lower on problem solving, and the difference remains even after 
accounting for mathematical, reading, and scientific literacy.
Among various dimensions of school leadership, vocational schools with bet-
ter problem-solving performance see principals more often promoting institu-
tional improvements and professional development, but less often demonstrating 
instructional leadership (by promoting teaching practices, praising teachers, and 
drawing teachers’ attention to the importance of pupils’ development).
Among student and family background characteristics, girls in every type of 
program score lower than boys on problem solving, and the size of the difference 
does not seem to change much after differences in mathematical, reading, and 
scientific literacy are accounted for. This finding suggests that girls’ disadvantages 
in problem-solving skills might be independent of their lower mathematics and 
science performance observed before.
Family wealth only has a significant and positive effect on problem solving 
after adjusting for performance in the three main domains. Similarly, family cul-
tural possessions have a negative and significant correlation with problem-solving 
scores after we control for mathematics, reading, and science scores. The positive 
relationship between home educational resources and problem-solving skills is 
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no longer statistically significant once mathematical, reading, and scientific 
 literacy are accounted for, except for vocational school students. Students who 
have attended at least a year of preschool score higher on problem solving in all 
three types of programs, but the advantage goes away once differences in 
 mathematical, reading, and scientific literacy are accounted for.
Problem Solving by Nature and Process: Comparing Problem-Solving Skills 
by Nature, Process, and Program
This section takes an in-depth look at problem-solving skills by nature of the 
problem situation and the different problem-solving processes, as measured by 
PISA 2012 (box 7.2). First the solution rates3 on each specific type of problem 
are compared. Then logistic regression models are used to predict the solution 
rates with the same set of school characteristics. 
Senior secondary general school students have the highest solution rates on 
both static and interactive problems (figure 7.5). Vocational students have 
Box 7.2 Definitions and Implications of the Nature and Processes of Problem 
Solving
PISA 2012 defines problem-solving competence as an individual’s capacity to engage in cogni-
tive processing to understand and resolve problem situations where a method of solution is 
not immediately obvious. It includes the willingness to engage with such situations in order to 
achieve one’s potential as a constructive and reflective citizen.
Nature of the problem situation
• Static problems: Information disclosed to the student at the outset is sufficient to solve the 
problem. These are the typical textbook problems encountered in schools. 
• Interactive problems: Interaction with the problem situation is a necessary part of the 
solving activity. These are the types of problems encountered in most contexts outside of 
schools. To excel in interactive tasks, it is not sufficient to possess the problem-solving 
skills required by static, analytical problems; students must also be open to novelty, toler-
ate doubt and uncertainty, and dare to use intuition (“hunches and feelings”) to initiate a 
solution. 
Problem-solving processes
Knowledge-acquisition tasks require students to generate and manipulate the information in a 
mental representation. The movement is from concrete to abstract, from information to 
knowledge. Students who are strong on these tasks are good at generating new knowledge; 
they can be characterized as quick learners, who are highly inquisitive (questioning their own 
knowledge, challenging assumptions), generating and experimenting with alternatives, and 
good at abstract information processing. 
box continues next page
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Figure 7.5 Solution Rates on PISA Items Measuring Different Natures and Processes of 
Problem Solving, by Program
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Source: Data from OECD 2012, PISA 2012 database (http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/). 
Note: PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment.
• Exploring and understanding involves exploring the problem situation by observing it, 
interacting with it, searching for information, and finding limitations or obstacles; and dem-
onstrating understanding of the information given and the information discovered while 
interacting with the problem situation. 
• Representing and formulating involves using tables, graphs, symbols, or words to repre-
sent aspects of the problem situation; and formulating hypotheses about the relevant 
 factors in a problem and the relationships between them, to build a coherent mental repre-
sentation of the problem situation. 
Knowledge-utilization tasks require students to solve a concrete problem. The movement is 
from abstract to concrete, from knowledge to action. Students who are good at tasks whose 
main cognitive demand is “planning and executing” are good at using the knowledge they 
have; they can be characterized as goal-driven and persistent. 
• Planning and executing involves devising a plan or strategy to solve the problem, and exe-
cuting it. It may involve clarifying the overall goal, and setting subgoals. 
• Monitoring and reflecting involves monitoring progress, reacting to feedback, and reflect-
ing on the solution, the information provided with the problem, or the strategy adopted. It 
combines both knowledge-acquisition and knowledge-utilization aspects. 
Source: Adapted from OECD 2014. 
Box 7.2 Definitions and Implications of the Nature and Processes of Problem Solving (continued)
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significantly lower solution rates on interactive problems, even compared with 
junior secondary students. Among general senior secondary students, model or 
experimental school students have significantly higher solution rates than ordi-
nary school students on both types of problems. 
Senior secondary general students also have higher solution rates on all four 
types of problems measuring different problem-solving processes, while voca-
tional students have the lowest solution rates. The gap is particularly pronounced 
(a 32 percentage point difference) on items involving “representing and formu-
lating.” Model secondary school students have higher solution rates on all four 
kinds of problem-solving processes than do ordinary secondary school students, 
and the advantage is most pronounced on “monitoring and reflecting” questions 
(12 percentage point difference).
Estimating Odds Ratio for Success, by Nature and Process
Nature of Problems: Static versus Interactive
PISA tested students on problem-solving tasks of two distinctive natures: the 
static problems are typical “textbook” problems that can be solved by using infor-
mation disclosed at the outset, whereas interactive problems often require 
 students to uncover the information necessary for solving the problem.
Despite the distinctive natures of the problem-solving tasks, the regression 
models seem to demonstrate similar associations with school-level characteristics 
(table 7.12). For example, for both static and interactive problems, public school 
students have 34 percent lower odds of receiving full credit. Mixed secondary 
school students also have a disadvantage on both static and interactive problem 
solving. 
Teacher qualities do not seem to have a significant relationship with either 
static or interactive problem solving, except that higher teacher morale is 
 associated with slightly higher odds of students succeeding in solving static 
problems.
Among school resource measures, the more creative extracurricular activities 
available at a school, the more likely students are to succeed in solving either 
type of problem. In addition, larger class size is related to slightly higher odds of 
succeeding on static problem solving.
Schools with better performance on interactive problems also report more 
student-related factors that disrupt school climate, consistent with the descrip-
tive findings that principals of better-performing schools might be more aware of 
students’ disruptive behaviors. Teacher-related factors that affect school climate 
are associated with a lower probability of students successfully solving either 
type of problem.
Among background characteristics, girls are significantly less likely to succeed 
in problem solving than boys, regardless of the nature of the problems. Home 
educational resources are associated with higher odds of solving interactive 
 problems, whereas cultural possessions are associated with higher odds of solving 
static problems. Students who have attended preschool for at least a year are 
more likely to solve interactive problems than those who have not.
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Table 7.12 Estimates of Odds Ratios for Success, by Nature of Problem
PISA variable
Static Interactive
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
Individual and family background
female 0.71 0.046*** 0.73 0.048***
WEALTH 1.07 0.064 1.06 0.049
HEDRES 1.01 0.047 1.09 0.043*
CULTPOS 1.11 0.046* 0.97 0.037
PARED 1.00 0.015 1.02 0.012
preschool 1.15 0.136 1.37 0.160*
Organization, competition, and policy
public 0.66 0.126* 0.66 0.115
compete 0.99 0.093 0.98 0.110
academic 1.13 0.111 1.02 0.085
mixed 0.78 0.066** 0.81 0.073*
Teacher
STRATIO 1.00 0.008 1.00 0.007
PROPQUAL 0.90 0.503 1.20 0.624
TCMORALE 1.11 0.053* 1.01 0.035
TCSHORT 1.00 0.000 1.00 0.000
Resources
SCMATEDU 1.01 0.056 0.99 0.034
SCMATBUI 0.96 0.049 1.06 0.042
COMPWEB 1.14 0.333 1.35 0.383
CLSIZE 1.01 0.004* 1.00 0.004
CREACTIV 1.17 0.060** 1.11 0.049*
Autonomy
RESPRES 1.01 0.069 1.08 0.058
RESPCUR 0.96 0.049 1.00 0.046
Accountability
Ppressure 1.06 0.111 1.10 0.085
scoretrack 0.99 0.075 0.95 0.073
Climate
STUDCLIM 1.06 0.038 1.08 0.034*
TEACCLIM 0.91 0.036* 0.89 0.033**
Leadership
LEADCOM 0.90 0.060 1.05 0.058
LEADINST 0.98 0.066 1.03 0.057
LEADPD 0.94 0.064 0.94 0.050
LEADTCH 1.04 0.069 1.02 0.054
Program
General high 1.93 0.230*** 1.81 0.194
Vocational high 0.82 0.119 0.74 0.089*
N 1,145 1,145
Source: Data from OECD 2012, PISA 2012 database (http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/). 
Note: See variable descriptions in table 7A.1. PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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After accounting for student and school characteristics, attending a general 
secondary school almost doubles the odds of solving static problems over junior 
secondary schools, and the difference is statistically significant. In comparison, 
vocational school students are much less likely, on average, than junior secondary 
school students to solve interactive problems, and the difference is statistically 
significant.
Problem-Solving Process
The various items on the PISA problem-solving test also distinguish between 
knowledge-acquisition and knowledge-utilization tasks, each of which 
 incorporate two problem-solving processes. Knowledge-acquisition tasks, 
 corresponding to “exploring and understanding” and “representing and formu-
lating” processes, require students to generate new, abstract knowledge by 
processing and manipulating information. Knowledge-utilization tasks, in 
contrast, correspond to “planning and executing” and require students to use 
abstract knowledge to solve concrete problems. In addition, items that 
involve “monitoring and reflecting” tasks test students on both knowledge 
acquisition and knowledge utilization.
Among knowledge-acquisition tasks, the odds ratio for items involving 
“representing and formulating” does not seem to vary by school characteris-
tics after controlling for background characteristics and the fixed effects of 
different programs (table 7.13). For items requiring “exploring and under-
standing” processes, several school-level characteristics are associated with 
higher success rates: students from schools that use academic criteria for 
admission (achievement or recommendations from feeder schools) are more 
Table 7.13 Estimates of Odds Ratio for Success, by Problem-Solving Process
PISA variable
Representing and 
formulating
Exploring and 
understanding
Planning and 
executing
Monitoring and 
reflecting
Coefficient
Standard 
error Coefficient
Standard 
error Coefficient
Standard 
error Coefficient
Standard 
error
Individual and family background
female 0.54 0.047*** 0.84 0.069* 0.75 0.065** 0.83 0.075*
WEALTH 1.10 0.077 1.09 0.063 1.04 0.061 1.02 0.069
HEDRES 1.09 0.056 1.04 0.051 1.07 0.054 0.99 0.060
CULTPOS 1.05 0.058 1.02 0.056 0.97 0.038 1.12 0.066
PARED 1.04 0.019* 0.99 0.015 1.01 0.014 1.02 0.018
preschool 1.17 0.195 1.27 0.183 1.35 0.173* 1.53 0.218**
Organization, competition, and policy
public 0.76 0.166 0.61 0.163 0.72 0.093* 0.59 0.119*
compete 0.92 0.162 0.96 0.113 1.16 0.094 0.80 0.096
academic 0.98 0.118 1.27 0.135* 0.94 0.072 1.06 0.116
mixed 0.79 0.106 0.87 0.084 0.81 0.070* 0.72 0.082**
table continues next page
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Table 7.13 Estimates of Odds Ratio for Success, by Problem-Solving Process (continued)
PISA variable
Representing and 
formulating
Exploring and 
understanding
Planning and 
executing
Monitoring and 
reflecting
Coefficient
Standard 
error Coefficient
Standard 
error Coefficient
Standard 
error Coefficient
Standard 
error
Teacher
STRATIO 1.01 0.012 0.99 0.009 1.00 0.008 1.00 0.009
PROPQUAL 3.11 2.223 0.79 0.490 0.71 0.285 0.76 0.486
TCMORALE 1.04 0.057 1.07 0.055 1.05 0.038 0.99 0.054
TCSHORT 1.00 0.000 1.00 0.000 1.00 0.000* 1.00 0.000**
Resources
SCMATEDU 0.98 0.052 1.05 0.049 0.98 0.039 0.93 0.046
SCMATBUI 1.01 0.059 0.97 0.056 1.08 0.045 1.06 0.056
COMPWEB 1.39 0.563 1.49 0.432 1.10 0.254 1.58 0.495
CLSIZE 1.00 0.007 1.01 0.005 1.00 0.003 1.00 0.004
CREACTIV 1.11 0.072 1.17 0.067* 1.10 0.047* 1.18 0.065**
Autonomy
RESPRES 1.21 0.143 1.02 0.073 1.00 0.041 1.08 0.084
RESPCUR 0.92 0.070 1.04 0.056 0.99 0.043 0.97 0.068
Accountability
Ppressure 1.15 0.131 1.14 0.124 0.93 0.068 1.30 0.145*
scoretrack 0.99 0.108 0.89 0.090 1.00 0.065 0.99 0.091
Climate
STUDCLIM 1.09 0.056 1.10 0.045* 1.07 0.029* 1.02 0.046
TEACCLIM 0.90 0.053 0.88 0.044* 0.90 0.029** 0.97 0.052
Leadership
LEADCOM 1.01 0.098 0.99 0.064 0.99 0.047 1.03 0.100
LEADINST 1.08 0.094 0.94 0.075 0.97 0.055 1.19 0.100*
LEADPD 0.89 0.078 1.01 0.064 0.99 0.050 0.86 0.063*
LEADTCH 1.02 0.084 0.99 0.067 1.03 0.042 1.01 0.091
Program
General high 2.28 0.375*** 1.67 0.219*** 1.78 0.183*** 1.96 0.251***
Vocational high 0.72 0.149 0.77 0.103 0.94 0.119 0.64 0.104**
N 1145 1145 1145 1145
Source: Data from OECD 2012, PISA 2012 database (http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/). 
Note: See variable descriptions in table 7A.1. PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
likely to succeed; creative extracurricular activities available in school are also 
associated with higher success ratios. 
Similar to findings on interactive problem solving, schools that report more 
student-related factors affecting school climate actually have better performance 
on both “exploring and understanding” and “planning and executing” tasks, 
whereas reported teacher-related factors are associated with lower success rates 
126 Linking Policies and Implementation to Learning Outcomes 
How Shanghai Does It • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0790-9
on the same types of problem. Creative extracurricular activities and school 
climate measures exhibit similar relationships with success ratios on “planning 
and executing” questions, which correspond to knowledge-utilization tasks. In 
addition, public school students show a disadvantage in accomplishing 
 knowledge-utilization tasks involving “planning and executing” compared with 
private school students.
For “monitoring and reflecting” processes that involve both knowledge-acquisi-
tion and -utilization tasks, public school students have 41 percent lower odds of 
gaining full credit than private school students. Pressure from parents and cre-
ative activities available at school are both positively related to the odds of solv-
ing “monitoring and reflecting” questions. Among measures of school leadership, 
principal’s instructional leadership shows a positive relationship with the odds 
of solving the “monitoring and reflecting” questions. However, promoting 
instructional improvements and professional development, as measured by how 
often a principal takes the initiative to discuss, pay attention to, and help teach-
ers solve classroom problems, actually shows a negative relationship with stu-
dents’ odds of solving “monitoring and reflecting” problems.
Among individual characteristics, girls are less likely than boys to succeed across 
all four problem-solving processes, and the gap is particularly large for “representing 
and formulating” questions that correspond to knowledge- acquisition tasks. 
Students who have attended at least a year of preschool are significantly more 
likely to solve “planning and execution” problems and “monitoring and reflecting” 
problems than those who have not. Family background characteristics do not 
seem to have a significant relationship with the success ratio on any specific 
problem-solving process, except that parental education level is associated with a 
higher probability of solving “representing and formulating” questions.
Summary
Examining student learning outcomes using PISA scores and their correlation 
with school- and individual-level characteristics sheds further light on how 
Shanghai’s educational policies and their implementation across schools can have 
an impact on student learning outcomes.
Mathematical, Reading, and Scientific Literacy
The performance of students in Shanghai shows great variation across academic 
programs. Particularly, the mean scores of vocational students are not only lower 
than those of general senior secondary students but also those of junior secondary 
students on all three domains (mathematics, reading, science). Students attend-
ing model or experimental secondary schools perform the best in all three 
domains. It must be emphasized that the variation across programs is partly 
accounted for by the admissions process that places students on the general 
 versus vocational educational track by performance on the zhong kao. 
Individual and family background characteristics differ significantly across 
academic programs. Compared with vocational students, general senior 
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secondary students come from wealthier families with more home educational 
resources, cultural possessions, and higher levels of parental education. They are 
also more likely to have attended at least a year of preschool. General senior 
secondary students attending model or experimental secondary schools enjoy 
higher levels of family wealth, home educational resources, and parental educa-
tion levels than do those attending ordinary secondary schools.
At the school level, the main differences between general secondary schools 
and vocational secondary schools lie in their teaching resources: general second-
ary schools are characterized by much lower student-to-teacher ratios and higher 
proportions of teachers with tertiary qualifications. Moreover, whereas the vast 
majority of general secondary schools use academic achievement as admission 
criteria, only 60 percent of vocational schools do so. Model or experimental sec-
ondary schools and ordinary secondary schools do not differ significantly on 
school-level characteristics except for the larger class sizes and student-to-teacher 
ratios of the former.
How are school-level characteristics associated with variation in students’ 
mathematical, reading, and scientific literacy? The correlation between school 
characteristics and student performance within each program (junior secondary, 
senior secondary general, senior secondary vocational) was investigated. Among 
junior secondary students, schools with more creative extracurricular activities 
available were found to perform better across all three domains. Consistent with 
what was found in 2009, private school students (accounting for 10 percent of 
the total junior secondary student population) perform significantly better than 
public school students on mathematics and reading. Moreover, junior secondary 
schools with more autonomy in determining curriculum and assessment actually 
perform worse in mathematics.
Among senior secondary students, teacher participation in school leadership is 
significantly related to higher mathematics and reading scores. The quality of 
school educational resources is also positively related to reading performance. 
The 2009 PISA data show a higher level of teacher participation in school gov-
ernance and better educational resources among better-performing schools. In 
addition, ability grouping in mathematics is related to lower mathematics scores 
among senior secondary students. Finally, students of mixed schools perform 
significantly lower than students of nonmixed schools in all three domains.
Among vocational students, schools with better mathematics performance 
tend to have lower student-related factors affecting school climate, consistent 
with what was found in 2009. Schools facing pressure from parents have higher 
mean mathematics scores than those who do not. The scientific literacy of voca-
tional school students is positively and significantly related to schools’ quality of 
physical infrastructure, class size, and availability of creative extracurricular 
activities.
In addition, individual and family background characteristics demonstrate a 
consistent relationship with student performance across academic programs. 
Girls perform significantly worse on mathematics and science, and better on 
reading, than boys, consistent with findings from other countries and economies 
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participating in PISA. Home educational resources, cultural possessions, and 
parental education levels exhibit a positive relationship with student literacy. 
In contrast, family wealth is negatively related to performance. Finally, students 
who have attended at least a year of preschool exhibit a significant academic 
advantage on all three domains.
Problem Solving
Similar to mathematics, reading, and science, test results on problem-solving 
skills among general senior secondary students compared with junior secondary 
students and vocational students were analyzed. Problem-solving skills in the 
models were measured by overall scores, as well as solution rates specific to the 
nature of problem solving (static vs. interactive) and process (representing and 
formulating, exploring and understanding, planning and executing, monitoring 
and reflecting). Model or experimental secondary school students demonstrate 
higher overall problem-solving scores and specific problem-solving skills than do 
ordinary secondary school students.
To begin, how school characteristics are related to overall problem-solving 
scores was investigated. Similar to the other domains, separate regression models 
were estimated for each academic program. Performance on mathematics, 
 science, and reading was included in the model to see if the predictors have an 
independent effect on problem solving or if the association is mediated by 
 performance on the three core domains.
For junior secondary students, problem-solving skills are significantly and 
 positively related to quality of school educational resources and principals’ 
instructional leadership, after accounting for mathematics, reading, and science 
performance.
For general senior secondary students, schools with higher student-to-teacher 
ratios and facing competition from other schools tend to have students who 
perform better on problem solving, although the relationship seems to be 
accounted for by differences in performance on mathematics, reading, and 
science.
Among vocational students, problem-solving skills are related to a number of 
school characteristics. Holding mathematics, science, and reading performance 
constant, vocational schools with smaller student-to-teacher ratios and class sizes 
have better problem-solving scores. Vocational schools with more autonomy over 
curriculum and assessment policies and whose academic performance is not 
tracked by an education authority perform better on problem solving, and the 
difference remains even after accounting for mathematical, reading, and scien-
tific literacy. Among various dimensions of school leadership, schools with better 
problem-solving performance have principals who more often promote institu-
tional improvements and professional development, but who less often demon-
strate instructional leadership. There is a significant advantage in problem-solving 
skills among private vocational school students over public ones, but the gap 
seems to be accounted for by performance in mathematics, reading, and science. 
Similarly, vocational schools that encounter parental pressure score higher on 
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problem solving, but the difference goes away once mathematical, reading, and 
scientific literacy are accounted for.
School characteristics are also used to predict success rates on specific types 
of problems. First, problem solving by nature of the task was examined. The 
analysis found that similar school characteristics are related to solution rates on 
both static and interactive problems. For example, public school students have 
significantly lower solution rates on both types of problems than private school 
students; more creative extracurricular activities available at school, and fewer 
teacher-related factors that affect school climate are related to higher solution 
rates on both types of problems. Several school characteristics seem to be signifi-
cantly related to solution rates on problem solving of a specific nature. For 
example, larger class sizes are associated with slightly greater odds of students 
solving static problems, but the effect on interactive problem solving is not 
 statistically significant.
We also examined the solution rates on problem-solving questions by the 
different types of problem-solving processes involved and found that the 
availability of creative extracurricular activities is positively related to success 
ratios on “exploring and understanding,” “planning and executing,” and “moni-
toring and reflecting” questions. Public school students show a disadvantage 
in both “planning and executing” and “monitoring and reflecting” processes 
compared with private school students. Among measures of school leader-
ship, although the principal’s instructional leadership shows a positive rela-
tionship with the success ratio on “monitoring and reflecting” questions, the 
promotion of instructional improvements and professional development 
actually shows a negative relationship with students’ success ratios on this 
type of problem.
It is interesting that the analysis found that schools reporting more student-
related factors that affect school climate in fact have students with higher 
problem-solving skills, particularly on interactive problem solving and certain 
problem-solving tasks such as “exploring and understanding” and “planning and 
executing.” This finding should be interpreted with caution given that the mea-
sure of student-related factors is reported by school principals. The finding could 
suggest that principals from better-performing schools are simply more aware of 
students’ disruptive behaviors. Or the finding could suggest that disruptive stu-
dent behaviors might not indicate worse performance on certain dimensions of 
cognitive skills.
Among individual characteristics, girls have lower problem-solving skills than 
boys, regardless of specific nature or process, and the disadvantage seems to be 
independent of their disadvantage in mathematics and science.
After variances in mathematics, reading, and scientific literacy are accounted 
for, family wealth is significantly correlated with higher problem-solving scores, 
while family cultural possessions are negatively related to problem-solving scores. 
The positive relationship between home educational resources and problem-
solving skills seems to be partially accounted for by variations in  mathematical, 
reading, and scientific literacy.
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Several family background characteristics are also associated with student 
skills in solving problems of a specific nature. For example, family cultural pos-
sessions are associated with higher odds of solving static problems, while home 
educational resources are associated with higher odds of solving  interactive prob-
lems. Parental education level is associated with a higher probability of solving 
problems involving “representing and formulating” processes.
Students who have attended at least a year of preschool have better problem-
solving scores, but the advantage seems to be accounted for by variations in 
mathematical, reading, and scientific literacy. Preschool attendance is also related 
to higher odds of solving interactive problems, and problems involving “planning 
and execution” and “monitoring and reflecting” processes.
Annex 7A
Table 7A.1 Description of PISA Variables
Variable Description
abg_math 1 = Ability grouping for some or all mathematics classes; 0 = no ability grouping for any mathematics 
classes
academic 1 = always consider academic performance or recommendation from feeder school; 0 = never or 
sometimes consider
CLSIZE Class size
compete 1 = face competition from at least one other school; 0 = no others
COMPWEB Ratio of computers connected to web and number of computers
CREACTIV Index of creative extracurricular activities at school
Total number of activities at school: band, orchestra, or choir; school play or school musical; art club or art 
activities
CULTPOS Cultural possessions index
female female = 1; male = 0
HEDRES Home educational resources index
LEADCOM School leadership: Framing and communicating the school’s goals and curricular development
Frequency of the following statements:
• I use student performance results to develop the school’s educational goals
• I make sure that the professional development activities of teachers are in accordance with the 
teaching goals of the school
• I ensure that teachers work according to the school’s educational goals
• I discuss the school’s academic goals with teachers at faculty meetings
LEADINST School leadership: Instructional leadership
• I promote teaching practices based on recent educational research
• I praise teachers whose students are actively participating in learning
• I draw teachers’ attention to the importance of pupils’ development of critical and social 
capacities
LEADPD School leadership: Promoting instructional improvements and professional development
• When a teacher has problems in his or her classroom, I take the initiative to discuss matters
• I pay attention to disruptive behavior in classrooms
• When a teacher brings up a classroom problem, we solve the problem together
table continues next page
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Table 7A.1 Description of PISA Variables (continued)
Variable Description
LEADTCH School leadership: Teacher participation in leadership
• I provide staff with opportunities to participate in school decision making
• I engage teachers to help build a school culture of continuous improvement
• I ask teachers to participate in reviewing management practices
mixed Mixed secondary school = 1
PARED Highest parental education in years
Ppressure 1 = face achievement pressure from many parents; 0 = pressure from minority of parents or absent
preschool 1 = attended preschool for at least a year
PROPQUAL Proportion of teachers with tertiary qualification
public Public school = 1
RESPCUR Index of school responsibility for curriculum and assessment
School principals’ report regarding who had responsibility for four aspects of curriculum and assessment: 
“Establishing student assessment policies,” “Choosing which textbooks are used,” “Determining course 
content,” and “Deciding which courses are offered.” The index was calculated on the basis of the ratio of 
“yes” responses for school governing board, principal, or teachers on the one hand to “yes” responses 
for regional or local educational authority or national educational authority on the other hand.
RESPRES Index of school responsibility for resource allocation
School principals’ report regarding who had considerable responsibility for tasks related to resource 
allocation (“Selecting teachers for hire,” “Firing teachers,” “Establishing teachers’ starting salaries,” 
“Determining teachers’ salaries increases,” “Formulating the school budget,” “Deciding on budget 
allocations within the school”). The index was calculated on the basis of the ratio of “yes” responses for 
the school governing board, principal, or teachers to “yes” responses for regional or local educational 
authority or national educational authority.
SCMATBUI Quality of physical infrastructure
Is your school’s capacity to provide instruction hindered by any of the following issues?
• Shortage or inadequacy of school buildings and grounds
• Shortage or inadequacy of heating/cooling and lighting systems
• Shortage or inadequacy of instructional space (for example, classrooms)
SCMATEDU Quality of school educational resources
Is your school’s capacity to provide instruction hindered by any of the following issues?
• Shortage or inadequacy of science laboratory equipment
• Shortage or inadequacy of instructional materials (for example, textbooks)
• Shortage or inadequacy of computers for instruction
• Lack or inadequacy of Internet connectivity
• Shortage or inadequacy of computer software for instruction
• Shortage or inadequacy of library materials
scoretrack 1 = achievement tracked by authority
Shortage_subject 1 = a lack of qualified [subject] teachers
STRATIO Student-to-teacher ratio
STUDCLIM Student-related factors affecting school climate
In your school, to what extent is the learning of students hindered by the following phenomena?
• Student truancy
• Students skipping classes
• Students arriving late for school
• Students not attending compulsory school events
table continues next page
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Table 7A.1 Description of PISA Variables (continued)
Variable Description
• Students lacking respect for teachers
• Disruption of classes by students
• Student use of alcohol or illegal drugs
• Students intimidating or bullying other students
TCMORALE Teacher morale
Think about the teachers in your school. How much do you agree with the following statements?
• The morale of teachers in this school is high
• Teachers work with enthusiasm
• Teachers take pride in this school
• Teachers value academic achievement
TCSHORT Index on teacher shortage
TEACCLIM Teacher-related factors affecting school climate
In your school, to what extent is the learning of students hindered by the following phenomena?
• Students not being encouraged to achieve their full potential
• Poor student-teacher relations
• Teachers having to teach students of heterogeneous ability levels within the same class
• Teachers having to teach students of diverse ethnic backgrounds (that is, language, culture) 
within the same class
• Teachers’ low expectations of students
• Teachers not meeting individual students’ needs
• Teacher absenteeism
• Staff resisting change
• Teachers being too strict with students
• Teachers being late for classes
• Teachers not being well prepared for classes
WEALTH Family wealth index
Source: OECD 2012, PISA 2012 database (http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/).
Note: PISA = Programme for International Student Assessment.
Notes
 1. PISA defines a public school as one managed directly or indirectly by a public 
 education authority, government agency, or governing board appointed by govern-
ment or elected by public franchise; and a private school as one managed directly or 
indirectly by a nongovernmental organization (for example, a church, trade union, 
business, or other private institution).
 2. Similar and consistent results are found in the program-specific regression models 
using school characteristics, as presented in the previous section, indicating that the 
effects of individual and family characteristics are robust to the inclusion or exclusion 
of specific school characteristics and restriction of samples to a specific program.
 3. Proportion of subcategory questions that students have successfully solved (that is, 
achieved full credit for).
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C h A P T E R  8
Summary and Discussion 
Introduction
This report documents and benchmarks key policies in basic education in Shanghai 
(see appendix A). It also provides evidence on the extent to which these policies 
have been implemented at the school level and throughout the system and, 
where possible, links implementation with learning outcomes as demonstrated in 
the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). The World Bank’s 
Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) benchmarking tools in 
various domains were used as the framework for collecting data and organizing the 
report. School-based surveys and other existing data and research were also tapped 
extensively to shed further light on implementation and on impact, if any. Finally, 
PISA 2012 data were explicitly used to analyze variations in student achievement 
within Shanghai and to examine which student, family, and school-level variables 
are correlated with the variation in student performance. The report was able, for 
the first time, to analyze policy factors that contribute to problem-solving skills 
beyond mathematical, reading, and scientific literacy.
What is particularly outstanding about Shanghai is that it has a very high 
degree of coherence between policy and implementation. Education policies are 
implemented very well in Shanghai. No large divergence between policy state-
ments and reality on the ground is observed, as is constantly witnessed in other 
systems. This exceptional connection between policy and implementation can 
be attributed partly to the cultural and historical Chinese characteristics of top-
down and centralized control by government authorities, and partly to high 
 levels of professional accountability among various stakeholder groups within the 
education system. Close monitoring ensures that the programs and policies 
mandated by the government are executed smoothly with fairly high levels of 
compliance.
Shanghai further distinguishes itself by its constant drive to renew and 
improve. The policy stocktaking exercise permitted not just the current policies 
to be examined, but also the evolution of policies in many areas. Clearly Shanghai 
has been on a relentless crusade to update education policies in line with its 
social and economic development. Ever since China opened up to the world in 
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the 1800s when western missionaries established new western-style schools, 
Shanghai has been on a journey of education reform. During the past three 
decades, and in particular since the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), 
the Chinese government has called for rounds of education reform. Three typical 
strategic documents so far have guided the overall direction of reform: (1) the 
State Council’s 1988 “Decisions about Education System Reform,” (2) the State 
Council’s 1999 “Decisions on Deepening Education Reform and Promoting 
Quality-Oriented Education in an All-Round Way,” and (3) the State Council’s 
2010 “China’s Medium- and Long-Term Education Reform and Development 
Plan Outline.” Shanghai closely followed the course of the central government’s 
reform course and has been pushing education reform accordingly.
The policy domains reviewed include teachers, school finance, school auton-
omy and accountability, and school assessment. The analysis concludes that based 
on SABER’s framework and rubrics for scoring (with underlying benchmarks), 
Shanghai has achieved an overall score of “established” and “advanced” in almost 
every area except in two specific goals: “role of school council in  governance” and 
“school accountability,” both of which were rated as “emerging.”
Clear expectations have been established for teachers and the teaching 
 profession. Shanghai’s education authorities have promulgated clear, docu-
mented guidelines for teachers to follow on grade-wise and subject-wise learn-
ing objectives, curriculum design, teaching-learning materials, and evaluation 
methods for all levels of schooling from first grade through twelfth grade. The 
Teachers Law of the People’s Republic of China (1993) defines teachers’ gen-
eral obligations and working hours. In Shanghai, teachers’ responsibilities go 
beyond the classroom to encompass extracurricular activities and professional 
development.
The system tends to attract the best candidates to enter the teaching profes-
sion. Teaching in Shanghai is a socially well regarded and monetarily appealing 
profession, with a proven set of entry requirements. The working conditions, 
such as infrastructure facilities and student-to-teacher ratio, are attractive, and 
clear career advancement mechanisms are in place. Most teaching candidates 
graduate from high-quality and systematic preservice teacher training programs. 
Additionally, an extensive in-service teacher training program is linked with 
career advancement and financial incentives. Professional development activities 
are designed to be collaborative and to pay particular attention to instructional 
improvement. School leaders are responsible for creating targeted teacher train-
ing plans based on evaluation results for each teacher. Weak and inexperienced 
teachers are paired with high-performing and experienced ones. Teaching-
research groups and lesson observations are two common and successful prac-
tices. A set of incentive policies is in place to reward teachers’ achievements and 
best practices.
Clear standards for selection and performance of school principals are in place 
and principals are expected to be instructional leaders. Requirements for princi-
pals are stringent across Shanghai, although they vary from one district to 
another. Supported by various leadership training programs, school principals in 
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Shanghai appear to play an extensive role in managing schools. They benefit from 
various monetary and nonmonetary performance-based incentives, and they play 
an influential role in curricular reforms and instructional development. An effec-
tive practice is in place of principal-led monitoring and evaluation of classroom 
instruction; constant evaluation of the efficacy of the curriculum; and communi-
cation with students, teachers, and parents. Principals exercise significant auton-
omy over various school-level decisions such as hiring of teachers and determining 
the performance-based portions of their salaries. Multiple systems are in place 
that monitor and evaluate teacher performance, promote research activities led 
by teachers, and encourage collaborative processes among teaching staff.
Shanghai’s public expenditure on education as a share of GDP was about 
3.5 percent in 2013, relatively small compared with other high-performing 
economies such as Finland, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States. 
However, education financing in Shanghai is structured not only to provide 
minimum inputs and ensure minimum outputs, but also to lift the learning out-
comes of all students by specifically targeting low-performing schools and 
 districts. Shanghai has discarded the rather inequitable “key school” system in 
basic education. Innovative financing instruments such as “entrusted manage-
ment,” which twins a low-performing school with a high-performing peer 
through a memorandum of understanding backed by government financing, 
is rapidly gaining support. This approach stands in stark contrast to practices 
in other countries that reward top-performing schools and hope to “weed out” 
 low-performing schools.
The analysis finds that clear and detailed policy tools are in place to ensure 
basic educational inputs in safe and adequate infrastructure, teaching-learning 
materials, professional development avenues, and appropriate class-size norms. 
Shanghai’s education system has established learning goals with regard to com-
pletion, progression, and knowledge and skills.
An extensive system of student evaluations at various grade levels allows edu-
cation authorities to relate outcomes to educational inputs, thereby allowing 
them to provide extra support to low-performing areas in the form of topical 
teacher training, additional management support from better-performing schools, 
and other relevant resources. Specific authorities are delegated the responsibility 
to monitor service delivery, such as establishing annual academic calendars, 
ensuring timely delivery of books for students and teaching aids for teachers, 
overseeing necessary construction activities within school premises, checking 
teacher attendance, substituting for occasional teacher absences, and more. 
A regimented, well-informed, and fairly transparent process for budgetary alloca-
tions affords schools sufficient autonomy to express their needs.
Shanghai is a trendsetter in its execution of specific policies to support disad-
vantaged individuals, communities, schools, and districts. With specific support 
programs and policies for children from low-income families and from migrant 
families, Shanghai has made relatively more progress in attaining equal and equi-
table access to schooling than any other region of the country. By eliminating the 
selective and elite key school system at the basic education level and promoting 
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“entrusted management” of schools, Shanghai has contributed immensely to the 
national education policies directed toward capacity building of weak schools. 
However, greater attention is required to strengthen the implementation of 
 special education policies. A closely monitored and  managed system for verify-
ing expenses on educational resources through well-instituted system-wide 
 processes for auditing has enabled Shanghai to achieve “advanced” ratings on 
efficient management of resources.
An investigation of the various policy provisions and outcomes related to 
autonomy and accountability found that the school budget planning and man-
agement processes are fairly participatory, with schools taking the initiative in 
preparing their operational budgets. Decisions regarding salary structures for 
teaching and nonteaching staff are relatively centralized and carried out in a top-
down manner. Nevertheless, district-level authorities have some discretion in 
creating specific salary disbursement standards for teaching and nonteaching 
staff. Overall, it was observed that Shanghai’s private school principals tend to 
exercise greater autonomy over staff and remuneration-related decisions than do 
public school principals. This variation is consistent with the school council man-
agement structure required for private schools and lack of the same for public 
schools. Establishment of parent-teacher associations is a fairly new concept in 
the region and has yet to effectively engage parents and the wider community in 
various processes of school management. Currently, at the school level, principals 
have the greatest autonomy over day-to-day teaching, learning, management, and 
reform initiatives.
Schools are explicitly required to conform to financial management guidelines 
and other broad city-level requirements. Additionally, schools receive an annual 
supervisory visit and are further subject to the comprehensive school evaluation 
using the “Green Indicators of Academic Quality of Primary and Secondary 
School Students.” However, Shanghai has made a deliberate effort to not use 
student exam results as an explicit mechanism for rewards or sanctions. In reality, 
of course, the high-stakes exams at the end of lower secondary and upper second-
ary school tend to influence the learning priorities in lower grades, and overall, 
schools continue to be assessed on the basis of their performance on these tests.
Professional accountability is maintained through inherent relations within 
the teaching staff and through the execution of in-service teacher training and 
monitoring procedures. School principals and senior teachers engage with others 
through elaborate teaching-research groups and constantly monitor and support 
them to improve their instruction and knowledge, so professional accountability 
becomes more apparent and more positively related with competence.
The common formats for student assessment used in China and Shanghai are 
continuous and formative classroom assessments; summative examinations, par-
ticularly at the end of ninth and twelfth grades; and national and international 
large-scale assessments. Classroom assessments are frequent and are executed in 
a variety of formats, such as quizzes, oral tests, presentations, home assignments, 
and so forth. This form of assessment allows students a wider variety of ways to 
demonstrate their learning than afforded by summative examinations in the form 
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of written tests. Clear guidelines have been established for assessment standards, 
and efforts have been made to align these standards with appropriately age- 
relevant expected learning outcomes. Additionally, efforts are made to monitor 
the quality of assessments at the school level, and the data are effectively used 
to inform teaching-learning and future assessment practices in the classroom. 
To improve classroom assessment, the municipal and district-level Teaching 
Research Offices undertake regular research projects on the status of student 
assessments to inform policy decisions. Examinations are summative, formal 
procedures that are mostly used for the purpose of making decisions regarding a 
student’s advancement to the successive level of schooling.
Senior secondary school entrance exams and senior secondary graduation 
exams are conducted for all graduates every year. These exams, primarily for 
selection purposes, are well-recognized social events in Shanghai and are closely 
followed by students, parents, educators, and the media. A well-structured sys-
tem is in place with clear policy guidelines, regular funding, and sufficient and 
well-trained human resources to enable effective execution of these exams. 
These exams are aligned with the learning goals for students and teachers. The 
exams are considered of good quality and the process overall is transparent and 
fair. However, these are primarily selection exams and are being blamed for put-
ting tremendous pressure on students and motivating schools and teachers to 
teach to the tests.
Shanghai is one of the pioneer Chinese cities to have participated in large-
scale international assessments. The city’s students performed exceptionally well 
on the 2009 and 2012 PISA and garnered significant national and international 
attention for their educational success. The enabling context for Shanghai’s par-
ticipation in PISA, which includes the presence of clear policy guidelines, neces-
sary funding, and effective human resources, was assessed at the “advanced” level. 
However, the city’s education system scored rather poorly on its policy goal of 
ensuring effective use of the data generated through such international assess-
ments. This finding reiterates the earlier observation in chapter 5 that Shanghai’s 
attention to a post-evaluation plan of action is disproportionately low.
The report also examines the extent to which Shanghai’s education policies 
and practices foster learning outcomes, as revealed in the 2012 PISA results. In 
2012, Shanghai continued to be the top performer on all three major domains 
of PISA (mathematics, reading, and science). Additionally, Shanghai emerged 
as one of the most equal education systems among PISA participants, with 
the highest proportion of disadvantaged students performing among the top 
25  percent of students across all participating countries and economies after 
controlling for socioeconomic status. In a comparison of the performance of 
students in Shanghai, significant variation was found across programs, with 
upper secondary students performing better than lower secondary, and model 
or experimental senior secondary school students performing better than those 
from vocational schools. Overall, model or experimental upper secondary 
school students scored the highest across all three domains—mathematics, 
 science, and reading.
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The learning outcome disparity by program is in part due to the system’s 
 tracking of students at the end of lower secondary schooling. However, the analy-
sis was also able to show that within each program type, policies and practices at 
the school level still play a significant role in explaining students’ PISA perfor-
mance. The findings confirm much of the existing education policy research for 
across the globe.
Factors Associated with Mathematical, Reading, and Scientific Literacy
Among junior secondary students, students in schools that offered more creative 
extracurricular activities performed better across mathematics, reading, and 
 science. Private junior secondary school students (accounting for 10 percent of 
the total lower secondary student population) performed significantly better 
than public school students on mathematics and reading. Moreover, junior 
 secondary schools with more autonomy in determining curriculum and assess-
ment actually experienced lower performance on mathematics.
Among upper secondary students, teacher participation in school leadership is 
significantly related to higher mathematics and reading scores. Quality of school 
educational resources is also positively related to reading performance. The 2009 
PISA data also show a higher level of teacher participation in school governance 
and better educational resources among better-performing schools.
Among vocational students, schools with better mathematics performance 
tend to have fewer student-related factors affecting school climate, consistent 
with what was found in the 2009 PISA assessment. Schools facing pressure from 
 parents have higher mean mathematics scores than those who do not. The scien-
tific literacy of vocational school students is positively and significantly related to 
schools’ quality of physical infrastructure, class sizes, and availability of creative 
extracurricular activities.
In addition, individual and family background characteristics demonstrate a 
consistent relationship with student performance across academic programs. 
Girls perform significantly worse on mathematics and science, and better on 
reading, than boys, consistent with findings from other PISA participants (OECD 
2015). Home educational resources, cultural possessions, and parental education 
levels exhibit a positive relationship with student reading literacy. In contrast, 
family wealth is negatively related to performance. Finally, students who 
have attended at least a year of preschool perform significantly better on all three 
domains. 
Factors Associated with Problem-Solving Skills
Similar to mathematics, reading, and science, better problem-solving skills are 
exhibited among general upper secondary students compared with lower sec-
ondary students and vocational students. Model or experimental senior second-
ary school students demonstrate higher problem-solving skills than ordinary 
senior secondary school students.
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For lower secondary students, problem-solving skills are significantly and 
 positively related to quality of school educational resources and principals’ 
instructional leadership, after controlling for mathematics, reading, and science 
performance. For general upper secondary students, schools with higher student-
to-teacher ratios and those that face competition from other schools tend to have 
students who perform better on problem solving, although the relationship 
seems to be accounted for by differences in performance on mathematics, read-
ing, and science.
Among vocational students, problem-solving skills are related to a number of 
school characteristics. Holding mathematics, science, and reading performance 
constant, vocational schools with smaller student-to-teacher ratios and class sizes 
have better problem-solving scores. Vocational schools with more autonomy over 
curriculum and assessment policies and whose academic performance is not 
tracked by any education authority perform better on problem solving, and the 
difference remains even after controlling for mathematical, reading, and scientific 
literacy. Among various dimensions of school leadership, schools with better 
problem-solving performance have principals who more often promote institu-
tional improvements and professional development, but less often demonstrate 
instructional leadership. There is a significant advantage in problem-solving skills 
among private vocational school students over public ones, but the gap seems to 
be accounted for by performance on mathematics, reading, and science. Similarly, 
vocational schools faced with parental pressure score higher on problem solving, 
but the difference disappears once mathematical, reading, and scientific literacy 
are accounted for.
Among individual characteristics, girls have lower problem-solving skills than 
boys, regardless of specific nature or process (see chapter 7 for discussions of 
problem-solving nature and process), and the disadvantage seems to be indepen-
dent of their disadvantage in mathematics and science, as observed before. 
Holding mathematical, reading, and scientific literacy constant, family wealth is 
significantly correlated with students’ higher problem-solving skills, while family 
cultural possessions are negatively related to problem-solving scores. The positive 
relationship between home educational resources and problem-solving skills 
seems to be partially accounted for by variations in mathematical, reading, and 
scientific literacy.
Several family background characteristics are also associated with student 
skills in solving problems of a specific nature. For example, family cultural 
 possessions are associated with higher odds of solving static problems, while 
home educational resources are associated with higher odds of solving interactive 
problems. Parental education level is associated with higher probability of solving 
problems involving “representing and formulating” processes.
Students who have attended at least a year of preschool have better problem-
solving scores, but the advantage seems to be accounted for by mathematical, 
reading, and scientific literacy. Preschool attendance is also related to higher odds 
of solving interactive problems, and problems involving “planning and execution” 
and “monitoring and reflecting processes.”
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Policy Considerations for Shanghai
PISA and SABER do not entirely capture the intricacies of Shanghai’s education 
system and the aspirations that have evolved through a rich history of local 
reforms. Shanghai has moved far beyond the PISA and is formulating and pro-
jecting new goals and visions. Nevertheless, the comprehensive assessment of 
Shanghai’s education policies provides an opportunity to reflect on a few policy 
considerations. The following list of policy considerations was arrived at after a 
series of consultations carried out with education thinkers and authorities in 
Shanghai during the process of this study. Further interactions were carried out 
during the drafting of the “Shanghai Education: Vision 2050” document by the 
World Bank through a comprehensive review of global policy literature and 
interactions with education policy makers in Shanghai. These considerations are 
intended to facilitate further discussions in Shanghai as well as in other aspiring 
education systems.
Consider delaying tracking to tenth grade or later. Evidence from Poland and 
Germany shows that delaying tracking and extending students’ time with general 
academic education to develop basic competencies in reading and mathematics 
could increase overall academic performance (Jakubowski and others 2016; 
Muhlenweg 2007). The zhong kao exam after ninth grade tracks students into 
three distinct senior secondary school programs with very little horizontal mobil-
ity between them. Cumulative differences in endowment in teachers and other 
resources further accentuate the disparity in education quality among the pro-
grams. Shanghai could potentially pilot eliminating the zhong kao and delaying 
tracking to tenth or twelfth grades like other advanced nations and providing 
more curriculum diversification. 
Increase assistance to migrant and other disadvantaged children. Shanghai 
 proactively enacted policies and approaches to expanding education services to 
migrant and other disadvantaged children. But the current eligibility criteria of 
three years of residency and employment may need to be relaxed to allow more 
migrant children to enroll in local public or government-sponsored private 
schools. “Disadvantaged” children are required to update their status every year 
to qualify for assistance, which could ostracize them further. The city does not 
allow migrant children to enroll in its public senior secondary schools, limiting 
their potential. 
Expand the role of parents, the community, and society in education. Parent-
teacher associations are a fairly new concept and tend to have limited responsi-
bilities. At the same time, many anecdotes and isolated studies seem to indicate 
that there is some dissatisfaction with the public education system. Shanghai 
could consider expanding the role of parents, the community, and society in 
general in the education system. 
Formally upgrade teacher entry qualifications to make the profession even more 
attractive. Require at least a bachelor’s degree as a teacher entry criterion. Doing 
so will place Shanghai on par with most Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development countries and other developed Asian countries. Most applicants 
Summary and Discussion  143
How Shanghai Does It • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0790-9 
already have bachelor’s degrees, so the higher requirement will reduce unneces-
sary recruitment inefficiency. 
Further reduce the allocation disparity of talented teachers and other resources 
among schools. Highly qualified teachers should be more evenly dispersed 
between rural and urban districts and between model schools and regular 
schools. SABER does not fully address this issue, and researchers should ana-
lyze the matter further. Qualified special education teachers may also be 
unevenly distributed. And as Shanghai includes more special education stu-
dents in regular classrooms, demand for special education–trained teachers 
will increase. 
Invest more in information and communications technology. Although 95 per-
cent of schools indicate that their student registration profiles are completely or 
mostly in an electronic format, only 72 percent have student growth profiles 
(with more detailed student achievement information) and 67 percent have 
teacher professional development profiles completely or mostly in an electronic 
format. Shanghai should invest more in technology. 
Further explore the role of public-private partnerships to address the last-mile 
issues in education service delivery. Promising initiatives such as entrusted manage-
ment of low-performing schools and purchase of education services from private 
providers could be scaled up and formally institutionalized.
In the past few decades, Shanghai has grown rapidly into a global economic and 
commercial capital. As assessments such as PISA have shown, it is also leading 
the world in basic education. This includes many educational areas—from 
attracting and developing high-caliber teachers to using financial and other 
resources to ensure that every child, regardless of background, has access to a 
top-flight education. The city wants to continue to forge ahead with education 
reform, closing the quality and accessibility gap even more. As the Shanghai 
education system continues to achieve a high level of basic cognitive achieve-
ment, there will be renewed discussion on how the current curriculum and peda-
gogy promote students’ social and emotional well-being and twenty-first century 
skills such as global citizenship and environmental consciousness.
It will be increasingly important for Shanghai to find a healthier balance 
between academic excellence and students’ social and emotional well-being. 
Though not explicitly discussed in this report, students in Shanghai report 
a high level of parental pressure and unhappiness when compared with their 
international peers. Society and government need to find a balance between 
academic excellence and the social and emotional well-being of the younger 
generation.
Pressure will also intensify to further expand early childhood education, delay 
tracking at the secondary level, and improve the relevance of higher education 
and training levels. Shanghai could further encourage institutions to engage in 
evidence-based education research and public education debates. It could also 
continue to build a virtuous cycle of reform and development toward an educa-
tion system that is even more competitive globally.
144 Summary and Discussion 
How Shanghai Does It • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0790-9
References
Jakubowski, M., H. A. Patrinos, E. E. Porta, and J. Wis´niewski. 2016. “The Effects of 
Delaying Tracking in Secondary School: Evidence from the 1999 Education Reform 
in Poland.” Education Economics. doi: 10.1080/09645292.2016.1149548.
Muhlenweg, A. 2007. “Educational Effects of Early or Later Secondary School Tracking in 
Germany.” Centre for European Economic Research. ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs 
/ dp/dp07079.pdf.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2015. The ABC of 
Gender Equality in Education: Aptitude, Behaviour, Confidence. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264229945-en.
   145 How Shanghai Does It • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0790-9 
A P P E N D I x  A 
Summary of Shanghai’s Basic 
Education Policy Environment 
by the World Bank–SABER 
Policy Framework
Table A.1 Shanghai’s Status under SABER Policy Goals
Policy domain Policy goals Status
Attracting and 
Developing 
an Excellent 
Teaching Force
1. Setting clear expectation for teachers
Clear policies are in place to provide overall guidelines on learning objectives, 
curriculum structure and design, teaching-learning materials, and an evaluation 
system for all subjects across all grade levels. Additionally, the Teachers Law of the 
PRC (1993) defines the general obligations of teachers and their working hours. 
In Shanghai, teacher responsibilities go beyond the classroom to encompass 
extracurricular activities and professional development.
Advanced
    
2. Attracting the best into teaching
Teaching in Shanghai is a socially well regarded and monetarily appealing 
profession, with a proven set of entry requirements. The working conditions, such 
as infrastructure facilities and student-to-teacher ratio, are attractive, and clear 
career advancement mechanisms are in place.
Advanced
    
3. Preparing teachers with useful training and experience
Shanghai requires a minimum three-year vocational tertiary education for 
primary school teachers and a four-year university education for secondary 
school teachers. In practice, however, the academic requirement is more 
stringent. Of the schools surveyed, 97 percent have a minimum academic 
requirement of a four-year bachelor’s degree when making hiring decisions. The 
initial teacher education programs in China tend to provide high-quality subject 
content knowledge and require an average six-month practicum. The policy 
requirement for preservice teacher qualification could be enhanced to reflect 
actual practice (a minimum of a four-year university degree) to reduce 
unnecessary inefficiency in the recruiting process and to send a positive signal for 
the teaching profession.
Established
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4. Matching teachers’ skills with students’ needs
Numerous incentives are offered to teachers to teach in hard-to-staff rural and 
semi-urban schools. Temporary transfers and rotations are made to help 
underperforming schools and disadvantaged student populations. Shanghai is 
not faced with critical shortages of teachers in any particular subjects. However, 
further research would be helpful to gather a clearer picture of demand and 
supply features of teachers’ skills and students’ needs.
Established
    
5. Leading teachers with strong principals
Recruitment criteria for school principals are high and practiced stringently. 
However, the qualifications vary across districts. Principals in Shanghai participate 
in various leadership programs, based on the “Professional Standards for Basic 
Education Principals,” over the course of their tenure. Part of their remuneration is 
linked to the overall performance of their schools. Principals play an instrumental 
role in designing instruction and monitoring and evaluating teaching activities 
within their schools. They have substantial autonomy in decisions related to 
pedagogic practices and teacher management, such as hiring and rewarding 
teachers.
Established
    
6. Monitoring teaching and learning
Adequate data on student learning outcomes are available to inform teaching 
and policy. Results from a series of formative and summative student 
assessments serve a diagnostic purpose, encouraging teachers to identify areas 
of improvement in instructional practice, as well as helping schools analyze their 
teachers’ existing strengths and weaknesses to tailor professional development 
opportunities. Based on the State Council’s 2012 “Advice on Strengthening the 
Teaching Force,” teacher performance is monitored comprehensively through 
multiple mechanisms, and not solely on the basis of students’ academic 
performance. Frequent district-level inspections of teachers’ work and classroom 
observations by senior teachers and principals are some of the common 
monitoring and evaluation processes.
Advanced
    
7. Supporting teachers to improve instruction
New teachers are required to complete at least 360 hours of professional 
development within the first five years of service, and an additional 540 hours to 
be considered for a senior rank. Professional development is a substantial part of 
schools’ operational expenditures. Professional development activities are 
designed to be collaborative and to pay particular attention to instructional 
improvement. School leaders are responsible for creating targeted teacher 
training plans based on the evaluation results for each teacher. Weak and 
inexperienced teachers are paired with high-performing and experienced ones. 
Teaching-research groups and lesson observations are two common and 
successful practices. However, compared with other countries (Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, and Singapore) the required number of professional 
development hours in Shanghai is low.
Established
    
8. Motivating teachers to perform better
Promotion opportunities are linked to performance. The “Guidelines for Regular 
Accreditation of Primary and Secondary Teachers” require teachers to be 
accredited once every five years to continue teaching. According to the Teachers 
Law of the PRC, teachers can be dismissed for misconduct, child abuse, and poor 
performance. A small proportion of teacher pay is also linked to workload and 
performance. Further research is required on the relationship between the 
teaching career ladder and the performance pay system in Shanghai.
Established
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Policy domain Policy goals Status
Financing 
Education for 
Quality and 
Equity
1. Ensuring basic conditions for learning
Detailed policies and regulations are in place to ensure basic educational inputs 
of infrastructure, learning materials, teacher qualifications, and staffing norms. 
However, in practice, disparities are evident across public and private, and city 
and rural schools. With regard to completion, progression, and knowledge and 
skills, the city has a well-established set of learning goals for basic education.
Advanced
   
2. Monitoring and evaluating learning conditions and outcomes
Both the school environment and teaching-learning outcomes are closely 
monitored. School- and district-level data are collected and compiled by the 
municipality annually. However, Shanghai needs to improve its use of 
information technology in collecting school data. The “Green Indicators of 
Academic Quality of Primary and Secondary School Students,” in place since 
2011, annually assess school quality holistically, including learning motivation, 
academic burden, and student-teacher relationships.
Established
    
3. Overseeing service delivery
Shanghai has established a city-level system to track effective school days and 
mechanisms to monitor the availability of learning materials and physical 
resources at schools. Shanghai has an established mechanism to verify teacher 
attendance as well as the need for substitute teachers in case of absences.
Established
    
4. Budgeting with adequate and transparent information
The “Provision on Budget Management for Institutions” under Shanghai Municipal 
Education Commission specifies the criteria for education funding. Education 
budgeting is underpinned by adequate and transparent information that is made 
available to the public. Mechanisms are in place to collect data at the school and 
district levels to support future budget planning with specific requirements.
Established
    
5. Providing more resources to students in need
Shanghai has specific policies to assist students from disadvantaged 
backgrounds with education expenses, such as free school meals for migrant 
children and students from families below the poverty line, and education 
subsidies to students with disabilities or economic hardships. However, 
“disadvantaged” students are required to update their status every year. 
Underperforming schools are being supported through innovative programs 
such as “entrusted management.” Greater efforts need to be made to improve 
opportunities for migrant children and students with disabilities.
Established
    
6. Managing resources efficiently
Systems are in place to verify the use of educational resources, but coverage can 
be expanded. Under the “Regulations on Primary and Secondary School Finance,” 
schools in Shanghai have to use allocated funding within the defined categories 
and submit detailed expenditure reports. Internal (school-level) and external 
(Municipal and District Audit Offices) audits are carried out to verify the use of 
resources. Schools that fail internal or external audits receive legal sanctions.
Advanced
    
Balancing 
Autonomy and 
Accountability
1. Level of autonomy in planning and management of the school budget
Budget planning is a collaborative and multistep process involving schools. After 
receiving the budget approved by the district Department of Finance and the 
municipal government, schools have the autonomy to execute the budget 
under defined categories. Schools have limited influence on teachers’ base pay 
scale, which is set at the municipal level, but they do have autonomy in 
determining the allocation of performance pay. Schools tend to have relatively 
more say in determining the salaries of nonteaching staff. Compared with private 
schools, public schools tend to have less autonomy, particularly in their ability 
to raise funds.
Established
    
table continues next page
Table A.1 Shanghai’s Status under SABER Policy Goals (continued)
148 Summary of Shanghai’s Basic Education Policy Environment by the World Bank–SABER Policy Framework
How Shanghai Does It • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-4648-0790-9
Policy domain Policy goals Status
2. Level of autonomy in personnel management
Districts in Shanghai vary in the degree of school-level autonomy for appointing 
and dismissing teachers. The authority to hire is significantly greater than the 
authority to dismiss. The hiring and deployment process for nonteaching staff is 
relatively more flexible. Shanghai has no uniform municipal-level policy on the 
appointment and deployment of principals, but districts have the authority to 
establish their own processes.
Established
    
3. Role of the school council in school governance
Public schools are not mandated to have school councils but follow the “school 
principal responsibility system,” whereby principals make key decisions, usually in 
consultation with the party secretaries and increasingly in consultation with the 
teacher staff association.
Private schools in Shanghai, by law, are required to establish “school boards” 
that have wider representation. Although the board participates in decision 
making about general planning and budgeting, it is generally not involved in 
professional matters concerning teaching and learning. Parent-teacher 
associations have existed since 2012, but their role is confined to supporting 
basic school management tasks and home education of children. There is no 
city-level policy, guideline, or manual regulating the participation of the 
community or the school council in school activities and learning inputs.
Emerging
    
4. School and student assessment
A well-established and frequently administered system of formative and 
summative assessments in schools is used to regularly inform teaching practices 
and make necessary adjustments. Citywide and nationwide standardized 
assessments are conducted annually, most prominently at the end of ninth grade 
and twelfth grade. The data from these assessments help policy makers track 
trends in student learning outcomes.
Established
    
5. School accountability
Clear city- and district-level guidelines govern the use of results from student 
assessments. However, the data, details of which are often not made public, 
could be more effectively analyzed. Schools in Shanghai have to strictly comply 
with the national “Elementary and Secondary School Finance Policy,” which lays 
out detailed rules for the management of budget, revenue, expenditure, surplus, 
and capital assets. Failure to comply leads to legal sanctions. Policy guidelines are 
in place for regulating financial management and transparency standards in 
private schools. However, there are no explicit policies and mechanisms for 
learning accountability toward stakeholders in the form of public forums. 
Communities and parents tend to explicitly entrust education professionals with 
the management of professional affairs and education institutions.
Emerging
    
Creating an 
Effective 
Student 
Assessment 
System
1. Classroom assessment (Enabling context, System alignment, and 
Assessment quality)
In 2013 the Shanghai Municipal Education Commission released “Advice on 
Curriculum-Standards-Based Teaching and Assessments at the Primary School 
Level” to instruct teachers on carrying out teaching activities and assessments in 
accordance with the curriculum standards. Classroom assessment is a core aspect 
of a teacher’s professional development and performance evaluation.
Established
    
2. Examinations—lower secondary graduation (Enabling context, System 
alignment, and Assessment quality)
The zhong kao exams at the end of ninth grade provide the selection criterion for 
high school entrance, and are indicative of the overall status of the basic 
education system. Formal policy documents authorize and guide the processes 
of this exam, and the municipal government allocates regular funding and the
Established
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necessary human resources. Based on the 2009 “Advice on Designing Lower 
Secondary School Graduation Examination in Shanghai,” a systematic method is 
used to select and organize teachers for the design and scoring of zhong kao, as 
well as to maintain standards of quality and fairness. 
3. Examinations—senior secondary graduation (Enabling context, System 
alignment, and Assessment quality)
Gao kao is a high-stakes competitive exam that determines college entrance for 
twelfth grade graduates. The exam is based on the national curriculum guidelines 
and standards. The National Examination Center takes the lead in designing the 
national gao kao, and province-specific gao kao questions are developed by 
provincial-level gao kao committees. Funding for gao kao preparation and 
implementation is a regular component of local education expenditures under 
the 2014 “Regulations on Tertiary Institutions Admission.” The gao kao 
undergoes a rigorous quality assurance procedure, including internal and 
external review, external certification, pilot, and translation verification. The 
passing rates of the exam are closely monitored by oversight committees and 
expert review groups. 
Advanced
    
4. National large-scale assessment (Enabling context, System alignment, and 
Assessment quality)
The State Council formally rolled out the Plan for National Compulsory Education 
Quality Monitoring in April 2015. The plan outlines an annual sample-based 
assessment in two different subject areas for fourth- and eighth-grade students, 
and covers six main subject areas (Chinese, mathematics, science, physical 
education, art, and moral education) over a three-year period. The assessment 
was first administered on a nationwide basis in 2015. In addition, children in 
Shanghai are annually assessed on a relatively more holistic set of indicators 
(“Green Indicators of Academic Quality of Primary and Secondary School 
Students”) launched by the Shanghai Educational Commission in 2011. To 
alleviate the fear that parents and children have of gao kao and zhong kao, 
Shanghai is currently piloting reforms to both tests and will roll out a revised and 
more flexible format in 2017–18. 
Established
    
5. International assessment (Enabling context, System alignment, and 
Assessment quality)
In both 2009 and 2012, the city participated in the Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA). Although the performance of students in Shanghai 
on PISA has been outstanding as a result of its cutting-edge provisions for 
ensuring an enabling environment for conducting international evaluation, the 
city’s performance with regard to professional development of teachers and 
postevaluation use of the PISA assessment data is rated “established,” not 
“advanced.”
Established
    
Note: PRC = People’s Republic of China; SABER = Systems Approach for Better Educational Results. 
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